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THESIS SUMMARY 
 
 
The United Kingdom‘s Department for International Development (DFID) has undertaken a 
highly innovative development strategy in Sierra Leone, reforming the security sector of the 
post-conflict state in order to ensure a stable environment in which investment and 
development can occur. Yet in doing so, DFID has not engaged with the actual locus of 
security provision in Sierra Leone and the effectiveness of reforms thus remains limited. This 
thesis seeks to understand why DFID has been unable to engage with informal security actors 
in its security sector reform (SSR) programme in Sierra Leone.  
 
Informal security actors are the dominant providers of policing and justice in Sierra Leone, 
with approximately 80 per cent of the population relying upon their services. Despite this, 
however, this thesis illustrates that DFID‘s bureaucratic and political nature produce 
particular understandings of security and the causes of war that focus overwhelmingly on 
state capacity and security provision. As a result, DFID engages with only state security 
providers and state failure aspects of the causes of war. Ultimately, this approach limits the 
ability of DFID‘s SSR programme to comprehensively address the causes of conflict and 
sustainably transform security provision in Sierra Leone. These limitations must be overcome 
if DFID is to remain at the forefront of SSR policy and practice. 
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Introduction 
 
In the car park next to a disused swimming pool in the United Kingdom Department for 
International Development‘s (DFID) Freetown compound, white four-wheel drives pass in 
and out of fortified gates. Sierra Leone‘s eleven year civil war, which left 10,000 amputees, 
35,000 orphans, and which partly had its roots in a dilapidated education system, might lead 
you to assume that the 4WDs were carrying medical supplies or returning from visiting 
schools upcountry.1 In fact, until 2009, DFID‘s projects in Sierra Leone focused 
overwhelmingly on the police, military, intelligence service and judicial system. Its funding 
more frequently supported the provision of uniforms, training in teargas and baton use, 
supplementing the salaries of judges and lawyers to deter them from private practice and 
building living quarters for the armed forces. Such work is indicative of the changing nature 
of development assistance, from being concerned primarily with education, healthcare and 
human rights up until the 1990s, to focusing increasingly on security since the end of the 
twentieth century.
2
 Security, DFID policy and practice suggests, is a prerequisite for more 
traditional development.
3
 As a result of this purported security-development nexus, 
‗programming in what traditionally were two discrete sectors is increasingly meshing.‘4 
Furthermore, this cosier relationship between security and development seems set to continue 
for the foreseeable future, with DFID spending under David Cameron‘s coalition government 
focusing on security in conflict and post-conflict countries.
5
 
 
This more proximate relationship between the concepts of security and development has 
combined with a zeal for social-engineering, resulting in a proliferation of peacebuilding 
interventions that aim to recreate societies that will supposedly ensure a more peaceful world 
order.6 As Francis Fukuyama notes, ‗the ability to shore up or create from whole cloth 
                                                 
1United Nations Children‘s Fund, ―At a Glance: Sierra Leone,‖ 
http://www.unicef.org/infobycountry/sierraleone_statistics.html, accessed 31 August, 2010. 
2
 Mark Duffield, Global Governance and the New Wars (London: Zed Books, 2001). 
3
 DFID, ―Eliminating World Poverty: Making globalisation work for the poor,‖ White Paper, December 2000; 
DFID, ―Poverty and the Security Sector‖ (London: DFID, 1998).  
4
 Agnes Hurwitz and Gordon Peake, ―Strengthening the Security-Development Nexus: Assessing International 
Policy and Practice Since the 1990s,‖ Conference Report, International Peace Academy, April 2004, 1. 
5
 BBC News, ―UK to spend £1bn on ‗war‘ nations,‖ 6 July, 2009; Nicholas Watt, ―Protests as UK security put at 
heart of government‘s aid policy,‖ The Guardian, 29 August 2010. 
6
 Roland Paris notes the ‗growth industry‘ that post-conflict peacebuilding developed into through the 1990s, 
with 14 large-scale interventions in post-conflict countries (more took place if interventions are broadened to 
states not emerging from conflict). See Roland Paris, At War‘s End: Building peace after civil conflict 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004), 3-4. 
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missing state capabilities and institutions has risen to the top of the global agenda and seems 
likely to be a major condition for security in important parts of the world.‘7 Out of this agenda 
new development strategies and programmes have been innovated. Central among them is 
security sector reform (SSR), involving the restructuring of the security apparatus to ensure 
democratic security governance in post-conflict and fragile states.8 The rationale underpinning 
SSR is that a well functioning, disciplined and democratically controlled security sector will 
provide a secure environment in which investment and development can occur in a 
sustainable manner.9 With these goals in mind, programmes have since been implemented in 
places such as Haiti, the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC), Kosovo, Timor-Leste, 
Iraq, Afghanistan, Liberia and Sierra Leone.  
 
DFID has become a lead innovator in SSR programming, coining the term in 1997 and 
partnering with the Ministry of Defence (MoD) and Foreign and Commonwealth Office 
(FCO) to provide ‗joined-up‘ and sector-wide reforms in post-conflict and fragile states. Of 
particular note has been DFID‘s SSR programme in Sierra Leone, largely perceived to be the 
most comprehensive and successful SSR project to date and thus occupying somewhat of an 
archetypal status in international peacebuilding circles.10 Yet interestingly, DFID‘s reforms 
have often not engaged with the actual locus of security provision in Sierra Leone. In focusing 
overwhelmingly on state security providers, DFID‘s SSR programme leaves untouched and 
unreformed the plethora of informal security actors that constitute the predominant policing 
and justice providers in Sierra Leone. This means that the SSR programme is having only a 
limited impact on the quality of security provided in post-conflict Sierra Leone. A lack of 
engagement with informal security actors also leaves contributing causes of the war 
unaddressed, suggesting that DFID has either only partially understood, or chosen not to 
engage with the full gambit of the causes of conflict in Sierra Leone. Understanding the 
causes and consequences of this lack of engagement with informal actors is the aim of this 
                                                 
7
 Francis Fukuyama, State-Building: Governance and World Order in the 21st Century (Ithaca, NY: Cornell 
University Press, 2004), xi-xii. 
8
 Timothy Donais, ―Inclusion or Exclusion? Local Ownership and Security Sector Reform,‖ Studies in Social 
Justice 3, no. 1 (2009): 118. 
9
 Alan Bryden, Boubacar N‘Diaye and ‗Funmi Olonisakin, ―Understanding the Security Challenges of Security 
Sector Governance in West Africa,‖ in Understanding the Security Challenges of Security Sector Governance in 
West Africa, eds. Alan Bryden, Boubacar N'Diaye and ‗Funmi Olonisakin (Berlin: Lit Verlag, 2008), 4. 
10
 ‗Funmi Olonisakin, Peacekeeping in Sierra Leone: The story of UNAMSIL (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 
2008), 1-3; United Nations Security Council, ―Security Council Presidential Statement Emphasises Security 
Sector Reform Essential Element of Post-Conflict Stabilisation, Reconstruction,‖ 5889th and 5890th Meetings, 
12 May, 2008, http://www.un.org/News/Press/docs/2008/sc9327.doc.htm, accessed 10 August, 2010; Adrian 
Horn and ‗Funmi Olonisakin with Gordon Peake, ―UK-led Security Sector Reform in Sierra Leone,‖ in 
Managing Insecurity, eds. Gordon Peake, Eric Scheye and Alice Hills (London: Routledge, 2008), 23. 
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thesis. 
 
Research questions 
This project began with an interest in the efficacy of DFID‘s SSR programme in providing 
improved security for Sierra Leoneans. Improved security is now recognised as being 
dependent on addressing the causes of civil war.11 In Sierra Leone, contrary to popular 
understandings, conflict was triggered as much by failures of informal systems of governance, 
such as chieftaincy and patrimonialism, as by failures of state government. This led to a more 
detailed consideration within the project of informal governance practices, with a particular 
focus on the chieftaincy system, given its unique strength and longevity in Sierra Leone and 
by extension the secret societies that support or are closely related to chieftaincy. It became 
increasingly apparent that important aspects of security - principally policing and justice 
functions - were administered to the majority of the Sierra Leonean population by such 
informal actors. Any attempts to comprehensively address the causes of conflict and to 
transform the nature of security provision in Sierra Leone would therefore have to engage 
with these informal actors. 
 
From this problematic the following research question emerged that structures this thesis: 
What limits DFID‘s ability to engage with informal security actors in its security sector 
reform programme in Sierra Leone. While an evolution towards greater engagement is 
apparent within DFID‘s policy and projects, overwhelmingly DFID has not engaged with 
informal actors. DFID‘s seeming inability to engage with informal actors can be explained by 
its understanding of the concept of security, which is linked to its concept of the state, both of 
which are determined by the organisation‘s bureaucratic nature and political mandate. This 
bureaucratic nature and political mandate provide DFID with a particular vision of the state 
and security that lead to an understanding of the causes of war as rooted in state failure. As a 
result, this viewpoint leads to an overwhelming focus in DFID‘s post-conflict SSR response 
on reforming formal state institutions. This ‗DFID view‘ is contrasted throughout the thesis 
with a ‗thicker‘12 understanding of security in Sierra Leone, embedded in equally ‗thick‘ 
understandings of governance, that locate the causes of conflict in not only state failure, but 
also failure of informal actors. This thicker approach suggests that comprehensively 
                                                 
11
 Mark White, ―The Security and Development Nexus: A Case Study of Sierra Leone 2004-2006,‖ Paper No. 4, 
Security System Transformation in Sierra Leone, 1997-2007, October 2008, 3. 
12
 Clifford Geertz, The Interpretation of Cultures (London: Hutchinson, 1975). 
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addressing the causes of conflict and sustainably transforming security would also require 
reform of informal institutions. Without being able to account for this thicker understanding, 
the success of DFID‘s SSR programme in Sierra Leone will be limited. Thus ultimately, it is 
DFID‘s bureaucratic and political character that prevent it from engaging with informal 
security actors and, by extension, from more successfully reaching the goals of addressing the 
causes of conflict and transforming security provision it has set itself.  
 
The pertinence of these enquiries is demonstrated by the status that Sierra Leone holds as a 
successful case of SSR; that DFID holds as a leading SSR donor; and the challenges that 
informal security actors pose to post-conflict recovery efforts globally. Sierra Leone is 
considered within the international community to be the most comprehensive and successful 
SSR programme to date, with projects being adapted from the Sierra Leonean experience to 
other contexts.
13
 Given the status that SSR in Sierra Leone has achieved as something of an 
archetype for sector-wide reform through a ‗whole of government‘ approach, some of this 
analysis will have transferability beyond this particular context. For instance, the Family 
Support Units, discussed in chapter three have since been adapted and included in SSR 
programmes in Liberia and the Democratic Republic of the Congo, and thus the analysis here 
will be of interest in these contexts as well. 
 
DFID has been at the forefront of SSR policy and has now been involved in SSR 
programming for over a decade. It has conducted one of the most comprehensive SSR 
programmes as a single donor, incorporating restructuring, recruitment and retraining of the 
Republic of Sierra Leone Armed Forces and Sierra Leone Police, the revitalisation of the 
Central Intelligence and Security Unit, reform of the judiciary and penal system, training of 
Parliamentary oversight committees and the Anticorruption Commission and the 
establishment of the Office for National Security, to provide sector-wide coordination of the 
security apparatus. These reforms have been ongoing over almost fourteen years, with police 
reform commencing in 1997, and the Justice Sector Development Programme to be wound 
down in 2011. DFID represents the most successful SSR programmer to date. It is widely 
accepted that DFID‘s efforts in Sierra Leone have contributed to a more stable and secure 
                                                 
13
 Olonisakin, Peacekeeping in Sierra Leone, 1-3; United Nations Security Council, ―Security Council 
Presidential Statement Emphasises Security Sector Reform Essential Element of Post-Conflict Stabilisation, 
Reconstruction.‖ 
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post-conflict environment.
14
 With great respect for this achievement, this thesis critiques 
DFID‘s SSR programme precisely because it has been so successful.15 By seeking to explain 
the organisational limitations of the most impressive SSR donor, this thesis may further the 
ability of SSR to better address causes of conflict and sustainably transform security provision 
in fragile and post-conflict states.   
 
While some in the security studies literature might discount the importance of informal 
security actors,16 increasing attention is now being paid to these actors given the challenges 
they pose to post-conflict recovery in many fragile security contexts, such as Afghanistan, 
Timor-Leste and Somalia.17 Given the emphasis placed upon local ownership and the need for 
greater recognition of context in the literature on peacebuilding operations, confronting 
challenges such as that posed by informal security actors is important in improving the ability 
(or indeed questioning the ability) of peacebuilders to achieve their goals of socially-
engineered states.18 An investigation into the ability of DFID – a leading SSR actor – to 
engage with informal security actors, who represent an important obstacle to DFID‘s social 
engineering plans in the context of Sierra Leone, is thus pertinent and timely. 
 
Contribution to the literature 
This thesis sits at the intersection of three literatures, drawing on and contributing to each: 
peacebuilding (specifically security sector reform); the civil war in Sierra Leone; and the role 
of informal actors (also referred to as non-state actors and twilight institutions). These three 
fields of study have each garnered substantial academic attention in their own right and the 
contribution made to each of them requires elaboration.  
                                                 
14
 Peter Albrecht and Paul Jackson, Security System Transformation in Sierra Leone, 1997-2007 (Birmingham: 
Global Facilitation Network for Security Sector Reform, Birmingham University, 2009), 147-148; Olonisakin, 
Peacekeeping in Sierra Leone. 
15
 Of course, other donors, such as the United Nations, World Bank and European Community – to name a few – 
are also active in Sierra Leone. However, their support is largely dwarfed by the role taken by DFID. DFID is 
frequently pointed to as the lead donor in Sierra Leone, particularly in relation to SSR, and it has undertaken 
substantial efforts to transform this image to one of burden-sharing through partnership. Its leadership role, 
however, makes it the most relevant donor to examine in the Sierra Leonean context. Author interviews with 
DFID Sierra Leone staff, February – April 2009. 
16
 See, for instance, Ian Loader and Neil Walker, Civilising Security (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
2007). 
17
 Peake, Scheye and Hills, Managing Insecurity; Mark Sedra, ―Security Sector Reform in Afghanistan: An 
Instrument of the State-Building Project,‖ in Fragile States and Insecure People? Violence, Security and 
Statehood in the Twenty-First Century, eds. Louise Andersen, Björn Möller and Finn Stepputat (New York, NY: 
Palgrave Macmillan, 2007); Ken Menkhaus, ―Local Security Systems in Somali East Africa,‖ in  Fragile States 
and Insecure People? Violence, Security and Statehood in the Twenty-First Century, eds. Louise Andersen, 
Björn Möller and Finn Stepputat (New York, NY: Palgrave Macmillan, 2007). 
18
 Mats Berdal, Building Peace After War (Abingdon: Routledge, 2009).  
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Peacebuilding and Security Sector Reform 
Literature on security sector reform, while scarce a few years ago, has burgeoned into a 
recognisable sub-field of the much broader literature on post-conflict peacebuilding. Early 
contributions from Nicole Ball and researchers at the Geneva Centre for the Democratic 
Control of Armed Forces focused on the practicalities of how to implement reforms in a 
highly technocratic manner.19 The research agenda has since deepened, with more attention 
paid to local ownership and context.20 There have also been some efforts to focus specifically 
on SSR in Sierra Leone.21 Overwhelmingly, however, these works have recounted the process 
of reform, rather than critiquing the nature of the reforms themselves. This has, of course, 
been invaluable in providing a record of what was a highly innovative development 
programme. However, the works provide less by way of critique of DFID‘s SSR programme, 
and thus do not sufficiently question some of the choices, assumptions or practices that are 
now informing SSR programmes across the globe. This thesis seeks to rectify this lacuna in 
the literature by focusing on one particular under-examined challenge that limits the ability of 
DFID to recreate Sierra Leone‘s security sector according to democratic civil-military 
relations models. 
 
The contribution made here, however, goes beyond simply indicating that security provision 
is broader than the state in Sierra Leone and that therefore DFID‘s SSR programme needs to 
engage with informal actors. In reinforcing the importance of such engagement through a 
‗thick‘ understanding of the causes of war and nature of security, the thesis also contributes to 
the SSR and peacebuilding literature by revealing the limitations of a key donor to perceive 
the complexity that characterises the security architecture in Sierra Leone. While these 
findings are specific to DFID in Sierra Leone, the insight is relevant to other donors working 
in fragile and post-conflict settings and points to the need for further research into the 
workings of donor organisations themselves. Given the reams of literature that ‗wag 
admonishing fingers‘22 at the inefficiencies of the aid industry, this thesis further contributes 
                                                 
19
 Nicole Ball, Reforming the Security Sector: Policy Options for the British Government (London: Saferworld, 
1998). 
20
 See, for instance, Laurie Nathan, No Ownership, No Commitment: A Guide to Local Ownership of Security 
Sector Reform (Birmingham: University of Birmingham, October 2007); Donais, ―Inclusion or Exclusion?‖; 
Sedra, ―Security Sector Reform in Afghanistan‖; and Osman Gbla, ―Security Sector Reform Under International 
Tutelage in Sierra Leone,‖ International Peacekeeping 13, no. 1 (2008): 78-93.  
21
See Albrecht and Jackson, Security System Transformation in Sierra Leone; Gbla, ―Security Sector Reform 
Under International Tutelage in Sierra Leone‖; and Michael S. Kargbo, British Foreign Policy and Conflict in 
Sierra Leone, 1991-2001 (Bern: Peter Lang, 2006). 
22
 Ben Ramalingam and Michael Barnett, ―The Humanitarian‘s Dilemma: Collective action or inaction in 
international relief?,‖ Background Note, Overseas Development Institute, August 2010, 2. 
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to the peacebuilding literature by suggesting that fruitful examination of this issue requires 
investigation into the internal workings of donors, through which their view of the world in 
which they work is refracted.
23
  
 
Causes of the conflict in Sierra Leone 
The commitment to ‗thick‘ analysis within this thesis also has implications for understanding 
the causes of conflict in Sierra Leone. Whilst DFID‘s ‗thin‘ approach to the causes of war 
locates failure merely at the level of the state, a thick approach suggests that failures of 
informal actors were also a cause of the conflict. Therefore, in order to comprehensively 
address conflict causes and establish a sustainable peace, DFID needs to engage with a 
broader range of actors than simply the formal state. There has been no attempt in the 
literature to link DFID‘s SSR programme in Sierra Leone to their understanding of the causes 
of war. This is surprising given that one of the aims of the SSR programme is to address the 
weaknesses that allowed conflict to occur,
24
 suggesting that DFID‘s understanding of the 
causes of conflict is important in formulating its SSR strategy. This thesis seeks to rectify this 
oversight. If SSR is being employed by DFID as the most comprehensive post-conflict 
peacebuilding strategy in Sierra Leone, and post-conflict peacebuilding is characterised as 
attempting to address the causes of conflict in order to build a sustainable peace, then how 
DFID understands the causes of conflict becomes crucial.  
 
Despite popular perceptions (supported by some scholars)
25
 that the war in Sierra Leone was 
centrally about diamonds, there has in fact been substantial debate over the causes of conflict. 
Early interpretations included Robert Kaplan‘s ‗new barbarism‘ thesis, articulated in a 1994 
article in the Atlantic Monthly. It claimed that conflict in Sierra Leone, and throughout Africa 
more generally, was suggestive of a reversion to ‗underlying primitivisms that are part of 
these cultures‘.26 According to Kaplan, African civil wars possess ‗less and less politics‘ and 
are largely criminally motivated, and therefore are not open to resolution through 
                                                 
23
 Pursuing a similar agenda through highlighting the different frames through which organisations view conflict 
in relation to operations in the Democratic Republic of Congo, is  Severine Autesserre, ―Hobbes and the Congo: 
Frames, Local Violence, and International Intervention,‖ International Organization 63 (2009): 249-280. 
24
 DFID, ―The Causes of Conflict in sub-Saharan Africa‖ (London: DFID, FCO and MoD, October 2001). 
25
 Paul Collier, ―Economic Causes of Civil Conflict and Their Implications for Policy‖, in Turbulent Peace: The 
challenge of managing international conflict, eds. Chester A. Crocker, Fen Osler Hampson and Pamela Aall 
(Washington: United States Institute of Peace, 2001); Ian Smillie, Lansana Gberie and Ralph Hazleton, The 
Heart of the Matter: Sierra Leone, Diamonds and Human Security (Ottawa: Partnership Africa Canada, 2000). 
26
 Robert D. Kaplan, ―The Coming Anarchy,‖ Atlantic Monthly (February 1994): 44-76.  
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conventional diplomatic means.27 Responding to Kaplan‘s work, Paul Richards explains that 
‗lacking any Cold War roots, or evident religious or ethnic dimensions, but possessing a high 
quotient of apparently bizarre and random acts of violence, many perpetrated by children, this 
conflict is cited by Kaplan as a prime instance of the New Barbarism.‘28 Kaplan‘s view, 
widely publicised within the American government,29 was later trumped by arguments, made 
principally by former-World Bank economist Paul Collier, that the conflict was centrally 
about diamonds. He argues: 
 
The risk of civil war has been systematically related to a few economic conditions, such as 
dependence upon primary commodity exports and low national income. Conversely, and 
astonishingly, objective measures of social grievance, such as inequality, a lack of democracy, 
and ethnic and religious divisions, have had no systematic effect on risk. I argue that this is 
because civil wars occur where rebel organisations are financially viable.30 
 
Collier‘s position was supported by the Sierra Leonean Ambassador to the United Nations at 
the time, who insisted that ‗the conflict was not about ideology, tribal or regional differences. 
It had nothing to do with the so-called problem of marginalised youths, or ... an uprising by 
rural poor against the urban elite. The root of the conflict was and remained diamonds.‘31 Yet 
as Krijn Peters points out, this argument does not account for the fact that the civil war was 
waged for several years without substantial diamond income and that while the conflict might 
be renowned as an example of war motivated by greed, real grievances are in fact perceptible 
in the motivations many former Revolutionary United Front (RUF) participants cite as their 
reasons for joining.32 
 
Paul Richards has produced perhaps the most thoroughly researched account of Sierra 
Leone‘s violence, arguing that its roots are located in systems of injustice and poor 
governance provided by the central government, as well as the systems of patrimonialism 
enforced by chiefs, elders and ‗big men‘ in the provinces.33 This work has been largely 
supported by that of Krijn Peters, Richard Fanthorpe, Paul Jackson, Tunde Zack-Williams and 
                                                 
27
 Ibid. 
28
 Paul Richards, Fighting for the Rainforest (London: James Currey, 1996), xv. 
29
 S. Bradshaw, ―The Coming Chaos?,‖ Moving Pictures Bulletin 25 (February 1996): 18-19. 
30
 Collier, ―Economic Causes of Civil Conflict,‖ 143. 
31
 Quoted in Angela McIntyre, Emmanuel Kwesi Aning and Prosper Nii Nortey Addo, ―Politics, War and Youth 
Culture in Sierra Leone,‖ African Security Review 11, no. 3 (2002): 12. 
32
 Krijn Peters, ―Footpaths to Reintegration: Armed Conflict, Youth and the Rural Crisis in Sierra Leone,‖ (PhD 
diss., Wageningen University, 2006), 7. 
33
 Paul Richards, ―Agrarian Underpinnings of the Sierra Leone Conflict,‖ in Violence, Political Culture and 
Development in Africa, ed. Preben Kaarsholm (Oxford: James Currey, 2006), 192-194. 
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often informs reports of organisations working within Sierra Leone, including the Truth and 
Reconciliation Commission.34 It is elaborated in this thesis as the most convincing account of 
the causes of conflict in Sierra Leone, offering the fullest explanation of the violence that took 
place and consistent with findings in interviews with former combatants, as well as 
representatives of government, the security sector and civil society. In this thesis, I draw upon 
Richards‘ work and through it demonstrate a key limitation of DFID‘s SSR programme: that 
is, its lack of engagement with the full spectrum of security actors. By examining the 
implications of the understanding of the causes of war for DFID‗s SSR programme, this thesis 
contributes to the literature surrounding the causes of war in Sierra Leone and highlights the 
ongoing relevance of the debate. 
 
Informal actors 
The third body of literature that the thesis is embedded in relates to the role of informal 
institutions in governance and security in fragile states. This research agenda has been 
pursued most vigorously at the Danish Institute for International Studies (DIIS) with key 
contributions from Finn Stepputat, Lars Buur, Bjørn Møller, Helene Kyed and Louise 
Andersen.35 As Helene Kyed and Lars Buur note, traditional leaders often carry out ‗state 
functions in local political settings, such as dispensing justice, collecting rent, and policing.‘36 
Christian Lund has employed the concept of ‗twilight institutions‘ to refer to those 
governance entities that exist beyond the state and yet carry out what are conventionally 
understood as state functions. He suggests that:  
 
when we approach the phenomenon of public authority and governance, it is useful not to see 
it as stemming from one single source, but rather to focus on how particular issues (security, 
justice, development, taxation and others) are governed and which actors are engaged in 
them.37 
 
The focus on informal actors adopted within the thesis also provides an implicit critique of 
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peacebuiling as state building. As Andersen, Møller and Stepputat suggest, ‗by virtue of the 
real life alternatives to state authority and state legitimacy ... [fragile states] present, they 
force us to rethink and explore the limits of the normative state model that is underpinning 
most of the current discussion about order and disorder in the global system.‘38 While 
peacebuilding is conceptually a broader category than state building (which may fall within 
its remit), increasingly peacebuilding has been operationalised through efforts to strengthen 
the state, as becomes clear through an examination of DFID‘s SSR programme in Sierra 
Leone.
39
 Andersen, Møller and Stepputat explain: 
 
The shift toward state-building discourse ... highlights that the establishment of efficient and 
legitimate national institutions are increasingly seen as pivotal. To overcome problems of 
violent conflict and poverty, societies need to build a state that is capable and responsible as 
well as effective and just.40 
 
This state building approach to building peace overlooks the important roles that non-state 
actors play within governance and security provision in many fragile states, particularly in 
Africa.41 Giving greater consideration to ‗everyday‘ governance42 and security provides a 
more accurate account of authority and service delivery practices which require reform to 
build a sustainable peace. Informal security actors are an often overlooked feature of the 
security matrix in Sierra Leone. Despite the prevalence of these actors, increasingly 
recognised in donor reports,
43
 few scholars have devoted substantial attention to them. The 
notable exception to this trend is Bruce Baker, who has written extensively on informal 
policing actors in Sierra Leone (and elsewhere).44 His work has been invaluable as a starting 
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point for this thesis, but does not link these actors to understandings of the causes of war or to 
SSR efforts. Understanding the importance of informal security actors in establishing 
sustainable peace through SSR therefore represents a new approach within the literature on 
informal actors.  
 
While focusing specifically on the case of DFID in Sierra Leone, the thesis speaks more 
generally to the need to understand conflict within its particular cultural context and to 
understand the provision of security (and governance more broadly) from an experiential and 
bottom-up perspective. This builds upon similar calls in other post-conflict and fragile 
contexts.
45
 In doing so we can begin to move towards a more relevant account of the 
otherwise loose and abstract categories of security and conflict, with which this thesis 
principally deals. 
 
Research methods and sources 
The importance of understanding security through a thick understanding of experience lies at 
the heart of this thesis and a sociology of practice approach is thus adopted, seeking to 
understand practices within their culturally meaningful context. James C. Scott, drawing upon 
Clifford Geertz, explains this approach as follows: 
 
Behaviour is never self-explanatory. One need cite only the famous example of a rapid closing 
and opening of a single eyelid, used by Gilbert Ryle and elaborated on by Clifford Geertz, to 
illustrate the problem. Is it a twitch or a wink? Mere observation of the physical act gives no 
clue. If it is a wink, what kind of wink is it: one of conspiracy, of ridicule, of seduction? Only 
a knowledge of the culture, the shared understandings, of the actor and his or her observers 
and confederates can begin to tell us ... It is one thing to know that landlords have raised cash 
rents for rice land; it is another to know what this behaviour means for those affected. Perhaps, 
just perhaps, tenants regard the rise in rents as reasonable and long overdue. Perhaps they 
regard the rise as oppressive and intended to drive them off the land. Perhaps opinion is 
divided. Only an inquiry into the experience of tenants, the meaning they attach to the event, 
can offer us the possibility of an answer ... A theft of grain, an apparent snub, an apparent gift 
– their import is inaccessible to us unless we can construct it from the meanings only human 
actors can provide. In this sense, we concentrate at least as much on the experience of 
behaviour as on behaviour itself, as much on history as carried in people‘s heads as on ―the 
flow of events‖.46 
 
Such a culturally-located and practice-oriented approach might seem commonsensical. Yet 
much of the literature on security, peacebuilding and SSR is glaringly abstract, focused more 
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on making neat conceptual contributions than providing empirically-grounded accounts. The 
thick practice approach adopted here is crucial to pushing security studies and the 
peacebuilding literature towards more empirically-relevant research. The methods employed 
for conducting research attempt to derive an understanding of how and why DFID reforms 
happened as they did, drawn from policy narratives and the experiences of those 
implementing the programmes, and how these reforms did or did not engage with informal 
security actors and the implications of this for addressing the causes of conflict and altering 
the experience of policing and justice for Sierra Leoneans. By so doing, the thesis aims to 
demonstrate how the causes of war, security provision and DFID‘s SSR programme have 
impacted upon the lives of Sierra Leoneans. While I emphasise practice over discourse alone, 
this is not to suggest that these two realms exist in isolation. Rather, policy can indeed have 
limiting effects on practice, but practices are also determined by a bricolage of other factors, 
including personalities, political dynamics, local conditions and so on. It is important, 
therefore, to build an understanding of DFID‘s policy narratives, and these can then be traced 
to determine what influence they have on practices, while recognising that practices will not 
be driven by policy alone.  
 
Research for the thesis begins with an analysis of DFID policy documents, which informs 
chapter one, in order to gain an understanding of the narratives DFID employs to explain the 
conflict in Sierra Leone and its SSR programme response. The goal is to understand the 
narratives informing DFID policy and thus underlying its practices in Sierra Leone. In 
examining policy documents, particular narratives of the causes of conflict in Sierra Leone 
become apparent that in turn ‗create a burden of reform‘.47 In this case, by explaining the civil 
war in state failure and security-development nexus terms, DFID legitimates a state building 
response in order to fulfil its purpose of reducing poverty (only possible, it suggests, by 
addressing the causes of conflict to create the stability needed for investments in 
development).
48
 As Roland Paris suggests, ‗the manner in which a problem is defined may 
open up certain kinds of policy responses, while foreclosing others.‘49 In an effort to construct 
a narrative of DFID policy related to Sierra Leone and SSR, a search of DFID (as well as 
some FCO and MoD) documents was undertaken, tracing programmatic choices back to their 
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implicit assumptions regarding the causes of conflict. Policy documents were selected through 
broad searches relating to ‗security‘, ‗Sierra Leone‘, ‗causes of conflict‘, ‗justice‘ and 
‗security sector reform‘. Approximately 40 policy documents, white papers, evaluation 
reports and speeches from 1997 until 2007 were examined in an effort to infer DFID‘s 
understanding of the causes of war and rationalisation of its SSR strategy (although emphasis 
was placed on the earlier documents, given that these had greater temporality to the 
programmes under investigation in Sierra Leone).  
 
A grounded-theory approach was adopted in analysing the policy documents, reading initially 
with little preconceived ideas as to what might be found.50 Arguments grew from issues raised 
or neglected in the policy documents, rather than from a preconceived interest in a particular 
theoretical standpoint. In this way, I sought for the documents to be evidence-led, rather than 
theory-led.51 On reading the documents, I was struck by particular themes or dominant 
narratives that were often consistent across them. These were then investigated further, 
making these themes or narratives the central element of research and looking for information 
specifically on these issues. For instance, searches were conducted for documents with the 
key phrases ‗non-state‘, ‗informal‘, ‗state failure‘, ‗security and development‘, as it became 
clear that these were either central or absent issues. In terms of the reliability and replicability 
of the analysis, I have attempted to observe Ted Hopf‘s litmus test, that if another analyst 
were to read the same policy documents, and were they to know of the importance of informal 
actors in Sierra Leone, they too would be struck by the absence of engagement with these 
actors in DFID‘s policy documents and the consistency with which the conflict in Sierra 
Leone was understood in state failure and security-development nexus terms.52  
 
Given my interest in understanding security through human experience, and the turn to 
practice underway in the social sciences more generally, gaining a fuller understanding of 
DFID‘s position on informal actors and the civil war required more than an analysis of 
discursive policy, but also an examination of DFID‘s programmatic practice.53 This required 
an abandonment of neat, rationalised policy statements and an engagement with the 
overwhelmingly pragmatic and often ad hoc manner in which decisions were made on the 
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ground. I do not, therefore, attempt to ascribe to these practices any more rationalising or 
forethought than was indicated by those describing the practices themselves. As Vincent 
Pouliot notes, ‗[o]ne cannot impute to practitioners a theoretical perspective that is made 
possible by looking at social action backward and from above.‘54 The emphasis on practice, 
rather, aims to illuminate the lack of conscious theorising in aspects of DFID‘s operations. 
While the thesis aims to build a picture of how DFID views the conflict in Sierra Leone and 
subsequently rationalises its SSR efforts, this in no way suggests that this view was a 
consciously orchestrated one. Rather, practices develop according to policy only to a certain 
extent, and are also influenced by a host of other factors.  Fieldwork was thus conducted to 
ensure sufficient weight was given to the more influential ‗logic of practicality.‘55    
 
I conducted 42 interviews in the United Kingdom and Sierra Leone with approximately 60 
people including DFID staff and consultants, academics, government, civil society and 
security sector representatives, chiefs, police officers, former-combatants on all sides of the 
conflict in Sierra Leone (particularly the RUF), a High Court Justice and numerous trade 
association members. The aim was twofold: to gain an understanding of how Sierra Leoneans 
access policing and justice services and to examine how DFID‘s SSR programme took place 
on the ground. Conducting interviews with both reformers and those that the reforms 
impacted allowed me to observe the reforms underway, as well as to understand why certain 
actions were undertaken and what impact these reforms had on the experience of security in 
Sierra Leone. These interviews were semi-structured in nature, allowing respondents the 
opportunity to pursue their own stories or topics of interest and affording me a broader picture 
than my own research agenda would otherwise have elicited. The interviewee net was cast 
broadly, providing a wide view of security provision in Sierra Leone (for instance, through 
interviews with trade associations that provide ‗in-house‘ policing and justice functions) and 
DFID programmes that have not been used as a case study within the thesis. While not all of 
this material could take centre stage within the thesis, the wider perspective allowed me to 
contextualise the research and ‗snowball‘ interviews that were not immediately relevant into 
others that were. These interviews complemented my secondary source research, providing an 
account of war and security in Sierra Leone informed by lived experiences of those who 
participated in the war and those who led programmes afterwards to prevent it from 
happening again. 
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The combination of policy analysis and semi-structured interviews undertaken has allowed 
for triangulation with the secondary source material, and also imbued the research project 
with greater depth, attentive to both discourse and practice. The practices examined through 
fieldwork (and set out in chapters two, three and four) act as a check on DFID‘s policy 
narratives, determining the consistency of DFID‘s approach to the informal across the policy-
practice divide. Furthermore, examination of practices through the case studies serves to 
reveal the practical problems of security provision that result from DFID‘s lack of 
engagement with informal security actors.  
 
The argument therefore builds foremost upon experiences recounted in interviews, and these 
are supplemented with my own analysis of the situation. In applying my own analysis of the 
findings here, some normative assessments are unavoidable. These normative assessments are 
as light as possible, privileging the experiences of those who live with the issues that this 
thesis addresses. However, where they do arise, my own assessments attempt to balance a 
commitment to human rights with a respect for cultural expression. I reject the ethnocentric 
presumption that the content or spirit of human rights is fundamentally a Western concept, 
although their articulation as we know them in international treaty law of course is. There is 
nothing ‗Western‘ about the desire for all women to live a healthy and safe life, or the belief 
that people should be treated equally. While the most prominent articulations of these ideas 
might, to a Western audience, be represented in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, 
non-Western concepts, such as ubuntu or Buddhism equally promote messages of equality 
and justice.
56
 Therefore while recognising that my own normative commitments inevitably 
inform the analysis, there is no reason to view these as defined by cultural difference, any 
more than by my gender, age, class, or other category. 
 
Choice of case studies  
An interest in practice naturally predisposed the thesis towards the utilisation of case studies, 
allowing for close examination of DFID programmes and security practices in Sierra Leone. 
The case studies provide a chronicle of such practices and test DFID‘s ability to engage with 
informal actors on the ground. In doing so important inconsistencies between policing and 
justice reform are revealed. These inconsistencies point to a tension within DFID‘s concept of 
security itself, central to its SSR efforts, which is also perceptible at the policy level. The 
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differences between the two case studies therefore reveal important observations about 
DFID‘s understanding of the nature of security.  
 
Of the vast array of DFID‘s reform projects in Sierra Leone, policing and justice reform were 
chosen for examination here primarily due to the high levels of involvement of informal 
actors within these security roles. It would not be particularly interesting to note that DFID 
has not engaged with informal military actors in Sierra Leone, simply because there are few 
informal actors that seek to provide military services. There are, however, a plethora of 
informal actors operating in judicial and policing capacities, and thus a lack of engagement by 
DFID with these actors is more surprising and interesting. Policing and justice are also those 
aspects of security that are most proximate and have most impact on the lives of ordinary 
citizens, in a manner that military or intelligence security do not. The case studies therefore 
attempt to deepen the analysis by highlighting that DFID‘s ability (or inability) to engage with 
informal security actors is not only manifest in aspects of policy, but also in aspects of 
practice. 
 
Sierra Leone Police Family Support Units 
The Family Support Units (FSUs), police stations set up at the end of the war to deal 
specifically with crimes involving women and children, provide an interesting case study for 
this thesis for four reasons. First, the case study aptly illustrates the argument that the UK has 
understood the conflict in Sierra Leone in state failure terms, and has thus attempted to 
rebuild state institutions (in this case, the state police), with little to no practical 
acknowledgement of the important roles played by informal security actors in policing 
women‘s behaviour. In this way, the FSU case study allows an investigation, through an 
examination of the policing services available to women in Sierra Leone, of the ability of 
DFID‘s reforms to account for the predominance of informal security actors. Second, the 
Units deal specifically with women‘s issues – a social arena in which informal actors, such as 
chiefs and secret societies, wield substantial authority in a patriarchal society such as Sierra 
Leone.57 Given DFID‘s lack of engagement with informal security actors within a 
jurisdictional field that sees a high prevalence of these very actors, the issue of engagement is 
particularly interesting in this case. 
                                                 
57
 Joe D. Alie, ―Reconciliation and Traditional Justice: Tradition-based practices of the Kpaa Mende in Sierra 
Leone,‖ in Traditional Justice and Reconciliation after Violent Conflict: Learning from African Experiences, 
eds. Luc Huyse and Mark Salter (Stockholm: International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance, 
2008), 133. 
  
17 
 
Third, the FSUs have been held up by the UK as one of the success stories of their SSR 
programme.58 They are thus viewed as one of the most successful projects within a SSR 
programme which is itself claimed to be among the most successful of its kind.59 In theory 
then, this project represents the best of the best. This is evidenced by the cooption of the FSU 
model into Liberian and DRC police reform efforts. The chapter is therefore not critiquing a 
weak project. Rather, it is evaluating one of the UK‘s self-proclaimed achievements and 
pointing to the seemingly overlooked weakness of the Units to engage with informal security 
actors. The findings are thus more useful than they would be had I chosen a case study from 
which lessons had already been learned, or which was perceived to have failed. The fact that 
this programme has been extended to other country contexts also makes the analysis 
potentially relevant further afield and in future SSR programmes. Finally, the FSUs have not, 
to date, been analysed in an academic context. Reference to them has occurred only in donor 
reports, or as an under-examined example of the success of SSR.60 As a case study the FSUs 
offer fresh material that has not yet been scrutinised and yet is widely claimed as a success.  
 
The Justice Sector Development Programme‘s Primary Justice Initiatives 
The primary justice projects
61
 of DFID‘s Justice Sector Development Programme (JSDP) 
were selected as a contrasting case study to the FSUs. Through the JSDP, DFID has 
undertaken its most extensive engagement with informal actors, through the customary justice 
system. This suggests at least some level of recognition and ability on the part of DFID to 
engage with informal security actors. It would be remiss not to examine the project in which 
DFID has made the greatest effort to engage the informal. In this way, I am examining the 
hardest case for my argument and the project that offers the greatest potential for DFID to 
engage informal security actors. However, despite DFID‘s laudable engagements with 
informal actors through the JSDP, these have been limited and at times problematic. 
Engagement with customary justice has been restricted to legal informal actors, excluding 
more dominant illegal informal security actors, such as chiefs and secret societies. 
Furthermore, reform efforts have focused upon formalising informal practices, such as 
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customary law, rather than engaging with informal practices on their own terms.  Finally, 
while the JSDP has gone further than other DFID programmes in engaging informal actors, in 
relative terms its support has still focused overwhelmingly on state judicial services, with only 
a fraction of JSDP resources devoted to primary justice. Thus while the JSDP represents a 
concerted effort to engage informal security actors, the nature of its engagements poses a 
different set of problems regarding DFID‘s approach to the informal that require examination. 
 
The JSDP case study also allows for an investigation of how DFID has brought justice 
reform, a relatively new addition to the SSR toolkit, into its ‗joined-up‘ programming in 
Sierra Leone. While justice is viewed as a part of security broadly speaking, it is also singled 
out for unique treatment both in DFID policy and practice, suggesting problematic 
integration. The case study of the JSDP thus also underscores the tensions inherent within 
DFID‘s concept of security itself, suggesting that its reform of the security sector is not as 
harmonised as the SSR concept implies. 
 
The contrast between the two case studies seeks to demonstrate the implications of DFID‘s 
inability to engage with informal security actors, as well as the divergence within DFID‘s 
supposedly ‗joined-up‘ SSR programme. Whereas in the FSU case study, engagement with 
informal actors has been severely limited (which does not appear to have impacted upon the 
presumed success of the programme and its replication in other peacebuilding contexts), such 
engagement has been most apparent in the case of justice reform, which has received 
significantly less plaudits and occupies an uncomfortable position within SSR more broadly. 
This contrast across policing and justice suggests a potential double standard within SSR that 
requires examination. 
 
Definitions 
Significant concepts within the thesis have sought, as much as possible, to ‗follow the actors‘ 
and adhere to DFID‘s own accepted definitions.62 This is in keeping with the broader 
methodology that focuses on the experiences of those involved, rather than assessing those 
experiences according to an external set of criteria or theories. This concomitantly resolves 
the dilemma that would arise were the thesis attempting to judge DFID‘s understanding of 
certain concepts by an external definition that did not accord with their own. To ensure 
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conceptual clarity throughout the thesis, three brief definitional caveats should be made at the 
outset.  
 
Security 
The concept of ‗security‘ is central to this thesis and SSR more broadly. Despite the vast 
literature that has built up around this concept within security studies,63 its usage here is 
surprisingly uncontroversial. There is a general agreement amongst SSR actors, and certainly 
within DFID, that the kind of security that SSR seeks to establish can broadly be understood 
as human security.64 Thus, I am not speaking about state security65 (although, DFID‘s SSR 
implementation is at times suggestive of such a narrow approach) or critical security66 
(although this informs aspects of human security given the changed referent object). Rather, 
the approach adopted suggests that security: 
 
has for too long been interpreted narrowly: as security of territory from external aggression, or 
as protection of national interests in foreign policy or as global security from the threat of 
nuclear holocaust ... Forgotten were the legitimate concerns of ordinary people who sought 
security in their daily lives.67 
 
In focusing on the individual as the security referent, human security aims to ensure freedom 
from want or fear, and thus encompasses a far broader range of threats than traditional 
military threat. It includes freedom from want of food, shelter, education and basic healthcare, 
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as well as freedom from fear of injustice, inequality and oppression.68 Human security does 
not aim to simply create a negative peace – characterised by the absence of violence – but 
rather a positive peace, where the absence of violence is reinforced by individuals secure in 
their basic rights and necessities. It is this fuller concept of security that DFID refers to and 
that is utilised throughout the thesis as constituting the ‗security‘ component of SSR. 
 
Governance 
The term ‗governance‘ has produced even larger debates than the concept of security 
regarding its meaning and scope. Again, the term is used here in the sense that DFID employs 
it, as ‗describ[ing] ... the way countries and societies manage their affairs politically and the 
way power and authority are exercised‘.69 Importantly, this definition suggests the notion of 
governance beyond government – that is, it leaves open the possibility of governance actors 
being non-state. This adheres to the increasingly accepted sense of the term within the 
literature on governance.70 As G. Shabbir Cheema and Dennis Rondinelli explain, 
‗government ... [has come] to be seen as only one, albeit important, governance institution.‘71 
The challenge for DFID becomes operationalising their broad definition of governance, 
particularly in relation to SSR where it has tended to take on a far more state-centric approach 
in practice. 
 
Informal 
The final term requiring explication is ‗informal‘. The most straightforward explanation of 
this term, as used within the thesis, is provided by a list of those actors that it is used as a 
catch-all category to denote. Informal security actors refer to chiefs, secret societies, patron-
client relationships, trade associations and any other set of social practices that provide 
security services (as well as, often, other governance functions) which exist beyond the state. 
Often in the literature these actors are referred to as ‗traditional authorities‘, although this 
label clearly denotes a smaller segment of informal actors, requiring that they possess some 
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69
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August, 2010). 
70
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 G. Shabbir Cheema and Dennis A. Rondinelli, ―From Government Decentralisation to Decentralised 
Governance,‖ in Decentralising Governance: Emerging Concepts and Practices, eds. G. Shabbir Cheema and 
Dennis A. Rondinelli (Washington, DC: Brooking Institute Press, 2007), 2. 
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claim to ‗tradition‘ and usually refers to chiefs, secret societies and elders.72 ‗Non-state‘ is 
also frequently used and was considered as an alternative,73 however, this term suggests a 
stronger binary between the state and informal actors than often exists in practice. As William 
Reno and Richard Fanthorpe point out, chiefs and big men are frequently linked to the state in 
important ways, obscuring any neat distinction between them.74 Whilst ‗informal‘ also 
suggests more of a binary between the formal and informal than is perhaps ideal,
75
 it is 
probably the most utilised term in the literature and is also DFID‘s preferred term in policy 
documents.76 Furthermore, those writing specifically on SSR refer to informal actors when 
denoting the kinds of actors that this thesis deals with.77 The term is thus employed here, 
while recognising the slight exaggeration of a neat separation between formal and informal 
actors. Where relevant, the overlap between the formal and informal will be acknowledged. 
With these definitional caveats in mind, the thesis proceeds as follows. 
 
Plan of the thesis  
Chapter one sets out DFID‘s perspective on the causes of war and its rationalisation of its 
subsequent SSR response. It provides an examination of the political context in the United 
Kingdom, and surrounding DFID in particular that facilitated the emergence of SSR and 
British intervention in Sierra Leone. Examining the context in which DFID has engaged in 
Sierra Leone provides insight into the organisation‘s understanding of the causes of war and 
its subsequent rationalisation of its post-conflict response. These narratives are interesting and 
important because they provide clues as to why policies and programmes have developed in a 
particular manner. DFID‘s approach to SSR in post-conflict Sierra Leone thus sheds light 
upon its lack of engagement with informal security actors. The organisation‘s implicit 
understanding of the causes of war is seen to revolve around state failure and the security-
development nexus. As a result, SSR is deployed to strengthen the capacity of the state to 
provide security, which it is believed will form a stable foundation for development.  
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Chapter two provides a juxtaposition to the first chapter, setting out a fuller explanation of the 
causes of conflict that DFID‘s worldview is only partially able to account for. Through a 
detailed account of the roles played by chiefs in Sierra Leone their centrality as governance 
(and, importantly, security) actors is demonstrated. The chapter reveals how these informal 
actors also failed to provide effective governance and ultimately social order, contributing to 
the outbreak of civil war. It is thus suggested that any efforts to comprehensively resolve the 
causes of conflict must address failures within this informal system, as well as within the state 
system in order to prove sustainable. Furthermore, given that chiefs and other informal actors 
often provide policing and judicial services to the majority of Sierra Leoneans, SSR must 
engage these actors in reforms to fundamentally transform security provision in Sierra Leone. 
Having established the dominant role played by informal actors in security and governance in 
Sierra Leone, the chapter returns briefly to re-examine DFID‘s SSR policy in light of this. 
While a policy-level evolution towards greater engagement with the informal is detected, 
particularly in relation to justice reform (as distinct from security sector reform), 
overwhelmingly the chapter demonstrates limitations within DFID‘s approach to the causes of 
conflict and SSR that inhibit the effectiveness of the SSR programme in Sierra Leone.  
 
The case studies in chapters three and four build upon the earlier conceptual chapters by 
examining whether engagement with informal actors has been more successful at the level of 
practice, and thus whether the discrepancies pointed to in the second chapter are of 
consequence. Each case study chapter starts by embedding the need for reforms in the history 
of dual formal/informal policing and justice systems. These histories demonstrate the 
longevity of a two-tiered security system, as well as the need for reform at both tiers. Chapter 
three provides a case study of DFID‘s police reform programme and specifically the Family 
Support Units within it. In attempting to provide improved policing for women in post-
conflict Sierra Leone, DFID seems unable or unwilling to engage with informal security 
providers, despite the predominant role played by such actors in relation to policing and their 
more accessible service. Chiefs and secret societies thus continue to provide harmful policing 
to women. Without engaging these actors, FSU services are limited to urban, educated women 
and thus cannot transform policing for the majority of women nationwide.  
 
The case study in chapter four examines the primary justice projects of the Justice Sector 
Development Programme. Here, the most success of engaging informal actors can be found. 
Yet whilst DFID‘s efforts to engage with the customary justice system are laudable, 
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limitations still exist. The JSDP engages only with legal informal actors, thus overlooking the 
more utilised illegal informal actors, and seeks overwhelmingly to formalise informal 
practices, for example through codification of customary law. Such an approach to informal 
justice misses crucial opportunities for more widespread and genuine change that could have 
a lasting impact on the administration and quality of justice in Sierra Leone.  
 
Finally, the fifth chapter turns to the question of why DFID is seemingly unable to engage 
with informal security actors in its SSR programme. The argument of the chapter focuses on 
the organisational and political nature of DFID itself and the challenges that these 
characteristics pose to engagement with actors operating within different organisational and 
political logics. These characteristics can also be seen to facilitate a view of the causes of war 
in Sierra Leone as rooted in state failure. DFID‘s liberal and bureaucratic nature thus makes 
certain worldviews more or less possible, influencing the kinds of programming that the 
organisation promotes. This nature also raises larger questions about DFID‘s ability to engage 
in security-related programming, which frequently involves dealing with actors outside of the 
organisations usual operating procedures. If DFID is unable to overcome these constraints, its 
involvement in SSR and other security-related development tasks needs to be fundamentally 
reconsidered.  
 
Effective SSR requires the ability to comprehensively address the causes of conflict and 
sustainably transform the nature of security provision in a host country. In Sierra Leone, both 
these goals require engaging with and reforming informal security actors, who constitute the 
dominant providers of policing and justice for the majority of Sierra Leoneans. If DFID is 
unable to achieve these goals due to its bureaucratic and political commitments, limiting its 
ability to engage with informal actors, then its effectiveness as a leading SSR programmer 
must be questioned. In examining DFID‘s ability to engage with informal security actors 
through policing and justice reform programmes in Sierra Leone, and providing reasons for 
their limited success in doing so, this thesis provides important analysis for future SSR 
programmes that can build upon DFID‘s achievements to ensure better security outcomes for 
the world‘s most vulnerable communities.    
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1 
The United Kingdom’s ‘African Albatross’1: DFID’s Policy on Sierra Leone 
 
As the Berlin Wall was falling and the threat of nuclear confrontation between the 
superpowers receding, providing space on the security agenda for threats of a more non-
traditional nature, a seemingly unconnected group of politically disgruntled men in Sierra 
Leone were planning to topple the government of Joseph Saidu Momoh. Little did those 
involved in either context know that the actions of those in Sierra Leone would come to 
represent the archetypal ‗new war‘ of the 1990s and contribute to the precipitation of not only 
new understandings of security, but also new approaches to development and peacebuilding. 
The impact of Sierra Leone upon security and development discourse has in no small way 
been facilitated by the United Kingdom‘s extensive engagement with its former colony and 
protectorate. In conducting the first comprehensive security sector reform (SSR) programme 
in Sierra Leone, Britain (and in particular DFID, as the lead agency) altered the mandate of 
the development industry and opened up the field of security to development specialists.  
 
This chapter seeks to examine the wider political environment that enabled an innovative 
security-development strategy to emerge in Sierra Leone and the DFID policies underpinning 
it. In doing so it highlights the state-centric nature of the UK‘s DFID-led security sector 
reform programme. A narrative of the broader political trends underway internationally and in 
Britain helps to explain DFID‘s identity and how such an unconventional development 
programme was possible in a geopolitically insignificant country like Sierra Leone. This is 
followed by a more in-depth analysis of DFID policy regarding the conflict in Sierra Leone, 
revealing how a particular understanding of the causes of war led to a rationalisation of state-
focused SSR. DFID policy is demonstrated to provide a unified and comprehensive account 
of peace, war, security and development through state-centred SSR. This chapter sets out the 
international and domestic environments that shaped DFID and how these led the Department 
to rationalise the war in Sierra Leone in a particular manner, justifying SSR. It serves to 
present DFID‘s policy on Sierra Leone on its own terms – as a neat and logical argument, not 
yet complicated by the messier interpretation of events set out in chapter two. The chapter 
therefore analyses the evolution of DFID and its policy that enabled the state-centric SSR 
framework that the remainder of this thesis critiques.  
                                                 
1
 Title taken from Michael Binyon, ―Labour‘s expensive African albatross,‖ The Times, 8 May, 2000. 
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This investigation first examines the background to the conflict in Sierra Leone in order to 
understand the climate in which DFID policy was formulated. Second, it discusses the 
broader international and domestic context within which UK policy towards Africa, generally, 
and Sierra Leone in particular were nested, in order to illustrate the environment into which 
DFID was born and which thus influenced it. Against this backdrop, the third section of this 
chapter will draw upon DFID policy documents and interviews to demonstrate dominant 
narratives that emerge regarding the causes of conflict in Sierra Leone. These narratives were 
the policy manifestation of the wider context in which DFID itself was established. Their 
particular understanding of the causes of war, in turn, leads DFID to particular forms of 
engagement in Sierra Leone. DFID policy surrounding this engagement is overwhelmingly 
state-centric, supporting a dominant theme in the policy literature that state failure was the 
root of the war in Sierra Leone. As a whole, the chapter will sketch a narrative of events, 
trends and concepts that link together to explain how DFID policy has conceptualised the 
conflict in Sierra Leone, and rationalised a state-centric SSR programme as the appropriate 
treatment to Sierra Leone‘s longstanding ills. It demonstrates that the manner in which a 
conflict is understood has important implications for how responses are formulated.  
 
A Dirty War in West Africa
2
 
In March 1991 a group of predominantly Sierra Leonean (but also Liberian, Guinean and 
Burkinabe) irregulars calling themselves the Revolutionary United Front (RUF) launched a 
cross-border assault from Liberia into Kailahun and Pujehun Districts in eastern and southern 
Sierra Leone.
3
 They were assisted by special forces from the National Patriotic Front of 
Liberia (NPFL), led by Charles Taylor (the warlord, Liberian president and international war 
criminal).
4
 Key members of the RUF had connections to Libyan leader Muammar al-Qaddafi, 
having been involved in Green Book
5
 reading groups at Sierra Leonean university campuses 
                                                 
2
 Title taken from Lansana Gberie, A Dirty War in West Africa: The RUF and the Destruction of Sierra Leone 
(London: C. Hurst, 2005).  
3
 Joe Alie, ―The Kamajor Militia in Sierra Leone: Liberators or Nihilists?,‖ in Civil Militia: Africa‘s Intractable 
Security Menace, ed. David J. Francis (Aldershot: Ashgate, 2005), 51. 
4
 Taylor supported the overthrow of President Momoh who had allowed the Economic Community of West 
African States Monitoring Group (ECOMOG) to use a Sierra Leonean airport as a base from which to launch 
bombers targeting NPFL territory in Liberia. Paul Richards, Fighting for the Rainforest: War, Youth and 
Resources in Sierra Leone (Oxford: James Currey, 1996), 4; Michael S. Kargbo, British Foreign Policy and the 
Conflict in Sierra Leone (Bern: Peter Lang, 2006), 15; Paul Williams, ―Fighting for Freetown: British Military 
Intervention in Sierra Leone,‖ Contemporary Security Policy 22, no. 3 (2001): 145. 
5
 The Green Book was written by Libyan leader Muammar al-Qaddafi in 1975 and promotes alternative 
conceptions of democracy and political philosophy to Western liberal models. The books (a series of three) 
formed the basis of Qaddafi‘s Libyan cultural revolution and have been circulated widely throughout the 
developing world. 
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and receiving guerrilla training in Benghazi, Libya in the 1980s.
6
 The stated aim of the RUF 
was to overthrow the corrupt government of President Joseph Momoh who, along with his 
cronies, was manipulating patrimonial networks to extract a personal profit from the country, 
crippling the economic prospects for the majority of non-elite
7
 Sierra Leoneans.
8
 Such a 
movement should have attracted the support of the general population, as the corruption and 
poor governance that the RUF claimed to be fighting against robbed the majority of citizens 
of opportunities and wellbeing.
9
 However the RUF miscalculated the people‘s willingness to 
accept gross violence against government officials, chiefs and the general population, and the 
rebels thus quickly lost the backing of their would-be support base.
10
 As a result, the RUF 
lacked legitimacy that could have transformed them into a broader-based popular movement. 
 
The state responded to the threat posed by the RUF by deploying the poorly paid and trained 
Sierra Leone Army (SLA) to counter the rebel‘s increasingly violent onslaught. However, the 
SLA proved just as susceptible to the lure of loot and diamond access that the RUF boasted, 
particularly after their enlargement by the National Provisional Ruling Council (NPRC) 
regime.
11
 The soldier/rebel or ‗sobel‘ phenomenon came to signify the overlap between the 
ostensibly opposed soldier and rebel forces.
12
 As a result of the weakness of Sierra Leone‘s 
state structure, manifested clearly in the inability and/or unwillingness of the SLA to protect 
                                                 
6
 Kargbo, British Foreign Policy and the Conflict in Sierra Leone, 22; Paul Richards, ―Green Book 
Millenarians? The Sierra Leone War within the Perspective of an Anthropology of Religion,‖ in Religion and 
African Civil Wars, ed. Neils Kastfelt (London: Hurst & Co, 2005), 119-146; Author interview with Members A, 
Promoters of Peace and Justice Freetown, 16 February 2009. The Promoters of Peace and Justice are a Sierra 
Leonean non-government organisation founded by former RUF and West Side Boys rebels to promote peace, 
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predominantly former-rebels, also contains former Community Defence Force fighters and civilians. 
7
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People, Policies, Institutions, ed. Stephen Ellis (Oxford: James Currey, 1996), 263. 
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Kargbo, British Foreign Policy and the Conflict in Sierra Leone, 18-31. Key contributors to the debate include: 
Robert Kaplan, ―The Coming Anarchy‖, Atlantic Monthly (February 1994); Paul Collier, ―Economic Causes of 
Civil Conflict and Their Implications for Policy‖, in Turbulent Peace: The challenge of managing international 
conflict, eds. Chester A. Crocker, Fen Osler Hampson and Pamela Aall (Washington, DC: United States Institute 
of Peace, 2001); Richards, Fighting for the Rainforest; Ibrahim Abdullah ed., Between Democracy and Terror: 
The Sierra Leone Civil War (Dakar: CODESRIA, 2004); and Gberie, A Dirty War in West Africa. 
9
 Andrew M. Dorman, Blair‘s successful war: British military intervention in Sierra Leone (Farnham: Ashgate, 
2009), 37. 
10
 Krijn Peters and Paul Richards, ―Why we Fight: Voices of youth combatants in Sierra Leone,‖ Africa 68, no. 2 
(1998): 200. For a detailed examination of how the RUF‘s change of tactics led to a loss of popular support see 
Paul Richards, ―Agrarian Underpinnings of the Sierra Leone Conflict,‖ in Violence, Political Culture and 
Development in Africa, ed. Preben Kaarsholm (Oxford: James Currey, 2006).  
11
 Peters and Richards, ―Why we Fight,‖ 184. 
12
 Williams, ―Fighting for Freetown,‖ 144. 
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the civilian population, communities formed their own civil defence forces (CDFs), thus 
further complicating the matrix of fighting factions in the conflict. These irregular forces 
drew, to some extent, upon the practices of secret societies, traditionally the forums for male 
and female initiation in Sierra Leone and West Africa more broadly.
13
 The CDFs used 
traditional medicine, as well as weaponry endowed with spiritual powers to protect and 
wound.
14
 Whilst they have been held up, within Sierra Leonean society at least, as the most 
legitimate of the fighting forces, not even the CDFs emerged on the other side of the war 
without charges (and later convictions) of war crimes.
15
 All groups were involved in the 
recruitment of child soldiers and the use of drugs including marijuana, crack cocaine and 
amphetamines (often mixed with gunpowder to create brown brown) to prepare troops for 
battle.
16
 Children were particularly favoured as recruits by the RUF because of their literacy 
skills, which allowed the RUF to convey orders and leave messages in towns they attacked 
promoting their message.
17
 
 
Whilst these various factions fought, protected, raped, kidnapped, forcibly recruited and 
mutilated the Sierra Leonean population, including a large number of children, the scope of 
Sierra Leonean politics also changed, with a proliferation of contesting factions. In 1992 a 
young, disgruntled SLA soldier, Captain Valentine Strasser, who had been fighting in 
Kailahun district arrived in Freetown with a small group of comrades to demand that 
President Momoh ensure better conditions for the fighting forces.
18
 The President, on hearing 
of the soldiers‘ arrival, fled Sierra Leone to Guinea, leaving Strasser to assume the 
presidency, with his band of soldiers forming the National Provisional Ruling Council 
(NPRC). Unable to repel the RUF and recognising the weakness of the state, Strasser 
increased the size of the army from 2,500 to 15,000 in 1995 and hired the South African 
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 Caspar Fithen and Paul Richards, ―Making War, Crafting Peace,‖ in No War No Peace, ed. Paul Richards 
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private security company, Executive Outcomes (paid in mining concessions) to push the 
rebels back from mining areas.
19
 The newly enlarged army of untrained recruits became 
increasingly difficult to control, committing abuses and making little headway in repelling the 
RUF. By the mid-1990s, Strasser and the NPRC came under strong pressure from the 
international community to hold the country‘s first elections since 1967 (Momoh had only 
brought one-party rule, instituted by his predecessor Siaka Stevens in 1978, to an end in late-
1991 with a new constitution). The atmosphere in the lead up to elections was threatened by 
an internal coup, in which Strasser was ousted by his NPRC colleague, Julius Maada Bio.20 
Elections, however, went ahead as planned and saw Ahmad Tehjan Kabbah, a former UN 
bureaucrat, assume the presidency in 1996 and enter into a peace accord with the RUF later 
that year.
21
 Democratic legitimacy, however, did not ensure stability in the country. By 1997, 
the peace accord was in tatters, with continued RUF fighting. Kabbah was also suspicious of 
the SLA, given their support for the former NPRC government, and sidelined them in 
negotiations.
22
 Support was given instead to building up the CDFs, numbering between 
15,000 and 25,000. Inevitably, this favouritism created resentment within the army and 
another coup was carried out in May 1997 by Major Johnny Paul Koroma and the Armed 
Forces Revolutionary Council (AFRC), forcing Kabbah into exile in neighbouring Guinea.
23
 
The AFRC invited the RUF to join the new government, surprising many and resulting in 
Sierra Leone being suspended from the Commonwealth and the United Nations imposing 
arms and petroleum embargoes.
24
 By 1998, rebel fighting had reached the capital of 
Freetown, which had hitherto been removed from the violence underway in the provinces. 
The fragility of the state was blatantly exposed. Nigerian peacekeepers under the auspices of 
the Economic Community of West African States Monitoring Group (ECOMOG) were 
deployed to push the rebels back with the help of the Kamajor CDF. A British private security 
company, Sandline International, was also engaged to support pro-Kabbah forces and was 
involved in the defence of the capital.
25
 With the rebels forced out, Kabbah returned to Sierra 
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25
 This involvement was apparently unknown to the British government at the time (although Peter Penfold, 
British High Commissioner to Sierra Leone from 1997-2000 and Tim Spicer, head of Sandline International, 
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Leone in 1998 and the United Nations Observer Mission in Sierra Leone (UNOMSIL) was 
established to monitor disarmament.
26
 These victories, however, were short-lived, with the 
RUF again invading Freetown in January 1999 under ‗Operation No Living Thing‘, in which 
approximately 6,000 people were killed.
27
 As a result, the unarmed UN Observer staff were 
withdrawn.
28
 RUF fighters were forced into retreat again by ECOMOG who in the process 
gained a reputation in Freetown for brutalities of their own.
29
 Kabbah was forced by the 
international community to renew the peace process with RUF leader Foday Sankoh and both 
parties signed the Lomé Agreement in July 1999.
30
 Controversially, the Agreement assured 
the RUF of legal amnesty and key posts in government, including Sankoh as Minister of 
Mines.
31
 Despite 11,000 United Nations Assistance Mission to Sierra Leone (UNAMSIL) 
peacekeepers being deployed to enforce the Agreement,
32
 it failed when the RUF captured 
UN peacekeepers and continued attacks and moves towards Freetown in 2000.
33
 On 7 May, 
approximately 700 British paratroopers, supported by 800 Royal Marine commandoes were 
deployed to Sierra Leone, ostensibly to evacuate British nationals, but ultimately also to 
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support UN and ECOMOG peacekeeping forces.
34
 A combination of Nigerian, UN and 
British forces eventually succeeded in driving the rebels from the capital for the final time and 
capturing rebel leader Foday Sankoh. UNAMSIL forces were later increased to a strength of 
17,500 – the largest United Nations peacekeeping deployment in the world at the time.35 
Fighting across the rest of the country continued between rebels and peacekeeping forces until 
March 2001. In May of that year the disarmament process began, led by the UK and the UN. 
Notably for the British, in August 2000 11 soldiers from the Royal Irish Regiment were taken 
hostage by the West Side Boys, a renegade militia in Sierra Leone.
36
 Operation Barras, 
launched in September, was successful in rescuing the men, although one British soldier and 
25 West Side Boys were killed.
37
 The war was officially declared over in January 2002. 
Elections were held in May 2002, with Kabbah re-elected as President and his SLPP party 
attaining a resounding majority of 83 of 112 seats.
38
 The RUF political party won no seats and 
received just 1.7 per cent of the national vote.
39
 
 
The costs of Sierra Leone‘s 11-year civil war were substantial, resulting in between 75,000 – 
200,000 deaths,
40
 12,000 amputee survivors,
41
 2 million displaced people,
42
 72,500 
demobilised combatants (including 7,000 children), 42,300 weapons and 1.2 million pieces of 
ammunition collected and 17,500 UN peacekeepers deployed.
43
 This devastation prompted, 
and the massive international response reflected, innovations in development and security 
discourse, most noticeable in British development, foreign and defence policy. This is 
apparent in the status that post-conflict peacebuilding efforts in Sierra Leone have attained as 
an archetypal case of new ways of operating in complex emergencies.
44
 Such innovations did 
not, however, occur in a vacuum and a sea-change in international thinking on how best to 
approach development, as well as shifting ideational sands within UK government structures 
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and commitments from key stakeholders provided fertile soil for the transformations to come. 
These international and domestic factors provided the context in which change was possible, 
and shall be examined in more detail below to explain the manner in which DFID came to 
engage with Africa, and Sierra Leone specifically. The separation of this discussion into 
international and national stimuli is for heuristic purposes only. Inevitably, these levels were 
strongly influenced by and intertwined with each other and only through their interplay, could 
the resultant policies have come about.  
 
Changing International Times: Aid, Development and Security 
Aid policy throughout the 1980s and early 1990s had focused upon reforming fiscal policies 
within developing states through structural adjustment programmes that de-emphasised the 
role of the state. These programmes promoted austerity measures and the liberal, free-market 
economic agenda, which would supposedly lure foreign investment and thus promote 
development. Yet by the end of the decade, little (if any) progress had been made. As James 
Ferguson notes: 
 
The idea that deregulation and privatisation would prove a panacea for African economic 
stagnation was a dangerous and destructive illusion. Instead of economic recovery, the 
structural-adjustment era has seen the lowest rates of economic growth ever recorded in Africa 
(actually negative, in many cases), along with increasing inequality and marginalisation.
45
 
 
New thinking was needed to legitimate national aid budgets and turn this deepening poverty 
around.
46
 Opportunities were to be found in the space that opened up for non-traditional 
security thinking at the close of the Cold War.
47
 With a nuclear stand-off between the United 
States and the Soviet Union no longer dominating security agendas, defence establishments 
(still wielding their Cold War-inflated budgets) began to look elsewhere for the threats of the 
1990s. These were to be found in the symptoms of the conflicts that were beginning to creep 
through the developing world: civil war in Somalia, Liberia and Sierra Leone; and genocide 
in Rwanda and Bosnia. Poverty, disease, inequality and resource scarcity came to be seen as 
the agitating factors that fractured countries, often along supposedly ethnic lines.
48
 Media 
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coverage of these conflicts brought ‗barbaric‘ fighting with machetes and hand-to-hand 
combat (in fact just cheaper and more accessible than high technological warfare) into the 
living rooms of an increasingly militarily-idle West. The imperative to ‗do something‘ was, at 
times, strong and international peacekeeping missions were able to be deployed in the name 
of human suffering by a newly unbound Security Council. The non-traditional instigating 
factors of these conflicts thus ascended the international security agenda as new major 
threats.
49
 
 
Correlated to this change in threat perception, the very understanding of security also began to 
shift towards an increased focus on development. The human security agenda, which arose 
throughout the 1990s (its most emphatic enunciation in the United Nations Development 
Programme‘s 1994 Human Development Report), considered a variety of non-military 
variables as intrinsic to the security of the individual (in place of, or alongside, the state).
50
 
Rather than merely being concerned with state security from external military threats, human 
security propounded the idea that an individual‘s security also needed to consider their 
freedom from hunger, disease and oppression and rights to education, healthcare and 
opportunity.
51
 This expansion of the security agenda ‗heralded certain versions of security 
that were much more conducive to integration with development concerns.‘52 As development 
and security became more closely aligned, a dramatic shift in the nature of aid operations also 
took place. Susan Willett points out:  
 
development practice moved from simply funding humanitarian programmes that sought to 
provide protection and relief to the civilian victims of war, to influencing aid recipient 
countries‘ military expenditure allocations through peace conditionality, to directly 
transforming security institutions under the rubric of good governance, so as to ensure a 
secure environment for market-based development.
53
 
 
Thus, security policy was broadening its scope to prioritise traditional development concerns 
on the threat agenda, while at the same time development policy was recognising security 
concerns as major obstacles to progress, and therefore as legitimate areas for aid 
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engagement.
54
 This more proximate relationship between security and development would 
later prove crucial for DFID‘s engagement with Sierra Leone. International events continued 
to justify the newfound complementarity between security and development. For instance, 
population flows from conflict zones created a fear in the West of being overwhelmed by the 
threats of crime and disease that supposedly attended such populations.
55
 Borders were 
rendered increasingly permeable by the new threats, simultaneously creating security and 
development concerns. These trends were cemented and retrospectively legitimated by 
another event that epitomised the context in which the UK, as well as other countries, crafted 
their security and development policy.  
 
The 11 September 2001 terrorist attacks on the United States profoundly influenced security 
and development policy making. The attacks brought home that not only were the new threats 
of underdevelopment and its associated symptoms of state failure threatening to those who 
experienced them in far off, developing countries – they were also threatening to the security 
of the West.
56
 As stated in the G8‘s Africa Action Plan: 
 
Poverty, underdevelopment and fragile states create fertile conditions for violent conflict and 
the emergence of new security threats, including international crime and terrorism. There will 
be no lasting security without development and no effective development without security and 
stability.
57
 
 
The UN High Level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change also makes the point in its 
report entitled, ‗A More Secure World: Our Shared Responsibility‘: 
 
Development is the first line of defence for a collective security system that takes prevention 
seriously. Combating poverty will not only save millions of lives, but will also strengthen 
states‘ capacities to combat terrorism, organised crime and proliferation. Development makes 
everyone more secure.
58
 
 
The United Kingdom, in particular, displayed its adherence to this perspective with Foreign 
Secretary Jack Straw stating in a speech in 2002 that ‗as well as bringing mass murder to the 
heart of Manhattan, state failure has brought terror and misery to large swathes of the African 
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continent, as it did in the Balkans in the early 1990s. And at home it has brought drugs, 
violence and crime to Britain‘s streets.‘59 With the realisation that underdevelopment posed a 
threat not just to those who live with it in their everyday lives, but also to those abstracted 
from it in the West, efforts to address this threat have been afforded a greater urgency. The 
recognition that, ‗the security of the poor … [is linked] to the security of the entire world‘60 
transforms the manner in which the developing world, where the threat of underdevelopment 
emanates from, is engaged with by the West.
61
 If the human security agenda was the impetus 
for bringing development and security closer together, then the dominant readings of 9/11 
have served to bridge the two concepts in a way that allows them to be increasingly 
interchangeable at a policy making level. This, Rita Abrahamsen argues, is moving policy as 
it relates to ‗weak or failed states‘ in Africa into an increasingly securitised mindset: 
 
[it] changes the legitimate modes of engagement with a particular problem. Framed as a 
development/humanitarian issue, Africa encourages compassion and particular policy 
responses formulated and implemented primarily by the Department for International 
Development. Approached as a security issue, by contrast, Africa may encourage fear and 
unease, and this may in turn potentially facilitate policy responses of a more militarized and 
illiberal nature, shifting the institutional responsibility toward the FCO and perhaps also the 
Ministry of Defence.
62
 
 
As a result, the events of 9/11 have cemented the trend of the 1990s: that development and 
security are increasingly bundled together as mutually dependent concepts that policy cannot 
neatly separate out. This poses challenges for institutional structures of government, with 
independent departments traditionally responsible for relatively discrete fields of expertise. It 
is this, increasingly blurred, international context in which the New Labour government 
undertook its transformational structural and policy changes in regard to security and 
development that set the stage for how policy would be formulated in response to the situation 
in Sierra Leone. This international context can be seen to have had a formative impact on the 
creation of DFID and the manner in which DFID can think and act.   
 
The Domestic Context of the United Kingdom 
British policy towards Sierra Leone changed significantly under Tony Blair‘s New Labour 
government. While the Conservative government of John Major had sent a small team of 
British police officers to Sierra Leone in 1996 to begin appraisals for a police reform 
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programme,
63
 this gesture had been at the direct request of President Kabbah upon his 
election.
64
 Support for the first democratic government in Sierra Leone since independence 
was thus provided, but no other political engagement with the former Colony was undertaken. 
Real shifts in UK development policy, which were central to DFID‘s engagement in Sierra 
Leone, began with the election of Blair‘s Labour government in 1997.  
 
DFID is born 
Development policy had been a central component of Blair‘s 1997 campaign, proposing the 
establishment of an independent department to oversee British aid. Aid had previously been 
dealt with by the Overseas Development Agency, a wing of the Foreign and Commonwealth 
Office (FCO) from 1970 onwards.
65
 As the ‗softer‘ side of foreign policy, aid concerns were 
often trumped by more traditional concerns of trade and arms sales.
 66
 An independent 
department, Labour argued, would allow aid to develop its own agenda and momentum, 
unhindered by hard-nosed and self-interested politics.
67
 Consequently, the Department for 
International Development (DFID) was established in 1997 with a mandate to: ‗Lead the UK 
Government‘s fight against world poverty.‘68 As Tom Porteous notes, ‗with the creation of 
DFID, development assistance was explicitly untied from the promotion of British 
commercial interests, and issues related to UK development policy in Africa got a hearing at 
cabinet level, a more strategic focus and a lot more cash.‘69 DFID‘s influence was, for a new 
department, unprecedented with a cabinet-level Secretary of State who was able to argue the 
Department‘s case at the highest levels of decision making and thus access greater funding.70 
This funding allowed DFID to commission its own white paper, conduct large-scale 
recruitment and open country offices throughout Africa and the developing world.
71
  
 
Africa had been a key and long-standing policy area for the Overseas Development Agency 
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and this trend continued within DFID.
72
 In view of Britain‘s minimal commercial and 
strategic interests in the continent, Africa was one of the more uncontroversial fields of 
operation for the government‘s new development apparatus.73 However, the energies focused 
on Africa within the newly created DFID were unprecedented (for instance, Africa received 
its own Conflict Prevention Pool of funding, separate from the Global Conflict Prevention 
Pool). In part, this was due to the leadership of Clare Short, whose interest in the continent 
grew throughout her time as Secretary of State for International Development. Short was 
reportedly greatly affected by her visits to Africa and was very impressed upon meeting Sierra 
Leonean President Kabbah, who she saw as an illegitimately ousted democratic leader with 
great potential.
74
 In relation to Sierra Leone, Paul Jackson and Peter Albrecht surmise: 
 
the personality of the then Development Secretary, Clare Short cannot be underestimated in 
terms of developing the political drive to intervene in Sierra Leone. As one UK Government 
source noted, she was ―…almost an elemental force … she was very, very committed 
personally – she met Kabbah, and took this upon herself as a kind of personal crusade‖.75 
 
While the new Department was inclined towards engagement with Africa for these more 
conventional reasons, new and more problematic issues, such as the prevalence of conflict in 
underdeveloped states also prompted unprecedented engagement. 
 
Conflict and Poverty 
With the abovementioned international trends pushing development and security ever closer 
together, DFID‘s poverty reduction mandate soon faced the dilemma of how to engage with 
the issue of conflict, which its own White Paper indicated was inhibiting development in 
many parts of the world, particularly in Africa.
76
 The International Development Act of 2002 
(and its predecessor, the Overseas Development and Cooperation Act of 1980) stipulated that 
DFID may only spend its budget on, ‗development assistance which contributes to poverty 
reduction‘ (or, in the case of the 1980 Act, that contributes to ‗development‘).77 Any 
programmes that engaged with conflict had to be able to demonstrate that they were 
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simultaneously reducing poverty. DFID nested its arguments in the high correlation found 
between rates of poverty and incidents of conflict. As the 1997 White Paper on International 
Development states, ‗[h]alf of the world‘s low income countries are suffering, or have just 
emerged from, serious conflicts.‘78 Clare Short reinforced the point in 1999, stating that 
‗[t]wenty of the 34 poorest countries are either involved in conflict or have recently emerged 
from conflict.‘79 Here, the mutual dependence between security and development becomes 
crucial. The security-development nexus, as it has been termed,
80
 has provided the modus 
operandi for DFID‘s branching into conflict and security issues. Given that conflict and 
underdevelopment are often correlated, and that conflict deepens underdevelopment by 
destroying infrastructure, services and livelihoods and deterring investment, there is an 
incentive for aid departments to address conflict, to maximise the effectiveness of their aid. 
As the Department began to form a greater understanding of poverty reduction and its 
causes/correlations, its areas of engagement duly expanded, covering issues of debt, 
corruption, conflict and trade.
81
 The high correlation between conflict and poverty in Africa 
made this region a key policy area.
82
  
 
New Humanitarianism 
The closer proximity between security and development prompted the creation of principles 
for a ‗new humanitarianism‘ within DFID. These were enunciated in April 1998, ‗aimed at 
tackling the underlying causes of crises and building peace and stability.‘83 The departure 
from earlier development policies was embedded in its attempts to go beyond the basic goal 
of alleviating human suffering by broadening aid to address the underlying structures that 
create conflict (which is recognised as exacerbating underdevelopment), promote human 
rights and limit the harm caused by aid.
84
 Consequently, efforts were being made to recognise 
the politics inherent within aid that often detracted from its purpose and to ensure that the 
moral impulse behind development assistance was not obfuscated. This new DFID policy has 
been noted by one commentator as being ‗crucial in defining ... [DFID‘s] identity and was 
universalist, reaffirming principles and human rights.‘85 Efforts to cast DFID‘s work as an 
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oasis of principles within the vast desert of otherwise unprincipled political decision making 
was apparent, for instance, in the title of Clare Short‘s 1998 Speech, ‗Principled Aid in an 
Unprincipled World‘.86 The worthy intention of the policy of new humanitarianism, to render 
aid more ‗principled‘ (according to notions of human rights, liberalism and democracy), 
created within DFID
87
 a unique identity that set it apart from the rest of government, and 
certainly from the FCO, as the former (and less principled, given its national interest mandate) 
aid department. As Zöe Marriage suggests, ‗DFID developed a morality discourse that was 
seductive domestically – being ostensibly ethical, long-termist and positive-sum.‘88 
 
DFID and its place in the British civil service 
These moves were not unproblematic, however, and DFID stepped on the toes of more than 
one department in its efforts to carve out a comprehensive policy approach to poverty 
reduction. Porteous notes that DFID has tended to: 
 
stray into jealously guarded areas of Whitehall outside the traditional remit of a development 
ministry. Inevitably, some interdepartmental frictions ensued, for example with the Treasury 
over who should represent the UK at the World Bank and IMF; with the Department of Trade 
and Industry over international trade; with the Ministry of Defence over its military training 
programmes in Africa; and with the FCO over numerous issues including the sharing of 
classified information, the clearing of drafts of UN Security Council Resolutions, and policy 
documents.
89
  
 
This turf battle is indicative of the bureaucratic culture emerging within the new DFID. The 
clout of the Department (with a seat in cabinet, a large budget and impressive new recruits) 
has allowed it to take on unconventional development issues (such as conflict) as well as 
imbue them with a new approach. As a new department, DFID has done old things in new 
ways and even some new things (like security) that were previously considered the reserve of 
other departments. DFID‘s approach has focused on democracy, equality and human rights in 
a far less nationally-interested manner than other departments, such as the FCO, Home Office 
and MoD, whose mandates have a stronger focus on the national interest. In addition, there 
were now two ministries dealing with, for instance, trade, but approaching the issue with 
different goals in mind. While this has involved, as Porteous suggests, some toe stepping, 
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other departments were also realising the inevitable interconnectedness of their work with 
DFID and others.
90
 Porteous goes on to note: 
 
just as DFID under Clare Short soon realised that it could not ‗do‘ development without 
straying into political and military affairs, so the FCO under [Robin] Cook, and from 2001 
under Jack Straw, came to realise that it could not ‗do‘ foreign policy in Africa without 
working closely with DFID – and not just on ‗pure‘ development issues, but also on others 
such as governance, security sector reform, crime, HIV, conflict and the problems of weak 
states. All the problems tended to merge into one.
91
 
 
The problem of departments doubling up on research and analysis to reach the same goals 
through different means was identified in a cross-cutting review on Conflict Prevention in 
Sub-Saharan Africa, conducted in 2000.
92
 To address this, the Africa Conflict Prevention Pool 
(ACPP) and the Global Conflict Prevention Pool (GCPP) were established in 2001. The Pools 
brought DFID, the FCO and the Ministry of Defence (MoD) together for ‗joint analysis, 
financing and coordination in areas where collaboration between the three departments can 
add value to UK conflict prevention activities.‘93 While the departments retain the integrity of 
their individual expertise (the FCO focusing on diplomatic initiatives of dialogue, negotiation 
and mediation; the MoD using its security background for peace support, enforcement and 
training; and DFID working towards poverty reduction through sustainable development, 
good governance and access to justice), the Pools allow for joint research, programming and 
funding to maximise the impact and harmonisation of UK interventions overseas.
94
 
Predominantly, ‗it is a financial instrument to deliver long-term conflict prevention activity.‘95 
The Pools form an integral part of the UK‘s ‗modernising government‘ agenda with a focus 
on ‗joined-up government‘96, implying rather uncontroversially that different departments 
within government should work together on issues that cut across various fields of expertise.
97
 
These Pools have since been superseded in 2008 by the Conflict Prevention Pool (CPP), 
which operates in the same manner and for the same purpose, but without a separate 
geographical pool for Africa. The CPPs have thus allowed the three participating departments 
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to take a looser approach to their own traditional spheres of operation and a more 
comprehensive approach to conflict prevention. For DFID, this has further legitimised its 
ability to address conflict as one of the key obstacles to poverty reduction, as understood 
through the security-development nexus.  
 
Ethical foreign policy 
DFID‘s focus on Africa and the problems of insecurity and underdevelopment were facilitated 
more broadly within British politics by an emphasis on an ethical foreign policy. This was 
centred on the idea that values, such as human rights and democracy were as important as 
interests in determining foreign policy moves. As Foreign Secretary Robin Cook stated: 
 
The Labour government does not accept that political values can be left behind when we 
check our passports to travel on diplomatic business. Our foreign policy must have an ethical 
dimension and must support the demands of other peoples for the democratic rights on which 
we insist for ourselves.
98
  
 
Whilst the phrase became somewhat of a tribulation for the FCO, Blair drew upon this 
concept in distinguishing his foreign policy approach from that of the previous Conservative 
administration.
99
 An ethical approach to foreign policy fit well with Blair‘s increasing interest 
in Africa and he is perhaps best (although, not most) remembered for his commitment to 
Africa.  
 
Blair‘s influence 
Tony Blair assumed office in 1997 with little experience or knowledge of African foreign 
policy and development concerns.
100
 His father had been a lecturer in the Law Department at 
the University of Sierra Leone, Fourah Bay College in the 1960s, and this personal connection 
is said to have cultivated in Blair a particular interest and compassion for Sierra Leone.
101
 Yet 
this alone could not explain Blair‘s unprecedented engagement with Africa, and Sierra Leone 
in particular, during his time as Prime Minister. Porteous outlines several of the influences on 
Blair that he argues supported his turn to Africa: 
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Nelson Mandela, whom Blair met on several occasions, and the emergence of a dynamic, 
optimistic South Africa after apartheid, had almost certainly had an impact on him, as they 
had on others in his party. Clare Short says Blair was also influenced by positive things he 
heard about DFID‘s development work in Africa and elsewhere. It has been reported that, on 
his last visit to London as US president, Bill Clinton told Blair that he regretted not having 
done more for Africa and advised him to make Africa a priority. One Labour MP and former 
junior minister who has watched Blair‘s interest in Africa develop closely says that Africa‘s 
poverty and suffering elicited visceral sympathy from Blair as a professed Christian.
102
 
 
Africa, and Sierra Leone in particular, were of interest to Blair for several reasons. For 
instance, the ‗third way‘ that Blair promoted as ‗an attempt to find middle ground between 
two diametrically opposed ideologies: old Left socialism and new Right capitalism‘, provided 
a set of values that lent themselves to a focus on Africa.
103
 The third way implied a sense of 
shared responsibility for issues such as democracy, liberty and justice beyond merely our own 
borders.
104
 Blair perceived a lack of such qualities in many African states, as demonstrated in 
his speech to the Labour Party Conference in 2001, in which he famously declared Africa to 
be ‗a scar on the conscience of the world.‘105 
 
Blair was also clearly convinced of the transnational nature of threats. Before the events of 
9/11 which, as noted earlier, led to a realisation that underdevelopment and instability 
threaten not merely those places where they manifest, but also the rest of the world, Blair had 
made known his belief that cause and effect were transnational. In his Chicago speech made 
in 1999 on a US visit, Blair, justifying the principle of humanitarian intervention in the 
context of NATO in Kosovo, claimed: ‗We are all internationalists now‘.106 He went on to 
argue, ‗We cannot turn our backs on conflicts and the violation of human rights within other 
countries if we want still to be secure.‘107 This linking of security across borders is 
fundamental to the interventionist nature of Blair‘s leadership. Andrew Dorman notes that as 
Prime Minister, Blair ‗broke all records for the use of the armed forces ranging from 
operations in the Balkans to Afghanistan.‘108 He authorised the use of force five times: in Iraq 
in 1998, Kosovo in 1999, Sierra Leone in 2000, Afghanistan in 2001 and Iraq again in 
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2003.
109
 The interplay of this interventionism with Blair‘s ‗third way‘ and its evolution into 
an ‗ethical‘ foreign policy was central to British engagement in Africa and facilitated DFID‘s 
unusually strong commitment to Sierra Leone.
110
  
 
Blair‘s cooption of Africa as one of his key concerns was apparent as he pushed African 
issues onto the agenda at the G8 Summit in Genoa in 2001, as well as appointed a special 
adviser on Africa within Number 10.
111
 In the lead up to the 2001 British election, Africa also 
became a significant theme in his second term campaign, which, upon re-election was 
elaborated as the New African Initiative. The Initiative would take the form of a partnership 
between Western and African governments to ‗offer greater investment, aid and debt relief for 
Africa‘.112 In 2004, recognising the need for greater local ownership, Blair launched the 
Commission for Africa, a panel of 17 independent commissioners, nine of whom were 
African. Its purpose was ‗to take a fresh look at Africa‘s past and present and the international 
community‘s role in its development path.‘113 These initiatives indicate that the Prime 
Minister saw Africa as an important and legitimate field for political engagement and the 
continent assumed a higher profile under Blair than under any other recent administration. 
This prime ministerial commitment provided DFID with a sympathetic (and interventionist) 
ear in the highest echelons of decision making.   
 
Julia Gallagher has noted, however, that despite Blair‘s enthusiasm, the terms of his African 
engagements were problematic.
114
 Africa, she suggests, figured in moral but not political 
terms in British politics.
115
 Gallagher argues that ‗[i]nvolvement in Africa is valued because 
of its ability to represent a pure space in the middle of the British state‘s activities: it brings all 
parties together, and it largely floats free of self-interest.‘116 The moral selflessness that 
engagement with Africa implies was central in casting British involvement in Sierra Leone as 
an operationalisation of an ethical foreign policy. Sierra Leone became the real world 
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example of many of the problems that the Labour Party and the newly-created DFID, in 
particular, had been emphasising and represented a cornerstone of Blair‘s ‗ethical foreign 
policy‘. Indeed, Blair stated in the wake of the intervention in Sierra Leone, ‗When people say 
run an ethical foreign policy, I say Sierra Leone was an example of that.‘117 This suggests that 
there were no British interests at stake in Sierra Leone and that the intervention was motivated 
by pure benevolence. While this goodwill undoubtedly played a role in the intervention, it 
cannot be claimed as the sole rationale. Closer analysis reveals there were other factors 
involved in prompting action. 
 
New security and development strategies 
In the late 1990s new strategies for security and development were developing in DFID and 
the MoD that attempted to confront the realities of modern conflict and underdevelopment. 
Sierra Leone was a prime candidate for the interventions being innovated because its 
diminutive geography seemed to make it an achievable theatre for operations. As a result the 
Sierra Leone case offered the UK government, including DFID, the opportunity to test and 
showcase its humanitarian intervention and peacebuilding ideals. As Peter Albrecht and Paul 
Jackson suggest: 
 
apart from the obvious moral imperative to aid one of the poorest countries in the world, there 
was also the perception that if the UK could not achieve its conflict prevention/stabilization 
objectives in a country such as Sierra Leone, where, then, would the instruments available to 
the UK Government be effective?
118
  
 
Sierra Leone offered a seemingly hospitable environment in which to implement their 
transforming approach to security and development through joined-up government and the 
rapid deployment of smaller military units (which the 1998 Strategic Defence Review 
advocated).
119
 As Albrecht and Jackson point out, if these efforts could not work in a country 
the relatively manageable size of Sierra Leone (27,699 square miles), it would become 
obvious that their innovations would also not work in larger, more geopolitically central 
countries, such as the Democratic Republic of the Congo or Sudan (905,567 and 967,495 
square miles respectively).
120
 Such countries would require significantly more expensive 
operations than Sierra Leone. As a former DFID Senior Governance Advisor explained, ‗had 
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it been a bigger country we would have been much more intimidated because we have ended 
up spending proportionately a huge amount of money in Sierra Leone compared with what we 
would normally spend in a country with that size population and land area.‘121 Sierra Leone 
thus ‗provided quite a useful test case for the new ... emerging security and development 
agenda‘.122 It offered a geographically and financially limited theatre, whilst simultaneously 
providing a convincing moral imperative that fit with the ethical foreign policy of New 
Labour and the responsible aid programme advocated by DFID.  
 
This combination of international trends, domestic policies and personalities were integral in 
shaping the environment in which DFID emerged as a distinct part of the British government 
and formulated its policies regarding Sierra Leone. These policies, in turn, provided the script 
which has facilitated the UK‘s most extensive engagement with an African country since 
colonialism. International trends in security and development discourse brought these two 
phenomena into closer proximity and opened up the possibility for shared terrain, which 
would prove critical to DFID‘s work in Sierra Leone. Changes on the UK political scene, 
such as the creation of an independent DFID, promotion of an ‗ethical‘ foreign policy, a 
commitment to joined-up government and a ‗third way‘ interventionism favoured by the 
Prime Minister, ensured that concerns about Africa received the highest level of political 
consideration and that radical responses to these concerns were possible. Without the energies 
of Blair, Short and (to a lesser extent) Cook, Africa would have remained a persistent blip on 
the radar of Western foreign policy – tucked away in the rarely politicised corner of aid 
policy. Events in Sierra Leone also provided a seemingly suitable case for the testing of these 
new ways of thinking.  It was in this context that greater engagement in Sierra Leone was 
made possible. However actual events appeared to take on a much more accidental nature. As 
Peter Albrecht and Paul Jackson have noted (quoting a senior DFID governance advisor and 
Clare Short respectively): 
 
 ―We could not – we, being the British – could not let this fragile, but democratically elected 
government collapse. Now, I don‘t think there was much theory behind that‖. Indeed, simply, 
as put by Clare Short, referring to this period: ―I was just doing it because it was disgraceful. 
No one was planning anything.‖123 
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While there might not have been much in the way of clearly enunciated policy to guide the 
UK‘s initial intervention, the international and domestic context made such an intervention 
plausible by increasing the profile of Africa, linking security to development and establishing 
intervention on humanitarian grounds as a moral imperative. As DFID‘s former SSR Advisor 
suggests, ‗the geopolitical ... stars were in alignment.‘124 
 
Britain Intervenes 
The UK took the lead role in brokering the Lomé peace agreement between the 
democratically elected Kabbah government and the RUF leadership in 1999, which led to its 
enforcement by UNAMSIL peacekeepers,
125
 and this lead role created a sense of obligation in 
the UK to ensure its success.
126
 This was compounded by a general feeling internationally, in 
the UN and in Sierra Leone, that Britain was the obvious state to look to for action on Sierra 
Leone given the entwined histories of the two states.
127
 By May 2000 the UNAMSIL mission 
was in crisis, not having yet received its promised troop commitments to enforce the peace 
agreement, which was in jeopardy as a result.
128
 The implications of a failed peacekeeping 
mission were alarming for UN credibility. As Hugo Young, writing in The Guardian 
lamented at the time: 
 
Intended to be 11,000-strong, the force there [in Sierra Leone] is the largest UN peacekeeping 
army in the world. Yet it is pathetically failing. It has become hostage ... to the armed gangs of 
rebel forces who are destabilising the regime it should be defending ... If this massive UN 
presence is incapable of sustaining peace, against a disorderly and largely untrained rabble, 
one must ask what future there can be for the entire principle of humanitarian peacekeeping 
internationally by the UN.
129
 
 
The UK was well aware of this risk to UN credibility and the misguided approach it implied 
for the UK‘s own newfound zeal for humanitarian intervention.130 There was also a concern 
for the some 1,000 British and Commonwealth citizens in Sierra Leone for whom the UK had 
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consular responsibility.
131
 Brigadier David Richards (who had previous experience in Sierra 
Leone) was thus sent to Freetown as a liaison to assess the situation.
132
 He arrived to find a 
deteriorating situation and, along with the British High Commissioner in Sierra Leone, David 
Jones, requested preparations for a rescue operation.
133
 The following day full political and 
military decision making powers were delegated to the High Commissioner and Brigadier 
Richards, allowing them to determine if and when an evacuation should take place.
134
 On 8 
May, as reports of advancing rebels were confirmed, evacuation was announced, British 
forces were deployed and 499 people rescued within a few days.
135
 In securing Lungi airport 
for evacuations, British forces engaged the RUF and thus began the process of ‗mission 
creep‘, blurring the mandate of the British deployment in Sierra Leone.136 The presence of 
British forces had an immediately stabilising effect in the country and the ease with which 
they defeated the RUF in their encounters with them reinforced this further. Any withdrawal 
risked relinquishing such tentative stability. According to Brigadier (now General Sir) 
Richards, he made the decision to extend the mandate of UK troops essentially independently, 
demonstrating the manner in which practice only loosely follows policy.
137
 However, in the 
UK, Short, Cook and Secretary of Defence Geoff Hoon were also pressing Blair for continued 
deployment to buttress the weak UNAMSIL forces and to protect the Sierra Leonean 
population from RUF atrocities.
138
 Blair agreed to continued deployment on the basis that the 
ethical cause outweighed the potential political fallout.
139
 On 12 May, Baroness Symons, 
Minister of State at the MoD announced to the House of Lords: 
 
The primary purpose behind our decision to intervene in this crisis is to protect and evacuate 
British citizens and others for whom we have consular responsibility from a dangerous, 
uncertain and unpredictable situation ... We also believe that an effective UNAMSIL, 
organised and equipped to meet its mandate, coupled with renewed commitment by all parties 
to the Lomé Accord offers the best hope for a lasting peace in Sierra Leone.
140
 
 
Thus, UK troops would continue to support UNAMSIL while its troop commitments of 
11,000 were honoured. While Britain‘s deployment was gradually scaled back, troops 
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ultimately remained to assist in disarmament and retraining of the Sierra Leone Army.
141
 This 
heralded the beginning of the UK‘s long engagement with Sierra Leone which, Michael 
Binyon, writing in The Times referred to as ‗Labour‘s expensive African albatross‘, where, ‗in 
the last five years, Britain has spent more money, given more aid per head of population and 
been more politically engaged ... than in any other African country.‘142 This 'albatross' was, 
however, not without foundation. Whilst the intervention itself was rather ad hoc and ordered 
by British personnel working on the ground, the legitimacy of such a decision was embedded 
within an enabling political environment. This was the outcome of the interplay between a 
series of forces, policies and events that ensured Sierra Leone was not merely a rescue 
operation, but a litmus test for a new political approach involving a newly independent aid 
department, ethical foreign policy and a heightened proximity between security and 
development concerns. It was a formative context for DFID, which was to lead the UK's 
response efforts in Sierra Leone. 
 
This background to both the Sierra Leonean conflict and the events and policies that drove the 
UK towards Africa, and Sierra Leone specifically, contextualise the UK's intervention and 
illustrate the environment in which DFID emerged. This context of a growing correlation 
between security and development, an ethical and interventionist foreign policy and 
government ministers promoting African concerns, was formative in shaping DFID and its 
unconventionally broad role for an aid department. This context provided space for a 
Department that emphasised poverty reduction over national interests and thus utilised an 
ethical and interventionist foreign policy to achieve its increasingly securitised developmental 
aims. These influences upon DFID have been crucial to the development of the Department's 
policy in relation to Sierra Leone. In particular, for enlightening how SSR came to be seen as 
the solution for Sierra Leone's troubles. The following section draws upon policy documents 
and interviews with DFID staff and consultants. It examines first the dominant narratives that 
emerge in DFID policy regarding the conflict in Sierra Leone, and how these narratives go on 
to shape the programmes that DFID enacts in response to the civil war. 
 
DFID Policy on Sierra Leone 
Uncovering the policy prescriptions that grounded DFID‘s substantial engagement in Sierra 
Leone reveals a lack of strategy at the policy level. In a review of the UK Government‘s 
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approach to peacebuilding (including SSR in Sierra Leone), Simon Lawry-White concludes 
that ‗the short answer to the question, ―What is the UK government‘s strategy on 
peacebuilding‖ is that there is no overall strategy.‘143 More specifically in relation to SSR, 
DFID‘s former SSR Advisor comments that ‗although the British Government has a security 
sector reform policy brief, [which only came out in 2003], there isn‘t actually a 
comprehensive SSR policy.‘144 Thus, an investigation of UK policy is not as straightforward 
as might be imagined. The following excavation of DFID‘s white papers and policy 
publications from 1998 onwards in relation to Sierra Leone, Africa, conflict, governance, 
security and justice reform is revealing. From an analysis of these documents, as well as 
speeches and interviews with DFID personnel and consultants, dominant narratives emerge to 
explicate DFID‘s engagement in Sierra Leone. These narratives begin with an explication of 
the problems that DFID perceives as needing to be addressed in Sierra Leone. The most 
useful document in this regard is a 2001 publication entitled, ‗The Causes of Conflict in Sub-
Saharan Africa‘. It states that ‗an effective response to African conflict requires agreement on, 
and understanding of, its causes. Past responses to conflict have often failed to understand the 
context within which conflict has operated or to address the causes.‘145 It highlights the 
importance of understanding how a particular war came about in order to be able to 
effectively respond to it.
146
 The manner in which DFID has conceptualised the causes of war 
in Sierra Leone, then, has consequences for the nature of their post-conflict efforts. Their 
rationalisation of the war is demonstrated to fit neatly with the post-conflict SSR programme 
that was prescribed by the UK. DFID‘s theorisation of the causes of war in Sierra Leone links 
with the subsequent reforms to form a neat and coherent image of the war to peace transition. 
 
At the outset it should be made clear that DFID, and the UK government more broadly, has 
no official line on the causes of war in Sierra Leone. The intervention that was prompted there 
was largely ad hoc, with no pre-assessment of the causes of war or framework for action. As 
Garth Glentworth, a senior Governance Adviser for DFID explains: 
 
there is far too much of this … assessment and pre-appraisal … These things [the causes of 
war] they come out and they hit you in the face, what you need to do immediately. Now there 
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may be secrets in there, I quite accept but you can start off and learn them as you go along. 
But this idea that you have got to have an in-depth assessment before you start to move an 
inch and the time it takes - I mean one of the things that is very bad in all this is timeliness, 
rapid response, whatever you like to call it. We don‘t move fast enough because we are always 
busy perfecting what we are going to do, appraising it and planning it and budgeting it and 
getting it approved, getting the logical framework right as if a bit of paper had any real 
meaning …You know we do all this before we even start and by that time things have got 
worse.
147
 
 
This statement reflects very real concerns about the division of valuable time between 
planning and implementation. However, whilst implementation might quite rightly be 
prioritised over the planning, there will inevitably be assumptions implicit in the 
implementation that could otherwise have been thought through in the planning stages. 
Skimming the planning in order to get on with implementation does not mean that there is an 
obvious consensus on the causes of war. Rather, it means that the understandings of the 
causes of war will be obscured and implicit in the actions being implemented. Thus, what is 
drawn out below is the dominant narrative of the causes of war apparent throughout policy 
documents and Ministerial speeches. Piecing these together assembles a relatively coherent 
image of the manner in which the conflict in Sierra Leone was understood, and engaged with, 
despite not being explicitly set out in policy terms. 
 
State failure 
The DFID publication, ‗Causes of Conflict in sub-Saharan Africa‘ suggests that ‗[i]t is 
possible to distinguish between the root causes of conflict, the secondary causes that enable 
and sustain conflict and the tertiary causes, or the barriers that hinder resolution.‘148 The first 
of the ‗root causes‘, receiving the lengthiest explanation in the paper, is ‗weak states and state 
collapse‘, with Sierra Leone specifically pinpointed as a ‗failed state‘.149 DFID claims: 
 
The weakening and collapse of state institutions has caused internal and regional conflict. 
Collapse is rarely sudden. It arises out of a long and degenerative process ... A key part of this 
process is the deterioration of the security sector, which becomes unaccountable and abusive. 
Judicial and penal systems collapse. The state finds itself unable to provide basic social 
services or security to its people. The erosion of infrastructure completes the break up of the 
state.
150
 
 
Sierra Leone has, in fact, been pointed to explicitly as a failed state on a consistent basis in 
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UK policy.
151
 Clare Short used this phrase to explain the causes of conflict in Africa, 
specifically mentioning Sierra Leone in 2000.
152
 In 2002, Foreign Secretary Jack Straw made 
a speech in the lead up to the first anniversary of 9/11, devoted to the topic of ‗Failed and 
Failing States‘, in which he spoke of Sierra Leone‘s plight.153 Porteous notes this trend, 
stating that ‗Sierra Leone is usually presented as the main example of successful UK 
intervention to rescue a collapsed state‘;154 and that Sierra Leone is contrasted with ‗weak 
states that have not completely failed, or have managed to overcome civil conflict and 
collapse … [such as] … Uganda, Rwanda, Mozambique, Zambia, Malawi, Ethiopia, Kenya 
and Tanzania.‘155 The state failure logic has been incorporated further into UK policy as an 
explanation for insecurity in Africa by the ACPP. The Pool‘s ‗Joint Approach to Preventing 
and Reducing Conflict in sub-Saharan Africa‘ states, ‗[a]s weakened authoritarian regimes 
lost internal control and external support, a number of states collapsed … [and] became the 
focal point for wider regional instability.‘156 Specific mentions of how state failure manifested 
to cause conflict in Sierra Leone refer to poor governance and frail state structures,
157
 
corruption amongst the political elite
158
 and an unruly security sector.
159
 This approach to the 
causes of conflict in Sierra Leone problematises state incapacity and seeks to strengthen it in 
order that ‗service delivery‘ be improved. Such increased capacity would, in theory, alleviate 
discontent amongst constituents and improve the environment for investment and thus 
economic development.
160
 DFID‘s 1997 White Paper, ‗Eliminating World Poverty‘ also 
refocuses developmental attention on the state as the institution with the power to enforce 
individual rights and security that are central to the stability required for investment.
161
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The definition of a ‗failed state‘, however, has not been entirely clear, and is often replaced by 
similarly obscure terms such as ‗fragile‘ or ‗weak‘.162 Discussion of these terms focuses on 
poor governance, weak institutions unable or unwilling to provide their services and corrupt 
political elites more interested in personal profit than in governing.
163
 Describing fragile states 
(as DFID later refers to them) in 2005, DFID defines them as: 
 
those [states] where the government cannot or will not deliver core functions to the majority 
of its people, including the poor. The most important functions of the state ... are territorial 
control, safety and security, capacity to manage public resources, delivery of basic services, 
and the ability to protect and support the ways in which the poorest people sustain 
themselves.
164
 
 
States fail, therefore, by ceasing to provide essential services, of which security is one of the 
most important. This fits with other extrapolations, such as Prime Minister Blair‘s Strategy 
Unit who stated that ‗[w]eak and failing states are often unable to meet the security and 
prosperity needs of their own people.‘165 The emphasis within these statements on service 
delivery has been noted by DFID‘s former Permanent Secretary as constituting the twenty-
first century theme of the Department (as opposed to the twentieth century theme of policy-
making).
166
 By prioritising the ability of the state to provide services, such as healthcare, 
education and, importantly, security, reforms centred on the state become the focus of 
response efforts. For instance, the ‗Causes of Conflict‘ publication goes on to claim under 
‗Responses to Conflict‘ that restoring the legitimacy of the state through improved service 
delivery is crucial to addressing state failure.
167
 Thus, by pinpointing state failure as a central 
cause of conflict in Sierra Leone, attempts to address these causes legitimate intervention into 
the state apparatus itself.
168
 As Porteous highlights, drawing on the Report of the Commission 
for Africa, ‗[i]f states could be fixed so that they ‗functioned‘ properly in terms of delivering 
basic services and security, then all would be well.‘169 The goal then is to strengthen and 
reform state institutions, of which the security services are a prime (if not the prime) 
component.  
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The state failure thesis, however, merely facilitates intervention into the state apparatus. 
While it pinpoints security provision as one of the key services which the Sierra Leonean state 
failed to provide, it does not in and of itself provide a justification for DFID‘s involvement in 
SSR. This move is dependent upon the second dominant narrative that emerges in DFID 
policy: the security-development nexus. This combines with the state failure thesis to form a 
coherent vision of the relationship between war and peace, security and development, 
legitimising SSR as an appropriate response to the causes of war in Sierra Leone.  
 
Security-development nexus 
The challenge that the issue of conflict posed to DFID is perhaps the most striking theme of 
the policy documents under review. From 1997 onwards, DFID has cast issues of conflict and 
security as being firmly within its mandate, despite the lack of precedent. The 1997 White 
Paper recognises that security is an essential pre-condition for development.
170
 By 1998, this 
claim was given greater substance in a document entitled, ‗Poverty and the Security Sector‘, 
claiming that ‗[c]oncern about insecurity is a strong concern of the poor. Evidence from 
participatory poverty assessments shows that wherever people‘s basic physical security is 
threatened ... dealing with this problem is seen by the poor as an overriding priority.‘171 This 
was supported by work done by the World Bank under their ‗Consultations with the Poor‘ 
project, in which 20,000 poor people at 468 sites in 23 countries were interviewed and 
indicated that safety, security and justice issues were of central importance to them.
172
 Yet in 
making this move, DFID was also aware that this was new and unconventional ground for a 
development agency. The ‗Poverty and Security Sector‘ document goes on to state that whilst 
‗the link between security and development has been increasingly recognised in recent years, 
particularly since the end of the Cold War ... few Development Ministries have until now 
focused directly on security sector reform.‘173 Clare Short tackled this concern in a speech at 
King‘s College London in 1999. Making the link between security and development clear, she 
argues: 
 
Twenty of the 34 poorest countries are either involved in conflict or have recently emerged 
from conflict. I believe that a security sector of appropriate size, properly tasked and managed 
is a key issue. We are therefore entering this new area of security sector reform in order to 
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strengthen our contribution to development.
174
  
 
Other efforts were made to show how conflict and insecurity negatively impacted on 
development. For instance, in 2001 DFID claimed that ‗over the past twenty years Africa has 
lost over fifty per cent of its transport infrastructure, many of the losses due to conflict.‘175 In 
2004 it highlighted that ‗war has led to consistent negative economic growth – at least 2% per 
year according to the World Bank.‘176 By 2007, the importance placed on security in 
achieving development was even stronger, with DFID claiming that ‗[w]hile aid can have a 
considerable impact on development and reducing poverty, policies beyond aid, for example 
security policy, can have an even greater impact.‘177 Simon Lawry-White, reviewing UK 
peacebuilding approaches between 1997 and 2001 notes that the security-development nexus 
is an underlying principle of UK conflict prevention efforts.
178
 Sierra Leone is an obvious 
theatre for demonstrating nexus claims, given its history of conflict and its ranking at the 
bottom of the UN‘s human development index since the 1990s. 
 
The state failure arguments regarding the causes of war in Sierra Leone, paired with the 
security-development nexus thinking within DFID to create a neat and unifying argument 
about how to get from war to peace and from insecurity to development. Its rationalisation 
suggests that as the Sierra Leonean state failed, service delivery by government security 
forces, schools and health programmes (to name but a few) broke down. The collapse of these 
services meant that people were rendered insecure due to an absence of police and military 
and were also unable to access education, health care or other government services. Without a 
judicial system, corrupt individuals and criminal groups could not be held to account for their 
actions. The poorer people were, the less they were able to protect themselves from such 
actors and thus the more insecure they became. Equally, the more insecure people were, the 
poorer they became as they could no longer work, go to school or invest safely in their 
futures. In failing to provide services, the state could thus no longer protect its citizens from 
violent forces or insulate them from the spiralling costs (both financial and in terms of safety) 
of accessing healthcare, education and foodstuffs. Poverty and conflict therefore existed in a 
state of mutual dependence and where one worsened, the other similarly deteriorated. As 
Schümer (quoting a DFID report) explains: 
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DFID maintains that ―poverty can only be eradicated through the resolution of violent 
conflict‖ and vice versa and believes that violent conflict, while indicative of a structural 
deficiency, is an aberration of a historical movement towards sustainable development and 
liberal democracy.
179
  
 
Thus, to reduce poverty is to prevent conflict and to resolve conflict is to support the 
alleviation of poverty. Or, as Hilary Benn, former Secretary of State for International 
Development states: ‗Development without security is impossible; security without 
development is only temporary.‘180 With these two ‗aberrations‘ removed both peace and 
development will take hold, as investors are attracted to an increasingly stable environment, 
and the developmental model propounded by Western donors such as DFID will be rendered 
unproblematic.  
 
Security Sector Reform 
This interpretation of the situation in Sierra Leone pinpoints the state (through state failure 
arguments) as the epicentre of breakdown and the key cause of the war. Reforms to 
comprehensively address the causes of conflict (according to DFID‘s dominant narratives) 
must strengthen the state by improving service delivery and one of the principal services that 
can strengthen the state, protect its citizens and create stability for investment and 
development is the security sector.
181
 As security is now perceived as being within the bounds 
of DFID‘s development work (given the international and domestic context in which DFID 
was established), reform of the security sector is a legitimate area of engagement. The state 
security sector, therefore, becomes the vehicle for ensuring security and development. Thus, 
SSR represents a logical approach to addressing the causes of conflict in Sierra Leone. As the 
Conflict and Humanitarian Affairs Department within DFID notes: 
 
Security sector reform is central to DFID‘s mission of poverty reduction. Badly managed and 
bloated security forces hamper development, discourage investment, and help to perpetuate 
poverty. On the other hand, well-managed and effective security forces operating within 
institutional frameworks defined by law, can be a force for good. Security sector reform can 
help create stability, promote human rights, and achieve transparency and accountable security 
expenditure.
182
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Strengthening the security sector feeds into a broader process of the transition from war to 
peace (and security to development). Following security-development nexus thinking, with 
the security sector functioning appropriately and effectively with the help of SSR, 
development can then take place in a more conducive environment.
183
 This enables peace by 
means of effective and disciplined security forces. The stability provided by this secure 
environment paves the way for increased investment, development and prosperity for the 
wider population. As Adrian Horn (senior policing adviser to the UK‘s police reform 
programme in Sierra Leone), ‗Funmi Olonisakin and Gordon Peake note, ‗[t]he UK 
government sees SSR as a foundational pre-requisite for the achievement of broad 
development goals.‘184 SSR then is doubly valuable, as it addresses state failure (which DFID 
sees as the cause of conflict in Sierra Leone) and it lays the foundations upon which DFID 
can also achieve its goals of poverty reduction and development through security-
development nexus thinking. 
 
Having problematised the state as a cause of the war and reading state failure to be the 
breakdown of service delivery functions, security provision through the UK‘s SSR 
programme has concomitantly focused predominantly upon state forces. Most notably, these 
include the Republic of Sierra Leone Armed Forces, the Sierra Leone Police, the Office for 
National Security, the Central Intelligence and Security Unit and the formal judicial system. 
This adheres to the reform logic that disciplined, effective and democratic security forces will 
be better placed to fulfil their mandate of protecting citizens, thus allowing a stable 
environment in which the country can develop.
185
 Such development will, in turn, improve the 
country‘s chances of remaining conflict-free, as will the presence of a reliable security force, 
capable of confronting threats. This state-focused SSR response fits more broadly with 
international trends of operationalising peacebuilding through state building. As Volker 
Boege and others explain ‗state-building today is seen by major donors as a central dimension 
of development assistance, and functioning and effective state institutions are seen as a 
prerequisite for sustainable development.‘186 
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Conclusion 
This chapter has sought to provide a rationalisation of DFID‘s policy approach to Sierra 
Leone. It has demonstrated how DFID came into being in the midst of particular international 
and domestic contexts which shaped the new aid department. The form that DFID took led it 
to engage with Sierra Leone in particular ways at the policy level. Policy documents were 
then excavated to reveal dominant narratives that indicate the thinking behind DFID‘s 
response to the war in Sierra Leone. The state failure argument regarding the causes of war 
justifies intervention into the state apparatus, focusing upon the security sector as the essential 
coercive component of statehood. The security-development nexus has complemented this 
state failure thinking and transformed the understanding of the causes of war into a broader 
and more comprehensive explanation about the causes of war, peace, security and 
development. Thus, by intervening to reform the security sector, security and stability will be 
fostered, allowing development to occur, thus fortifying peace and decreasing the likelihood 
of a return to conflict.  
 
These dominant narratives fit together to provide a comprehensive explanation of the causes 
of peace and war, and security and development. A neat and unifying programme cycle can 
therefore be discerned. The UK‘s engagement with Sierra Leone has been guided by a new 
closeness of security and development agendas. The specific nature of that engagement can be 
linked to the ways in which the causes of war were implicitly understood, through the rubric 
of state failure and the security-development nexus. This has led to a focus on strengthening 
state institutions and pairing security and development objectives in a mutually dependent 
manner. Security sector reform offered a unique opportunity to simultaneously address both 
dilemmas. This programme, an exercise in the joined-up government that the merging of 
security and development required, promoted state controlled security. State centrism 
prioritised the formal state organisations of security, such as the police, military and 
intelligence services as the prime agents for effecting the change that would allow, 
comprehensively, for security, development and peace to follow. This DFID worldview was 
facilitated by international trends bringing security and development into a more proximate 
relationship and a domestic political scene in the UK that gave Africa unprecedented priority, 
promoted an ethical foreign policy and an independent aid department, and advocated 
intervention on humanitarian grounds. 
 
Yet how much of this seemingly comprehensive rationalisation reflects actual experiences of 
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war and security in Sierra Leone? To what extent is the reality of on-the-ground security 
provision and conflict causes encapsulated in DFID‘s policy approach? As Robert Egnell and 
Peter Halden note, the state structures that DFID aims to reform are not necessarily the 
structures through which governance is provided in Sierra Leone: 
 
The European experience, state form and formative trajectory is not universal but specific. For 
example, the form of state and formative trajectory in many African states is radically 
different. These points are not ―merely‖ academic or of interest only to historians and 
sociologists but have profound consequences for the enterprise of state-building as 
practitioners, politicians and academics coming from one particular tradition, which is often 
universalised and taken for granted, attempt to establish the state institutions of one tradition 
in very different contexts ... Stressing differences in state forms is not culturally or 
civilisationally essentialist or relativist. Nor does it portray non-Western states and societies as 
exotic, and it does not ascribe differences in state structure to any kind of ethnic or cultural 
differences. Rather it implies that we have to recognise the importance and salience of 
structural and cultural contexts if we are to achieve at least a fraction of the goals we set.
187
 
 
These concerns shall be addressed in the following chapter, suggesting that DFID‘s policy 
approach might not explain as much as it portends. For our purposes here, however, DFID – 
in spite of its protestations of having no definitive policy on SSR or Sierra Leone – appears to 
implicitly maintain an incredibly coherent image of conflict, security and development that 
centres upon the state.
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2 
 Challenging UK Policy:  
‘Thicker’ understandings of conflict, security and governance  
 
‗reality … must first be known about before it can be reformed‘1 
 
A re-reading of the conflict in Sierra Leone reveals a complex matrix of war, security and 
governance that DFID‘s thin policy narratives cannot account for. This chapter examines the 
causes of war drawing upon fieldwork interviews and accounts from researchers and 
academics with in-depth experience in Sierra Leone. These insights highlight simplifications 
made within DFID policy in the face of significant local complexity. The manner in which 
DFID has understood the conflict in Sierra Leone clearly has implications for the reforms that 
it delivers. If DFID has misinterpreted the causes of the war, then it is likely that its reform 
programmes are not addressing the full panoply of problems facing Sierra Leone.  
 
In setting this out, it is necessary to look beyond state failure to the authorities that play a 
more central role in the lives of the majority of Sierra Leoneans. Charting the role that chiefs
2
 
and secret societies play in Sierra Leonean society reveals their centrality to the 
administration of governance at a local level. It is then demonstrated how the failure of these 
informal actors to provide equitable and just services created grievances amongst rural youth, 
compelling many to join the Revolutionary United Front (RUF), also indicating a failure of 
the chieftaincy system to maintain order. The administration of the chieftaincy system and its 
related secret societies can thus be seen as one of the causes of civil war. In order to 
effectively address the causes of conflict and ensure a sustainable peace, DFID would 
therefore need to engage not only in reform of the state, but also in reform of informal actors. 
Arguments that strengthening the state will simultaneously render the chieftaincy system 
redundant are rebuffed for their lack of recognition of the interwoven nature of the state and 
chieftaincy system in Sierra Leone. The chapter returns briefly in the final section to DFID 
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policy to determine whether it acknowledges the importance of informal actors in security 
sector reform efforts. 
 
The claim of the chapter is not that DFID‘s understanding of the situation in Sierra Leone is 
entirely wrong, but rather that the effectiveness of DFID‘s SSR programme is limited because 
the understanding of the causes of war that underlies DFID policy is ‗thin‘. In contrast, this 
chapter seeks to provide a ‗thick‘ account of the causes of war and nature of security 
governance in Sierra Leone. In so doing, it draws upon the work of Clifford Geertz who 
popularised ‗thick‘ and ‗thin‘ notions of understanding.3 Employing the example of a wink, 
Geertz demonstrates the point.
4
 Understood at a ‗thin‘ level, the action is described as a 
contraction of the eyelid. A thick description takes into account this action and probes deeper 
to examine its cultural significance, understanding it as a wink and thus a meaningful 
communicative gesture.
5
 It is thus to understand practices within their cultural context, 
involving an ethnography of practice, rather than merely thinly recounting actions that are not 
culturally understood.
6
 Incorporating a notion of ‗thickness‘ into understandings of the causes 
of war in Sierra Leone recognises the deeper layers of failure that require comprehension and 
reform in order to build a sustainably peaceful society. A thicker or deeper understanding 
provides a multi-causal, rather than mono-causal explanation of the conflict. 
 
Adopting a state failure approach to the conflict, as DFID does, is not necessarily 
incompatible with local understandings of the causes of war – but this failure occurred at a 
significantly broader level than DFID appears to have realised and the state is but one of its 
victims. Failure is not merely of the bureaucratic state, but also of the chieftaincy system, 
suggesting that governance goes beyond the bureaucratic level of the state to the informal 
structures of the chieftaincy system. By focusing primarily on the state in reform efforts, 
DFID misses the other layers at which failure is also embedded. Ultimately, this chapter seeks 
to demonstrate the crucial role played by the chieftaincy system in creating the conditions for 
conflict. Without factoring the breakdown of the chieftaincy system into its analysis, DFID 
misunderstands the locus of failure and sets itself up to reform only some of the problematic 
institutions and practices. In order to provide a thicker account of the causes of war in Sierra 
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Leone, the prevalence of the chieftaincy system and secret societies in the daily lives of their 
subjects requires elaboration. 
 
Chiefs: The ‘missing bottom’ of governance in Sierra Leone7 
The chieftaincy system in Sierra Leone is frequently pointed to as an institution that Sierra 
Leoneans cannot imagine living without.
8
 Despite widespread recognition of serious problems 
within chieftaincy, it seems few, if any Sierra Leoneans advocate abandoning this system.
9
 
Rather, chiefs are spoken of as the custodians of culture and the human face of government 
who know their people.
10
 Paul Jackson refers to the chiefdom as ‗the basic unit of local 
government.‘11 As their extensive functions demonstrate, chiefs are an integral component of 
governance provision in Sierra Leone and cannot be easily separated from the state, either 
theoretically or in practice. 
 
History of Chieftaincy 
The chieftaincy system in Sierra Leone arises out of a mixture of cultural precedent, 
colonialism and patrimonialism. Little has been written about the functions of pre-colonial 
traditional leaders and it is difficult to determine how longstanding current functions are. 
Edward Sawyer suggests: 
  
Chieftaincy in late-pre-colonial Sierra Leone was an unstable institution founded on a not 
always consistent mixture of biological legitimacy, patrimonial largesse and military strength, 
where popular allegiances were tempered by tensions between ruling and non-ruling houses, 
between freemen and slaves, and between the potential advantages of going it alone and those 
to be had from allying with rival chiefs.
12
 
 
An interview with a paramount chief in Sierra Leone indicated that traditional leaders were 
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chosen in pre-colonial times for their impressive skill sets.
13
 Most often, these skills were in 
hunting and fighting, but also at times in diplomacy and intellect.
14
 Yet this oral history was 
less exact on their pre-colonial functions. With so few pre-colonial sources it remains difficult 
to determine whether the roles and responsibilities of modern day chiefs resemble that of their 
pre-colonial ancestors. It seems inevitable that whatever ‗traditional‘ functions may remain 
will have been influenced by the modern state, which now shares the governance portfolio 
with the chiefs.  
 
While pre-colonial Sierra Leone possessed tribal leaders of the kingdoms that were to be 
unified through colonialism, no ‗chiefs‘ or ‗paramount chiefs‘ existed by that terminology.15 
Reference to chiefs began when the Crown Colony of Freetown and the Western Area was 
established in 1808 and colonial officials began travelling upcountry to make friendship 
treaties with traditional leaders to facilitate trade.
16
 The terminology of ‗chiefs‘ was formally 
established when the provinces of Sierra Leone became the Sierra Leone Protectorate in 1896. 
While the Crown Colony (Freetown and the Western Area) continued to be governed by a 
direct officer administration, the Protectorate (upcountry provinces) was governed through the 
British policy of indirect rule.
17
 As a result, the British colonisers required local leaders to 
implement their ordinances, collect their taxes, and control their subjects. The British used the 
leaders of the kingdoms and gave them the title of chiefs (predominant elsewhere in the 
British African colonies).
18
 Explaining this process, Richard Fanthorpe claims that the British 
‗created a multiplicity of small chiefdoms in order to facilitate tax collection, often 
dismantling large pre-colonial polities in the process.‘19 The concept of chiefs and paramount 
chiefs was entrenched further as a result of the Hut Tax War of 1898. The Protectorate 
Ordinance, which established the Sierra Leonean Protectorate in 1896, also proposed a 
taxation scheme for the provinces:  
 
Every owner of a habitable house in the Protectorate was, from January 1 1898, to be liable 
henceforth to an annual tax of five shillings, and for houses of four rooms or more, ten 
shillings; whilst every village whose number of houses was under twenty no tax would be 
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imposed. The amount could either be paid in cash or kind, that is, one bushel of rice or one 
bushel of palm kernels, taken at its trade value, as equivalent to cash.
20
 
 
Some chiefdoms refused to participate ‗in what they perceived to be the demeaning exercise 
of tax collection for a higher political authority‘.21 Whilst chiefs were entitled to keep part of 
the tax, the majority was for the British administration, and specifically the building of a 
railway network in Sierra Leone, which would facilitate commerce.
22
 It has been suggested 
that many chiefs were not aware that in signing the treaty that turned the provinces into a 
Protectorate, they were handing control of their territory and subjects over to the British.
23
 It 
is entirely plausible that many chiefs assumed the treaty was similar to many of the friendship 
treaties that they had signed in the past – which stipulated that the British would protect them 
from other colonial powers (the French were aggressively pushing into modern-day Sierra 
Leone throughout the 1800s) and they in turn would facilitate trade with the Freetown 
Colony.
24
 The imposition of the Hut Tax was thus the first instance in which chiefs were 
made aware that their power would henceforth be transformed. A rebellion (often overlooked 
in British colonial histories) was launched by various traditional leaders and ultimately 
suppressed by the British. Those leaders who agreed to the tax and facilitated British 
administration, or who ‗replaced‘ (at British discretion) executed recalcitrant leaders, were 
recognised as chiefs.
 25
 ‗For organisational and administrative purposes they [the British] 
divided the protectorate into many small ―chiefdoms‖ each governed by a ―paramount 
chief‖‘,26 with town and section chiefs under them.27 Henceforth paramount chiefs were 
derived from two or three ‗ruling houses‘ (particular families, at times selected by the British) 
in each chiefdom and served for life, thus making paramount chieftaincy a largely hereditary 
title.
28
 Yet, as Richard Fanthorpe explains: 
 
It has … been shown that British officials‘ assumption that pre-colonial chiefship was a 
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hereditary estate, owned by ‗ruling families‘ (or ‗houses‘), sometimes had little historical 
basis. Furthermore the early British administration was not averse to promoting men – and 
occasionally women – to paramount chiefship on the basis of willingness to collaborate rather 
than previous political status.
29
 
 
The hereditary title of chieftaincy was a British misunderstanding, based upon customary 
practices of some communities in Sierra Leone, but not the majority. The broader idea that 
chieftaincy is a traditional custom derived from local precedent is also a misunderstanding 
and only true insofar as it is a little over 100 years old and introduced through coercive 
colonialism as much as independent cultural evolution.
30
 As Paul Jackson notes, ‗[i]n other 
words, paramount chiefs are only traditional in so far as the British labelled them as such.‘31 
 
Colonialism augmented the role and powers of chiefs in an enduring manner. During this time 
the adminstrative functions of the chiefs expanded to include new powers. In 1901 chiefdom 
police were approved and ‗charged with preserving law and order‘ in the provinces.32 In 1902 
the colonial government recognised chiefdom courts, which administered customary law. 
William Reno, highlighting the impact of this change, notes that it ‗gave chiefs explicit state 
approval to implement forced labour and impose sanctions against those challenging their 
chiefly authority. Other ―reforms‖ allocated chiefs broad powers to enforce their decisions 
with little local control or accountability.‘33 These functions were added to further throughout 
the 1930s so that:  
 
chiefs became everything from ―health authorities‖ (1931), to ―education officers‖ (1935), to 
enhanced ―court magistrates‖ (1937). Crucial for their later influence over informal diamond 
markets, chiefs were given greater legal powers over alienation of land, control of settlement 
and local immigration.
34
 
 
Many of these colonial-era responsibilities remain in the modern chieftaincy system. 
Contemporary chiefs have a variety of functions and wield considerable power. As Sawyer 
notes, ‗chiefs still retain strong support in underpinning rural communities and protecting 
citizens in a country that has a history of centralised governance and abuses of bureaucratic 
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power.‘35 
 
Having been administered separately, the Colony and Protectorate, together constituting 
modern-day Sierra Leone, were only united ten years prior to independence under a 1951 
constitution.
36
 This division between the capital and the provinces was historically kept in 
place not only geographically, but ethnically, with Freetown being settled by Creole or Krio 
freed slaves, whilst the interior was constituted by various local ethnic groups, predominantly 
the Mende and Temne. Whilst Freetown is now substantially more multi-ethnic, the capital-
province divide remains and, as Jackson notes ‗has led to a continued juxtaposition of state 
police and chiefdom police, magistrate‘s courts and customary courts, national tax and 
chiefdom tax, etc.‘.37 Since independence, this bifurcation has meant that the provinces 
continue to be a governance afterthought as national governments prioritise the needs and 
interests of the wealthier and more economically active capital and its immediate surrounds. 
This was most evident under President Siaka Stevens, who increasingly centralised authority 
under a one-party state. As Jackson notes, ‗since independence from Britain in 1961, the main 
feature of Sierra Leone‘s political system has been increasing centralisation of power and 
resources in Freetown. An integral part of this was Siaka Stevens‘ abolition of local 
government in 1972.‘38 
 
Centralisation resulted in government policy becoming increasingly irrelevant to the 
provinces, determined as it was in Freetown for Freetown concerns. As a former RUF fighter 
explained, the rationale of the government was that ‗if Freetown has light, Sierra Leone has 
light‘ (referring to the country‘s intermittent power supply).39 The provinces were thus 
increasingly removed from the centre and relied more heavily upon the chieftaincy system, 
which was inherited by the Sierra Leonean Republic from the colonial period at 
independence. This, in turn, increased the relative power of the provincial chiefs, who were 
left to their own devices so long as their actions did not negatively impact on the government 
in Freetown.
40
 Richard Fanthorpe suggests: 
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The colonial divide between colony and protectorate, and concentration of state and service 
activity in Freetown, has left chiefs in Sierra Leone in a stronger political position than many 
of their counterparts in other West African countries. ‗Straddling‘ chiefdom and state politics 
remains the foundation of many political careers in Sierra Leone.
41
 
 
The portfolio of these uniquely powerful chiefs can be divided into four key areas of 
responsibility: taxation; law and order; culture; and land. Together, these substantial areas of 
authority demonstrate the power and centrality of chiefs to the daily affairs of provincial 
Sierra Leoneans. 
 
Taxation 
Taxation is, understandably for chiefs, one of the most important of their powers, as it 
provides the basis of chiefs‘ incomes and the salaries of their staff. Chieftain authority to levy 
taxes has been historically contentious, with the Hut Tax War threatening these powers during 
colonialism.
42
 Ongoing centralisation of state power in Freetown from independence in 1961 
to the end of the civil war in 2002 allowed chiefs to exercise their powers with little outside 
interference. With the recognition, however, that poor governance, particularly of the 
provinces, by the state was a cause of conflict, the central government has sought to 
decentralise its powers to Local or District Councils (formerly abolished by Siaka Stevens in 
1972).
43
 This has resulted in chiefs and the Councils operating overlapping jurisdictions, and 
has created tensions in some areas such as taxation and finance. As Paul Jackson notes, 
‗[l]ocal government finance has never really been a ‗sexy‘ subject. However in Sierra Leone, 
the financial structure of local government has become a burning issue in so far as it links 
traditional chiefs [and] modern local government.‘44  
 
The new Local Government Act (2004) is the formal legislation that brings chiefs into state 
government. In doing so, however, it creates space for probable conflict between chiefs and 
Councils. As Jackson explains: 
 
One of the most contentious issues, which will undoubtedly lead to conflict in some areas is 
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the collection of the local tax. This is a poll tax levied on every adult. Historically this has 
been set centrally at 500 Leones a year (around 20 US cents) and collected by the chiefs. 
Under the new law, the tax is still collected by the chiefs, but they share the tax with the local 
government, following the pre-1972 system. In addition the setting of the level of tax is now a 
district-level decision. In other words, the district sets the tax level, the chief collects it, and 
then they share the proceeds (there are no guidelines about how to allocate shares in the 
Act).
45
 
 
There is a division, then, within the taxation system that renders it both a modern government 
and traditional chieftaincy power. To some extent this linking of chiefs and government is 
meant to ensure taxation is more accountable and consistent than the days when chiefs had 
relatively unfettered taxing authority. Yet by splitting the taxation process, ample room is left 
for malpractice. For instance, Councils may set the tax rate at 500 Leones per head. Chiefs 
may then collect tax at a rate of 550 Leones per head, making a profit on the side. Or, as 
Jackson suggests: 
 
If a tax collector or government inspector attempts to estimate the amount of head tax due 
from an area, he is forced to ask the local headman. The local headman will under-report the 
population and therefore the amount due. There are no accurate population records so no 
checks can be performed. The headman will then collect the correct amount of tax from each 
individual and pocket the difference, or divide it with the chiefdom treasurer.
46
 
 
Chiefs can justify such behaviour on the basis that they are now made to share tax with the 
Local Councils (the central government in Freetown declared that Councils should be 
financially self-sustaining as of 2008).
47
 Chiefs claim that this has decreased their funds and 
they are now unable to pay themselves or their staff adequately. One paramount chief insisted 
there is only enough money to pay his staff for two months of each year.
48
 Through taxation, 
chiefs thus continue to serve their own conventional purpose within the community (in 
collecting taxes to cover the costs of the services they provide), while also contributing (not 
necessarily voluntarily) to formal government structures. The dual authority for taxation 
clearly incorporates chiefs into the formal government through the Local Councils, although 
not without tension. The traditional tax collection authority of the chiefs may have been 
modernised, but the power still also remains vested in the chieftaincy institution and thus 
provides chiefs with a key governance function. 
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Law and Order 
Linked to revenue raising activities, chiefs are also responsible for justice, law and order 
within their chiefdoms. Chiefs interviewed for this thesis reiterated law and order as their 
central purpose, alongside maintenance of culture and tradition.
49
 There are several 
mechanisms through which chiefs fulfil this conventionally state-based function 
(conventional, that is, according to Western practices). The most visible of the justice systems 
in the provinces are the Local Courts (the courts that arbitrate on customary law outside of 
Freetown, where formal English law predominates), applying to approximately 70 – 80 per 
cent of Sierra Leoneans.
50
 Chiefs do not technically wield power within the Local Courts. 
Since 1963 Court Chairmen have been nominated by chiefs as arbiters for these Courts, and 
are meant to be confirmed by the government, through the Minister for Local Government.
51
 
However, in practice, a ‗cabinet‘ of the paramount chief and eight section chiefs ‗recommend‘ 
a person to the government, and this has rarely (if ever) been rejected.
52
 The paramount chief 
also acts as an ‗adviser‘, and appoints four other ‗court members‘ to advise the selected Local 
Court Chairman.
53
 In this sense, chiefs can be seen to select the Court Chairmen themselves, 
and ensure a strong role for themselves in determining the nature of justice that the Courts 
deliver. One of the paramount chiefs interviewed indicated how important it is that chiefs 
retain this power (as moves are now afoot to shift this power of selection to the judiciary 
under a Local Courts Bill, yet to be debated by Parliament).
54
 He claims that the ‗cabinet‘ of 
chiefs know their subjects and are able to determine which of them understands the local 
culture and is aware of the ancestry of the land (important in resolving land disputes), in a 
way that the government or judiciary does not.
55
 This means that the chiefs are able to 
determine which person will best serve the community, based upon a high level of local 
knowledge, unfathomable to outsiders.  
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Local Courts offer a more accessible form of justice to most Sierra Leoneans than the formal 
court system (according to the Sierra Leone Bar Association there are only seven lawyers in 
private practice outside of Freetown).
56
 They are widely perceived to be cheaper than the 
formal court system, although as Clare Castillejo discovered in researching the justice system 
in Sierra Leone: 
 
The customary justice system is also expensive. While citizens must pay a substantial fee in 
order to bring a case before the local courts, by far the biggest costs are the fines levied by 
these courts. In all the districts visited, it was reported that local courts often levy exorbitant 
fines, well beyond the limits of their legal mandate. Those who are unable to pay these fines 
must either leave the chiefdom or serve time in prison. It is clear that court fines are a major 
source of income for local courts and chiefdoms.
57
 
 
Excessive fines were a key grievance of many who participated in the civil war and there is 
little evidence to suggest that they are decreasing in the post-conflict environment.
58
 
Technically the jurisdiction of Local Courts is limited to cases where claims are not more than 
200 Leones (although confusion exists as to the exact amount), and over crimes that carry a 
penalty of less than six months in prison.
59
 However, these limits are not apparently 
understood in practice. As Castillejo again notes: 
 
It was widely reported that customary courts often adjudicate on cases that are beyond their 
jurisdiction and should be sent to the formal courts, thereby denying people the justice process 
that they are entitled to and a justice outcome that is in line with the national legislation and 
constitutional rights that the formal courts must uphold.
60
 
 
Alongside the Local Court system, which is constitutionally enshrined, chiefs also operate a 
more arbitrary (and technically illegal) conflict resolution function. If one of their subjects is 
in dispute with another over a relatively minor matter – a small sum of money, an ongoing 
argument, fighting or other bad behaviour, the matter may be taken to the chief, rather than 
the Local Court.
61
 This process is quicker and generally less costly (depending on the 
resulting fine). Unlike the Local Courts, users do not have to pay for travel (each village has 
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its own chief but not necessarily a Local Court), accommodation and the travel and 
accommodation costs of witnesses. In this instance, subjects generally only have to (literally) 
pay their respects – either through a small fee, food or in-kind payment.62 The chief will then 
settle the dispute after speaking to the relevant parties. Determinations are not based on any 
fixed law or jurisdiction, but a loose customary code that differs from chiefdom to 
chiefdom.
63
 Chief‘s justice generally results in a fine for one or both of the parties.64 The 
problem, it seems, arises with the level of the fines, which many argue are unnecessarily 
high.
65
 The chiefs retort that the fines need to be high in order to have their ‗disciplining‘ and 
‗deterrent‘ effect.66 Small fines, it is argued, would not be as useful in achieving this. 
 
Chiefs are assisted in their law and order duties by chiefdom police who act as Local Court 
attendants and carry out the chief‘s business (summoning people to the chief or Court for 
instance). One paramount chief claimed that the chiefdom police are ‗the backbone of security 
in their communities.‘67 Yet the chiefdom police have been sidelined by the government and 
international donors alike. While the Sierra Leone Police (SLP) have been through a 
comprehensive reform programme, the chiefdom police are not trained and have no uniforms 
or weapons.
68
 Chiefs have the impression that they are completely disrespected.
69
 Their role 
in Sierra Leonean society remains somewhat ambiguous and little could be gleaned from 
interviews about their purpose. It seems that they formerly carried out general policing 
functions, when state police were either sparsely spread across the provinces, or uninterested 
in policing duties, as occurred in the lead up to and during the war. It was suggested in an 
interview with a Paramount Chief that chiefs and their staff (principally the chiefdom police) 
previously suffered less interference in carrying out their law and order duties according to 
their own practices.
70
 The better trained and funded SLP are now seen to have trespassed onto 
these ‗traditional‘ roles.    
                                                 
62
 Author interview with Paramount Chief Mohammed Tshombe Kargoi the 2
nd
, Wunde Chiefdom, Bo District, 
19 March 2009. 
63
 Author interview with Justice Fofana, Justice of the High Court of Sierra Leone, 10 March 2009. 
64
 Author interview with Paramount Chief Mohammed Tshombe Kargoi the 2
nd
, Wunde Chiefdom, Bo District, 
19 March 2009. 
65
 Peters, ―Footpaths to Reintegration,‖ 34-37. 
66
 Author interview with Paramount Chief Mohammed Tshombe Kargoi the 2
nd
, Wunde Chiefdom, Bo District, 
19 March 2009. 
67
 Ibid. 
68
 Ibid. Although, as is dealt with in chapter four, efforts are now underway to rectify this as part of DFID‘s 
Justice Sector Development Programme. 
69
 Author interview with Paramount Chief Amara Bonya Vangahun, Nongowa Chiefdom, Kenema District, 20 
March 2009. 
70
 Author interview with Paramount Chief Mohammed Tshombe Kargoi the 2
nd
, Wunde Chiefdom, Bo District, 
19 March 2009. 
  
70 
 
Finally, chiefs also carry out law, order and justice functions through controlling the 
movements of people through their chiefdoms. As individuals become ‗strangers‘, that is, 
move outside of their own chiefdom, they are expected to inform the chief in any chiefdom 
they enter of their presence and intentions.
71
 In this way, chiefs exercise a kind of 
immigration official role – maintaining order through an omnipotent knowledge of the 
demography of their chiefdom at any given time. Given that strangers are perceived as less 
reliable than those indigenous to a chiefdom, as their ancestry and (tied to this) their character 
are unknown, chiefs must keep a close eye on the newcomers.  
 
Custodians of Culture 
Chiefs are frequently referred to in Sierra Leone as the custodians of culture.
72
 This appears to 
be the role that most Sierra Leoneans associate with their ‗traditional‘ leaders. They are seen 
as the link between the ancestors and traditional cultural practices of the past and the present. 
This is most clear in the chief‘s patronage of the two main secret societies in Sierra Leone – 
the poro and the sande (or bundu).
73
 These are, respectively, the initiation societies for males 
and females. They involve up to three months in the bush with society leaders who teach the 
youths of adult ways of life and perform ritual ceremonies, such as clitoridectomy (female 
circumcision).
74
 The majority of Sierra Leoneans in the provinces go through the societies‘ 
initiation practices (it is estimated that 94% of those eligible in provincial Sierra Leone join a 
secret society
75
 and the prevalence of the societies continues to be noted in the literature).
76
 
These rituals are highly secretive and mark a rite of passage which prepares initiates for adult 
life and marriage.
77
 Stephen Ellis and Gerrie Ter Haar note the historical and continuing 
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power of secret societies: 
 
In those areas of West and Central Africa that generally had no bureaucratic form of 
government before colonial times, secret societies often played an important part in politics 
and governance in the broadest sense. In many cases, the establishment of Christianity and 
bureaucratic government in colonial times has not led to these secret societies fading into 
insignificance but rather to their incorporation into modern systems of rule.
78
 
 
As the guardians of the secret societies, chiefs preside over an important cultural institution 
which is a formative aspect of most Sierra Leoneans‘ lives. This relationship between the 
chiefs and the secret societies has a long history. As Northcoate Thomas notes in his 1916 
anthropological study, ‗[t]here is a clear relation between the chieftainship and the Poro 
society … [its] function is, among other things, to maintain the chief‘s authority. So close is 
the connection that chiefs may be spoken of as … Poro chiefs.‘79 Further, Jackson highlights 
the important role played by chiefs in the secret societies: 
 
An additional consideration is the relationship between chieftaincy and the secret societies. 
The subtleties of most secret societies are a closed door to most researchers, but their 
influence is a constant in Sierra Leonean politics. To stand as a paramount chief, one has to be 
a member, and in the Temne, Loko, Limba, Susu, Koranko and Yalunka tribes, the paramount 
chief is both the spiritual and the political authority over the chiefdom. It is also commonly 
asserted that critical governance issues have been decided by the secret societies.
80
 
 
The significance of the societies‘ teaching to many Sierra Leoneans also renders it a manner 
of cultural education. In many instances, this may constitute the ‗finishing school‘ for many 
youths who have received only several years of primary education. Further, secret societies 
operate as informal justice mechanisms, resolving disputes between initiates and within the 
community.
81
 Drawing upon focus group discussions held throughout Sierra Leone, Magnus 
Jörgel and Mats Utas note that up to one third of Sierra Leoneans consider secret societies to 
play an important role in security provision and that the importance of the societies is 
increasing post-conflict.
82
 This is particularly so of the poro society and is indicative of the 
patriarchal bias in Sierra Leone.  
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The cultural estate of the chiefs is thus significant. They represent, perhaps more strongly than 
the state, the identity of many Sierra Leoneans. As Roger Tangri noted in the late 1970s: 
 
The chiefdoms … constitute the chief focus of loyalty for the vast majority of the people (80 
percent of Sierra Leone‘s population live in chiefdoms). The individual is largely first and 
foremost a member of a chiefdom whose geographical limits are known, whose officials are 
often dealt with on a personal basis, and whose authority system is understood.
83
 
 
Key contributors to more recent debates on Sierra Leone, such as Paul Richards and Richard 
Fanthorpe, also point to the importance of chiefdom-level politics in shaping the identities of 
Sierra Leoneans.
84
 Cultural governance may not be a conventional governance portfolio but 
its resonance with many Sierra Leoneans is deeply embedded. Further, the secret societies 
carry out what can loosely be described as education and justice functions. Regardless of the 
desirability of such practices, these activities are an integral component of the governance and 
security architecture in Sierra Leone.  
 
Land 
Finally, chiefs are the custodians of the land and, unlike land in the Western Area (what was 
the Crown Colony) their legal right to the land is inalienable, meaning that no other title can 
remove their absolute ownership (except in the case of some mining rights, which can fall 
under national jurisdiction).
85
 This affords chiefs extensive powers in determining who may 
farm, mine or live on the land within their chiefdom and allows them to extract payment for 
such privileges. However, chiefs interviewed for this research explained that now they cannot 
legally remove land from a family if the family lawfully owns it (that is, if their ancestors 
owned it).
86
 Their powers regarding the land now more frequently involve settling land 
disputes, as chiefs possess the historical knowledge of each of their subject‘s entitlements 
through ancestry.
87
 They can, however, still extract payment for newly acquired land, and still 
receive royalties from mining companies operating within their chiefdom.
88
 This ability to 
control land rights, determine ownership and charge for land usage represents an incredibly 
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powerful chieftain function which has a significant impact on the people of provincial Sierra 
Leone. Peoples‘ entitlements to land are determined largely by their chiefs, rather than a 
government department.  
 
These four-fold chieftain functions – taxation, law and order, culture and land – demonstrate 
the broad administrative powers that these informal actors wield. These roles ensure that 
chiefs‘ proximity to their subjects is significantly closer than that of the state, which has 
historically been at a remove from the provinces.
89
 The failures in governance and justice that 
many, including DFID, have pointed to as the causes of the war, then, will be demonstrated 
below as not residing purely in the formal state structures in Freetown. Rather, these failures 
reside in the actual practices of governance, which for the majority of Sierra Leoneans means 
the chieftaincy system – through which they derive their law, order and justice, land rights 
and cultural identity and through which they pay their taxes.  
 
The manner in which these functions have been carried out by chiefs have not been 
unproblematic and have, in fact, contributed to the grievances that led some to violently revolt 
against authority structures in Sierra Leone. In this sense, the chieftaincy system (alongside 
the state) can be seen to have failed. At one level, it has failed to provide a just social order. 
This may appear to be a normative judgment but it is also, as the following section reveals, an 
objectively observed phenomenon attested to by many Sierra Leoneans on all sides of the 
conflict. A just social order can thus be seen as a prerequisite of governance imposed by 
Sierra Leoneans. At another level, the chieftaincy system has also failed on its own terms. The 
chieftaincy system was instituted under colonialism, and has been retained throughout 
independence, to govern the provinces and to maintain order. Often this order has been 
maintained through oppressive and coercive practices – and thus might be said to have 
worked only too well. However, chieftaincy fails to fulfil its own purpose when such 
oppressive and coercive practices become sufficiently extreme as to undermine the 
maintenance of social order. By administering their chiefdoms without sufficient regard for 
justice or good governance, to the point that grievances led some to join a rebellion, the 
chieftaincy system has failed in its central purpose of maintaining order. These failures shall 
be examined here, providing a ‗thicker‘ account of the causes of war and thus pointing to 
actors beyond the state as also being in need of reform. 
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‘Thick’ causes of war 
Popular depictions of the causes of war in Sierra Leone centre on diamonds,
90
 the inherent 
barbarism elicited by environmental degradation,
91
 the materialistic desires of drug-addicted 
school dropouts
92
 or (in DFID‘s case) state failure.93 These readings, however, are based on 
generalist logics or understandings that fail to resonate with particular lived experiences in 
Sierra Leone.
94
 Such abstract arguments do not grasp the ‗very specific political origins‘95 of 
the conflict, which are crucial in understanding the motivations and goals of the RUF. The 
political origins of the war become apparent and convincing as a primary explanation of the 
conflict from an examination of secondary source material, as well as interviews with former-
RUF fighters and representatives from civil society and the civil service in Sierra Leone. 
These political origins were consistently identified as issues of poor governance and injustice 
within the formal government of Sierra Leone, as well as within the systems of traditional 
leadership that supported it.
96
  However, they differ from most of the more abstract arguments 
(that is, based on more generalisable logics than on context-specific experiences) by granting 
political motivations and real grievances to the rebels that are embedded in Sierra Leonean 
history. They are not answers that are transferable to other contexts (although certainly, the 
methodology of looking for locally and historically relevant causes is) but rather can explain 
with greater specificity the nature of the war in Sierra Leone. From the following account it is 
more apparent how violent conflict occurred and why it was largely staged within a rural 
context. 
 
Grievances against the state 
The original RUF leaders were pan-Africanist, socialist-inspired youths, attempting to topple 
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the corrupt All Peoples‘ Congress (APC) government of Joseph Momoh.97 Momoh was the 
appointed successor of Siaka Stevens, who had ruled Sierra Leone from 1968-1985 (from 
1978 under one-party rule). The APC governments were widely recognised as having 
plundered the nation‘s assets and mineral wealth for personal gain, politicised the security 
forces to ensure regime security and, by the 1980s, given up on service delivery for the 
citizens they supposedly served.
98
 In a telling example in 1980, the government spent close to 
the country‘s entire annual budget on hosting a week-long Organisation for African Unity 
(OAU) conference in the capital of Freetown.
99
 This sort of irresponsible spending prompted 
labour and student union strikes which were violently (and at times lethally) suppressed by 
the government. Ongoing strikes throughout the 1970s and 1980s over poor work conditions 
and education opportunities led President Momoh to claim in 1984 that ‗[e]ducation is a 
privilege, not a right‘, further infuriating students nationwide.100 
 
Poor governance at the state level is one of the key arguments employed to explain the war by 
former combatants, civil servants and civil society in Sierra Leone and is not inconsistent with 
the view taken by DFID.
101
 According to one former-RUF fighter, after finishing teacher 
training college, he became disillusioned with the lack of job prospects and poor working 
conditions. Teachers were so poorly and inconsistently paid by the state that they ‗became the 
laughing stock of this country‘.102 Their poverty became publicly discernible by their ‗black 
power‘ footwear – sandals fashioned out of lorry tyres, and led to public ridicule.103 The lack 
of respect teachers received, he believed, was directly attributable to the failure of the state to 
provide sufficient resources for education. His frustrations with the state played a key role in 
motivating him to join the RUF. 
 
Alongside poor social services and inappropriate spending, the government and political elites 
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were also accumulating vast wealth from the diamond industry in Sierra Leone.
104
 Systems of 
patrimonialism ensured that positions of power and opportunity were granted on the basis of 
personal connections, rather than on merit. This lack of meritocracy infected school and 
university placements as much as the labour workforce. As Jimmy Kandeh highlights: 
 
Government scholarships to attend institutions of higher learning were routinely awarded not 
on the basis of academic merit but on the strength of a prospective student‘s patronage ties and 
ethnic identity. It was quite common, for example, for students who were admitted at Fourah 
Bay College [Sierra Leone‘s main university] to be denied scholarships while those receiving 
government scholarships failed to gain admission. This anomaly of ‗admission without 
scholarship‘ and ‗scholarship without admission‘ expressed precisely the sort of injustices that 
alienated the vast majority of Sierra Leonean youth.
105
 
 
According to interviews with former rebels, many of them had been involved in student and 
labour groups from an early age – often centred on a socialist, pan-African ideology drawn 
from Libyan leader Colonel Qaddafi‘s Green Book.106 They argued that the violent struggle of 
the RUF was a last resort for political change.
107
 The military had attempted to overthrow the 
government in coup attempts but failed. The labour and student unions carried out strikes and 
riots throughout the 1970s and 1980s and had also failed to secure improved governance. The 
RUF‘s initial intention, it was claimed, was to carry on this work through force as a last 
resort.
108
 
 
Grievances against the chieftaincy system 
Yet failure was not only plaguing the bureaucratic state. Upcountry in the provinces, chiefs 
and ‗big men‘ kept patrimonialism in place through often arbitrary justice systems, land 
ownership, marriage licences and community labour that denied substantive justice and 
fermented grievances that ultimately led to conflict. If a youth committed an offence (perhaps 
disrespecting an elder), wanted to get married or start farming his own land, an indeterminate 
fee had to be paid to the local chief or patron.
109
 These fees were at times exorbitant, with 
chiefs receiving ever-less money from the increasingly bankrupt central government.
110
 This 
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meant that youths were often not able to pay the fees or fines, allowing elders and the wealthy 
to exploit poor youth by commuting excessive fines or land and marriage fees to labour.
111
 
Paul Richards and Caspar Fithen elaborate on other forms of injustice: 
 
One instance was a system of imposing fines on young men (who could not afford to marry) 
for interfering with the wives of chiefly polygynists (‗woman damage‘). These fines were 
commuted into labour service, with the result that many young men found themselves 
continuing to work without wages on the farms of chiefs … In recent discussions many 
villagers cite heavy fines – for various torts, including ‗woman damage‘ … as being among 
the main reasons why young men became ‗outlaws‘ in the diamond fields, some later 
enrolling in the RUF.
112
  
 
The link between such injustices and participation in the conflict is explained by Joe Alie. He 
states that ‗[i]n the provincial areas especially, young men suffered at the hands of corrupt and 
high-handed local authorities. Some of these aggrieved young men were later to return to their 
communities during the civil conflict to exact revenge on their former oppressors.‘113 Such 
injustices thus roused a desire for revenge on the part of those aggrieved.  
 
Slavery 
These enforced social divisions based on age, wealth and status, were also steeped in a history 
of slavery, suggesting that these injustices, and the frustrations borne of them, were more 
longstanding than may first appear.
114
 Richards suggests that there is a correlation between 
the prevalence of slavery and enrolment in the RUF, stating: ‗Most of those who volunteered 
for the movement originated in the Gola Forest region and adjacent parts of Kailahun and 
Pujehun Districts – precisely the chiefdoms where domestic slavery lasted longest, and slaves 
were most numerous in forming agrarian capital.‘115 
 
The British Empire banned slavery in 1807, but this was not drafted into ordinances applying 
to the Sierra Leone Protectorate until 1926 – 1927, largely because colonial authorities were 
aware of the resistance with which abolition would be met by chiefs who relied upon unpaid 
labour for their wealth and status.
116
  In Sierra Leone, domestic slaves were common in the 
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provinces, with some familial relationships (such as that between a nephew and his maternal 
uncle) replicating slave-master hierarchies.
117
 In 1928 a District Commissioner assigned to the 
Protectorate noted the ‗calm bordering on indifference‘ which greeted the anti-slavery laws.118 
This, it seems, was due to the rather ingenious rebranding of slavery by slave owners in Sierra 
Leone. As one chief clarified, ‗we don‘t have slaves now, we have cousins.‘119 Mariane 
Ferme explains that:  
 
not much had changed in the organisation of labour and social relations … [I]n the interstices 
between marriage, slavery, and other relations, along the continuum of interdependence, were 
created spaces for the perpetuation of inequality under new guises, such as the familiar idiom 
of kinship that turned slaves into ―cousins‖.120 
 
This new system of slavery blurred with the strong patrimonial culture in Sierra Leone 
whereby everyone ‗stands for‘ somebody.121 That is, everyone exists in a hierarchy of 
dependence and obligation based loosely on age, wealth and status. A client is subject to his 
patron and will work for, fight for, or otherwise support him.
122
 The patron in turn is 
responsible to his clients, for example providing food, shelter or money for school fees or 
court fines.
123
 Richards and Fithen argue that systems of patrimonialism can be seen to mirror 
slavery: 
 
Patrimonialism tried to provide a (post-slavery) framework for the incorporation of young 
people less inclined to challenge the values of chiefly rule. The basic idea is that of forming an 
orderly queue for emancipatory resources … Patrons are vertically linked. As Mende people 
say ‗no one stands by him or herself, everyone is behind someone‘ (i.e. every local person 
enjoys the protection of a patron higher in the system).
124
  
  
No relationships, it seems, escaped infiltration by patrimonial politics. Above, Ferme 
mentions how the ‗interstices between marriage‘ provide room for slave-like relationships to 
emerge.
125
 It is customary for a man to pay ‗bride price‘ to the family of the bride, which may 
include presents for the bride, payment of her sande initiation costs,
126
 work on her family‘s 
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land or a percentage of the groom‘s own produce or profits.127 A former RUF conscript 
demonstrates this problem of excessive obligation: 
 
[In the village] elders … force young men to marry … as soon as we harvest our first … palm 
fruits. If you refuse they cause more problems than being in the bush as a rebel. They charge 
you to court for smiling at a girl … But the bride price is not reasonable. You will be required 
to do all sorts of physical jobs for the bride‘s family, like brushing[128] and making a farm for 
the family … sharing the proceeds of your own labour, harvest or business … You will be 
forced to give them seventy per cent [of your palm oil], or you will lose your wife and be 
taken to court … Marriage is the same as slavery.129 
  
Consequently, the manner in which youths were often linked, through fines, labour and 
marriage to their elders and chiefs is reminiscent of the slave/master relationships that saw 
young men unable to break free from the cycle of unpaid work. This system was at times 
manipulated to ‗catch‘ young men, resulting in increased labour or fines owed to chiefs or 
patrons. Krijn Peters explains: 
 
Chiefs have at times accepted many girls as wives from poorer families, seeking patronage or 
preference, and … then encouraged these girls to find young paramours as a way of increasing 
the labour power at their disposal through the levying of fines for woman damage.
130
 
 
At other times, this system of patrimonialism essentially invented infringements in order to 
keep young men in check and reinstate the hierarchy in which they exist on a low rung vis-à-
vis older and wealthier men. Richards argues: 
 
At times a charge was trumped up, because the elder needed labour, or a young man was 
known to have acquired some money by trading or growing a cash crop. Elders sometimes 
talked openly about ‗squeezing dry‘ this or that young man for fitiyai (‗arrogance‘), resorting 
to some minor or imagined infringement of the customary (and unwritten) code. The fault 
might not be ‗woman damage‘, but simply dressing too well, or having resources deemed 
inappropriate to junior status.
131
 
 
It is not surprising, given the long history of these injustices that young men were eager to 
change the system.  
 
‗Strangers‘ 
Many youths attempted to flee these injustices, or were forced out by community elders who 
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perceived them as troublesome or disrespectful, thus resulting in the migration of young and 
isolated individuals.
132
 In Sierra Leone, those who come from outside a chiefdom are known 
as ‗strangers‘ and accrue less rights and privileges (in terms of land, work and marriage) than 
those indigenous to the chiefdom.
133
 These chiefdom rights are crucial as ‗the vast majority of 
rural Sierra Leoneans still obtain primary rights of residence, land use and political/legal 
representation as ―natives‖ of chiefdoms, rather than as citizens of the state.‘134 Strangers are 
not known to the chiefdom through their ancestry, which plays a central role in ones‘ identity 
and social standing in Sierra Leone. As Kris Hardin notes: 
 
identity … relies on an assortment of ritual actions that actually locate individuals in particular 
spaces by giving them rights, as well as obligations, to others who share those spaces. Where 
someone is born, where they join Sande or Poro, where their ancestors are buried, where they 
themselves will be buried work to limit the claims to identity and the rights and statuses 
available through the descent and kinship system. Rituals associating the individual with 
particular places are performed at critical junctures. These ritual acts tie individuals to 
particular places and to the ancestors associated with those places. In addition to legitimising 
rights to resources, such public demonstrations function in ways that supersede future personal 
claims by making it difficult for others to forget essential parts of an individual‘s genealogy.135 
 
This strong linking of identity to ancestry and birthplace meant that fleeing/expelled youths 
were regarded as an underclass with even less access to justice and equality than they would 
have been entitled to within their own chiefdom. For instance, ‗strangers‘ have traditionally 
not been granted the right to vote in chieftaincy elections and are unable to purchase land or 
marry until such a time as the chief and local elders accept the stranger into the community.
136
 
This customary system has also been held in place by national legislation, through a 1972 
amendment to the Protectorate Land Ordinance of 1927, which allowed paramount chiefs to 
distinguish ‗natives‘ of their chiefdoms from ‗non-natives‘ (or strangers) in regard to land 
rights.
137
 Natives were viewed as possessing hereditary rights to local land, whereas non-
natives would require leases to use chiefdom land.
138
 The preference for natives over non-
natives also forced ‗newcomers to make farms at a considerable distance from the main 
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settlement‘,139 heightening their exclusion from the hub of community life. ‗Stranger‘ status 
thus served to alienate many youths and forced others to the mining regions or urban centres, 
where populations were already considerably more mobile and distanced from chiefdom 
politics. It has been estimated that approximately one third of the total population of a Sierra 
Leonean village can be classed as strangers.
140
 As Richard Fanthorpe notes: 
 
This is a source of social exclusion that may have greatly exacerbated the rupture generated by 
state recession and the contraction of patrimonial networks. Modernised, educated and 
individuated youth, once jettisoned by contracting patrimonial networks, may have had little 
opportunity, let alone desire, to return to rural communities governed by chiefs. Readily 
recruited by belligerent groups on both sides, they were already primed to sow chaos by their 
double alienation.
141
 
 
Thus, in the urban setting, youths were deprived of education and employment opportunities 
by a corrupt state. In the provinces, youths were forced to work the land of their elders, unable 
to cultivate their own land in order to make money to pay bride price and establish their own 
families or opportunities. In both instances, youth were marginalised from decision-making 
and positions of power and treated unjustly according to patronage rather than merit, leading 
to a rising discontent with the governance structures that oppressed them. As Richards and 
Fithen lay bare: 
 
The contradictions between patrimonialism and meritocracy could be put no more clearly. The 
[RUF] movement appealed to those upon whom the brunt of patrimonial failure fell: young 
people in the diamond pits and failing schools ... The children of a political elite, fed by 
diamond wealth, enjoyed superior overseas education, while local schools fell apart and 
teachers remained unpaid. Cadres dreamed of a fairer, more inclusive system where hard work 
and ability would determine success.
142
 
 
The need for chieftaincy reform 
It is not so surprising reading this history of Sierra Leone that issues of justice and governance 
at the chieftaincy as well as state level were consistently pointed to as key causes of war not 
just by former-RUF rebels, but also by many civilians. For instance, The Final Report of the 
Truth and Reconciliation Commission (TRC) determined that: 
 
Successive political elites plundered the nation’s assets, including its mineral riches, 
at the expense of the national good … Many Sierra Leoneans, particularly the youth, 
lost all sense of hope in the future. Youths became easy prey for unscrupulous forces 
who exploited their disenchantment to wreak vengeance against the ruling elite … 
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The Commission holds the political elite of successive regimes in the post-
independence period responsible for creating the conditions for conflict.143 
 
Referring explicitly to the chieftaincy system, the TRC goes on to note: 
 
These institutions were perceived by the people in the Protectorate not to be progressive as 
they were dominated by Paramount Chiefs who were elected on a limited franchise by only 
the Tribal Authorities, to represent their Chiefdoms on the Councils. Feelings of 
disenfranchisement took root quite early in the Protectorate and contributed to a diminished 
sense of self-esteem and perception of enforced marginalisation, especially among the youths, 
which became a recurring theme as a cause of conflict.
144
 
 
The argument that failures of governance and justice within both state and informal structures 
were causes of the war is also supported by the initial tactics employed by the RUF. These 
included targeting of chiefs and government personnel and property.
145
  
 
Given the extreme uncertainty with which youths lived, with little or no education or 
employment opportunities, the prospect of long-term labour or financial commitments to 
elders and chiefs draining what little resources youths had and the reality of remaining locked 
in a system of patrimonialism where social mobility was checked by personal connections, 
many were looking for an alternative. This was given some shape through Qaddafi‘s vision of 
democracy promoted in his Green Book and the study groups that formed around it in the 
urban centres of Sierra Leone.
146
 These ideologues were then able to recruit (albeit often by 
force) from the disenfranchised and disgruntled youth living in rural areas to whom pan-
Africanist socialism appealed. Several of the former RUF rebels interviewed as part of this 
research had been abducted from rural areas by the RUF in the early stages of the war. While 
they admitted to at first being angry or frightened at their abduction, all of them claimed to 
have accepted the ideology and cause of the movement relatively quickly (over days or a 
couple of weeks at most) as it resonated with their experiences of injustice and poor 
governance.
147
 One former rebel revealed how he was kidnapped by the RUF shortly after 
dropping out of school.
148
 He had been given a scholarship to complete secondary school but 
at the end of his first year, the principal demanded he pay him in order to continue receiving 
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the scholarship. He refused (as he had no funds) and the scholarship was taken from him and 
given to another student, whose family was willing to pay for it. With no funds to remain in 
school, the former student was travelling to Liberia to visit a cousin who had offered financial 
assistance when the RUF captured him. Their grievances over poor governance, corruption 
and injustice spoke directly to his own experiences and he became an enthusiastic recruit.
149
 
These findings fit with those of Krijn Peters and Paul Richards, who have determined that 
‗[a]bductees cooperated with the movement to save their lives, but some found the 
movement‘s analysis of the breakdown of Sierra Leonean society meaningful and accepted 
guerrilla training willingly.‘150 They go on to note more fully: 
 
many under-age combatants joined up voluntarily ... some looking for revenge ... others to 
survive. Youngsters in a war zone find themselves ―on the street‖ ... Joining a militia group is 
both meal ticket and substitute education ... The pay may be derisory ... but weapons training 
pays quicker dividends than school ever did; soon the AK47 brings food, money, a warm bath 
and instant adult respect ... The combat group substitutes for lost family and friends.
151
 
 
Even some who fought with the SLA and CDFs recognise the underlying motivations of the 
RUF as deriving from the failure of patrimonial politics (which permeated both the state and 
chieftaincy system) to provide education and opportunities on an equitable basis.
152
 
Moreover, they view these as legitimate frustrations.
153
  
 
Disillusionment with the chieftaincy system is apparent more widely within Sierra Leonean 
society as well. Fanthorpe notes the ‗deep grievances‘ articulated by many rural Sierra 
Leoneans who support the maintenance of the chieftaincy system.
154
 A DFID-funded 
community consultation records the following summary of findings in relation to heavy fines 
and abuses by chiefs: 
 
This is an age-old problem in the community and is one of the main factors underlying the 
war. These heavy fines cause deep-seated grudges as well [as] force young people to flee as 
they are unable to pay. The chiefs in the community are not paid ... therefore, they find their 
living from conflict and the fines that it produces. Combining this practice with other 
malpractices that chiefs enjoy has made chiefs a target for victimisation by armed youth, as 
they themselves feel victimised by the authorities.
155
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Such concerns over the chieftaincy system are also recognised by the Government of Sierra 
Leone (GoSL). In a 1999 report published with the UNDP, GoSL notes that, on the basis of 
community consultations ‗[t]he cry for reform in aspects of the institution of chieftaincy was 
overwhelming.‘156  
 
The causes of the war can be seen through this ‗thicker‘ description to revolve around justice 
and governance issues. Specifically, the central government was perceived as culpable of 
failing to fund social services such as schools and healthcare.
157
 The chieftaincy system 
supported the central government in return for mining licenses and ensured that access to 
resources and opportunities were regulated by wealthy elders who entangled youth upcountry 
into their profiteering through unpaid labour and the arbitrary chieftaincy justice system.
158
 
This poor governance and injustice was also rooted in longer histories of domestic slavery in 
Sierra Leone. Such a rationalisation of the RUF‘s motivations in no way excuses or justifies 
the horrific violence that they unleashed upon the Sierra Leonean population. It also does not 
explain the increasingly random and wanton violence that the RUF resorted to later in the 
war.
159
 Indeed, as the war continued, the RUF became seemingly divorced from their political 
message of egalitarianism and systematically brutalised the very people they claimed to be 
fighting for.
160
 Rather, the argument here aims to get to the heart of the circumstances that led 
to conflict being perceived as a viable option for its participants, in order that such 
circumstances can be addressed to prevent future violence. In doing so, it points to 
significantly more structural and political problems than the popular and generalist 
explanations of the conflict, such as greed for diamonds or inherent barbarism suggest. 
 
DFID‘s approach to the causes of war in Sierra Leone revolved essentially around a state 
failure argument. The findings from the Sierra Leonean context above give greater specificity 
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to that failure, but do not necessarily contradict the argument. Poor governance and injustice 
constitute key features of a failed state. In this sense, DFID has not been entirely off the mark 
in reading the Sierra Leonean situation. Yet understanding the war in terms of injustice and 
poor governance does not render only the central state culpable, but also informal structures 
such as the chieftaincy system that can be seen to have held in place many of the injustices 
discussed above. The problem then becomes not the ‗failure‘ aspect of the DFID‘s argument, 
but the ‗state‘ component. DFID has not sufficiently understood the causes of the war because 
they have not understood the multiple layers at which breakdown has occurred. A former-
RUF member suggested in an interview that part of the problem with post-conflict 
reconstruction efforts is that Western donors take a bureaucratic approach to governance, 
whereas Africans take a broader view.
161
 His insight is apt – the grievances that instigated the 
war are not limited to failures of the central bureaucratic state. Rather, they are linked to and 
supported by failures elsewhere in the Sierra Leonean governance structure. Unless the UK 
can address failure at this level, as well as within the state, their reform efforts will be of 
limited success as they will not engage with the manner in which security and governance 
actually operate in Sierra Leone. The centrality of the chieftaincy system to the lives of the 
majority of Sierra Leoneans highlights the importance of reconfiguring understandings of 
governance to include informal practices, which impact directly on the central government 
and the Sierra Leonean population. Broadening the UK‘s ‗state failure‘ argument to include 
chieftaincy would ensure that it engages not only with the various sites of failure that have 
been pointed to as causes of the war, but also with the actual practices of governance, rather 
than with theoretical models of how they should work.  
 
The state of state (and non-state) governance 
A common refrain in response to arguments that informal actors or forces require engagement 
and reform is that these entities will simply wither away as the state modernises.
162
 This 
modernisation argument was popular in the 1960s and many donors continue to promote the 
idea that liberalisation will ultimately resolve problems in the developing world.
163
 Yet 
arguments that informal practices are symptomatic of the fact that the state in Africa is not yet 
sufficiently liberalised or modernised neglect the entrenchment and utility of informal 
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governance practices and writes them off as backward.
164
 As Béatrice Hibou notes in relation 
to the economic sphere: 
 
The interconnection of the formal and the informal is a deeply embedded feature of the way in 
which African economies are organised. Hence, informal and illegal economic behaviour 
cannot be considered solely as the consequence of insufficient liberalisation, since the real 
reasons for these things are more complex.
165
 
 
The prevalence of informal actors, including the chieftaincy system, is also not likely to 
simply disappear with greater liberalisation – not least because of the interwoven nature of 
these informal actors and the state, both facets of the modern governance prism. They reflect 
Sierra Leone‘s take on modernity – combining imposed state structures with indigenous 
practices. As Ryann Manning notes, modern and ‗traditional‘ governance mechanisms ‗are 
actually integrated, interdependent, and even fused.‘166  
 
Chieftaincy and the state do not operate in isolated spheres of governance. Rather, they 
interact and impact upon each other, and in so doing spin further the web that binds them 
together as a governance system. For instance, the chieftaincy system is heavily relied upon 
by state politicians in order to secure votes and political support from constituents through 
allied chiefs.
167
 The chieftaincy system has now also been incorporated into the state system 
through decentralisation efforts
168
 and has the responsibility for collecting government tax, of 
which they receive a share. The role of the state has also altered the role of the chiefs by 
assuming, most controversially, greater responsibility for policing and justice, which chiefs 
traditionally saw as theirs.
169
 Manning demonstrates the overlap between ‗modern‘ and 
informal systems: 
 
Local governance and justice in Sierra Leone involve a complex array of institutions and 
individuals, who draw their structure and legitimacy from a range of systems and heritages – 
customary, colonial, and modern – and interact with one another in a rich and sometimes 
unpredictable manner ... This process of mutual accommodation results in a hybrid system 
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different from what was intended by either in isolation.
170
 
 
The colonial-imparted state is now not merely a foreign, non-African beast. Whilst its 
skeleton might always hark from a European closet, it has since been fleshed out with 
indigenously African practices.
171
 The beast, then, is quite a unique one. This is not to say that 
the state in Africa is therefore unproblematic (indeed, Sierra Leone might be a good example 
of its problematic nature), but rather that one cannot engage with the state as if it were a 
European one and ignore the fundamental ‗Africanisation‘ of the state that has occurred. The 
interaction between formal and informal governance practices has produced something 
separate and unique from each of them. The chieftaincy system has fundamentally altered the 
Sierra Leonean state in ways that need to be taken into account when seeking to reform the 
state exogenously.  
 
Each of these changing relationships has meant that the state in Africa is not the European 
model imparted through colonialism, and chieftaincy is not the traditional authority it was 
often assumed to be before or during colonialism. Two hundred years have allowed each of 
these governance practices to be endogenised, modernised and entwined. Drawing upon the 
work of James Scott in his discussion of the construction of Brasilia, as an idealised city in 
Brazil, he points to many of the same concerns raised here: 
 
A village, city, or language is the jointly created, partly unintended product of many, many 
hands. To the degree that the authorities insist on replacing this ineffably complex web of 
activity with formal rules and regulations, they are certain to disrupt the web in ways that they 
cannot possibly foresee … Cities with a long history may be called ―deep‖ or ―thick‖ cities in 
the sense that they are the historical product of a vast number of people from all stations 
(including officialdom) who are long gone. It is possible, of course, to build a new city or a 
new village, but it will be a ―thin‖ or ―shallow‖ city, and its residents will have to begin … to 
make it work in spite of the rules.
172
    
 
The results of DFID-led reform efforts are unclear. Strengthening the state alone in the hope 
that informal governance mechanisms will fall by the wayside may lead to the discovery that 
the state only works when attended by its historically associated informal governance 
mechanisms. These adaptive mechanisms may also react in unexpected ways, forging new 
roles for themselves – as they have done in the face of substantial upheavals over the last two 
centuries through colonialism, independence and civil war. As Christian Lund surmises, ‗it is 
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difficult to ascribe exercised authority to the ‗state‘ as a coherent institution; rather, public 
authority becomes the amalgamated result of the exercise of power by a variety of … 
institutions‘.173 
 
In order to comprehensively address the causes of conflict, and thus to ensure sustainable 
security, DFID needs to reform those institutions culpable of failure. This chapter has sought 
to demonstrate that such failures lie not only in the state, but also in the informal structures of 
the chieftaincy system, which in failing to provide an equitable society fermented grievances 
that ultimately undermined their central purpose of maintaining social order. As a part of the 
failures that led to conflict, the chieftaincy system is itself in need of post-conflict reform. 
This will not come about by simply ignoring the informal and focusing efforts upon 
strengthening state institutions. Such an approach does not recognise the interwoven nature of 
chieftaincy and the state in Sierra Leone. Rather, a more thorough SSR programme would 
recognise the important role played by chiefs in providing services, including security, to 
provincial Sierra Leoneans and attempt to engage with such actors accordingly.   
 
Does DFID policy take the prevalence of these important informal actors into account? While 
DFID policy was demonstrated in the first chapter to have provided a state-centric approach 
to the causes of war in Sierra Leone, to give a fair account its policy is reappraised here in 
light of this chapter‘s findings to determine what treatment (if any) informal actors are given. 
The overwhelming focus of DFID‘s reform efforts remain on state security providers. Yet 
there has been an evolution, albeit subtle, in DFID policy towards increasing recognition of 
the informal. This budding recognition, it is argued, supports the position that engaging 
informal actors is crucial to effective SSR and that DFID has become increasingly aware of 
this throughout their experience in Sierra Leone. 
 
DFID Policy Revisited: A place for the informal? 
Initial reviews of security sector reform policy documents revealed little engagement with 
informal security providers prior to 2004. Whilst a 1998 Evaluation Report suggests that 
‗DFID projects have largely ignored the presence and role of many other traditional and 
communal institutions involved in the maintenance of social order‘,174 policy on SSR at the 
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time did not seem to incorporate an understanding of these roles. For instance, analysis in the 
1998 ‗Poverty and the Security Sector‘ document is purely state-centric.175 DFID‘s 2000 
White Paper, ‗Eliminating World Poverty: Making Globalisation Work for the Poor‘, makes 
no reference to informal or non-state security actors, despite establishing the importance of 
SSR for poverty reduction.
176
 By 2002, DFID had employed the oft-cited list of security 
actors as determined by the OECD (see figure 1).
177
 This list includes traditional justice 
systems and non-statutory security forces but there is no other engagement with the role or 
importance of these actors within security provision, other than to suggest that they need to be 
brought within the legal framework of the state.
178
 The first non-state security actors to 
receive serious attention were private security companies, in the joint DFID, FCO and MoD 
‗Security   Sector   Reform   Policy  Brief‘,  in   2003.179  Again,  customary  justice  providers  
 
Figure 1: Security Actors180 
 
Core security actors 
armed forces; police; paramilitary forces; gendarmeries; presidential guards, intelligence and security 
services (both military and civilian); coast guards; border guards; customs authorities; reserve or local 
security units (civil defence forces, national guards, militias). 
 
Security management and oversight bodies 
the Executive; national security advisory bodies; legislature and legislative select committees; ministries 
of defence, internal affairs, foreign affairs; customary and traditional authorities; financial management 
bodies (finance ministries, budget offices, financial audit & planning units); and civil society 
organisations (civilian review boards and public complaints commissions). 
 
Justice and law enforcement institutions 
judiciary; justice ministries; prisons; criminal investigation and prosecution services; human rights 
commissions and ombudsmen; customary and traditional justice systems. 
 
Non-statutory security forces 
liberation armies; guerrilla armies; private body-guard units; private security companies; political party 
militias. 
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received mention, but were not dealt with in any detail.
181
 It was not until 2004 that informal 
security actors received serious policy attention with the publication of DFID‘s ‗Non-state 
Justice and Security Systems‘, which recognised, ‗the importance of traditional and informal 
systems as complements to formal state systems. It [DFID] notes that non-state justice and 
security systems may need reform in order to become fairer and more effective‘.182 The 
document recognises that informal systems ‗are critically important in the context of DFID‘s 
pro-poor approach to security and justice‘,183 yet also cautions that in some cases ‗it may be 
preferable not to engage with non-state systems, or even see them dissolved.‘184 Thus SSR 
policy has come, slowly, to recognise the importance of engaging the informal. 
 
A broader review of the policy documents to include issues related to the justice sector, 
however, reveals a greater and more promising engagement with informal security actors. As 
early as 2000, DFID produced a policy document on ‗Justice and Poverty Reduction‘ which 
recognised that ‗[i]mproving access to justice requires that both formal and customary 
systems be made to work justly and equitably.‘185 The document goes on to highlight the high 
rates of reliance on informal justice systems and points out the human rights challenges that 
such actors can pose.
186
 This was followed in 2002 by a broader policy publication on ‗Safety, 
Security and Accessible Justice‘, which reiterated the importance of informal security 
arrangements and extended the awareness of informal actors beyond judicial actors to 
policing providers as well.
187
 This divergence between security sector reform and justice 
sector reform policy is surprising, given the integrated nature the reform programmes are 
meant to have taken on through the Conflict Prevention Pools and on the ground in Sierra 
Leone.  
 
The policy awareness of informal actors that emerges at different times in different sectors 
should not, however, suggest that DFID have made this issue a priority. Indeed, of the 
approximately 40 policy documents analysed, only eight mentioned informal security actors, 
and just a handful of these went into more detail than simply mentioning that such actors 
exist! Shining a light on this corner of policy discourse should not exaggerate its prominence. 
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The state clearly remains the preferred vehicle for security provision and engagement, with 
only sparing mentions of informal security and governance actors, predominantly in policy 
related specifically to justice reform. An evolution can be discerned though, with later policy 
indicating an increased awareness of the importance of informal actors in SSR. 
 
Alongside these sparing mentions there has also been one notable attempt during the early 
stages of the UK intervention in Sierra Leone to engage with paramount chiefs. While this 
might suggest a cognisance on DFID‘s part of the importance of informal actors, a brief 
examination of the programme suggests otherwise. The programme can more accurately be 
described as a failed quick-fix attempt to restore stability in provincial Sierra Leone, without 
acknowledging the failures of the chieftaincy system or engaging in its reform in the manner 
in which state security services were engaged. This programme represented a superficial 
flirtation with chieftaincy, revealing a lack of understanding of the complexities of the system 
and treating it more as a vehicle to stabilisation, rather than a crucial governance mechanism 
in need of reform, alongside the state security and governance systems. The programme was 
aborted by 2002 after an external review and a lack of support amongst the chieftaincy 
itself.
188
   
 
Chiefdom Governance Reform Programme 
The project was originally launched as the Paramount Chiefs Restoration Programme, but 
became known as the Chiefdom Governance Reform Programme (CGRP) after the signing of 
the 1999 Lomé Peace Agreement.
189
 Work did not begin in earnest, however, until 2000.
190
 
The CGRP sought to re-empower the paramount chiefs in order to demonstrate to citizens that 
order and stability was returning to Sierra Leone and encourage repatriation of the chiefs (on 
the assumption that their subjects would then follow them).
191
 Richard Fanthorpe, evaluating 
the programme, highlights the limited scope of the project: 
 
Fear of the consequence of a post-war power governance vacuum in rural areas prompted 
DFID to design a programme for restoring paramount chiefs. This was enthusiastically 
supported by the SLPP government, which was keen to re-establish political control over the 
countryside. These concerns and interests have so far overridden efforts to reform chiefdom 
                                                 
188
 Richard Fanthorpe, ―Post-war reconstruction in rural Sierra Leone.‖ 
189
 Author interview with Garth Glentworth, Senior Governance Advisor, DFID, 17 October 2008. 
190
 Zöe Marriage, Challenging Aid in Africa: Principles, Implementation and Impact (New York, NY: Palgrave 
Macmillan, 2006), 24. 
191
 Clare Short, ―Hansard Written Answers,‖ 24 July, 2002, 
http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm200102/cmhansrd/vo020724/text/20724w10.htm, accessed 25 June, 
2009; Author interview with Garth Glentworth, Senior Governance Advisor, DFID, 17 October 2008. 
  
92 
 
governance in the light of grievances voiced in ... chiefdom consultations.
192
 
 
In order to fill the void of political control, DFID funded the building of houses for the 
paramount chiefs and filled chieftain vacancies (as a result of deaths and displacement during 
the war approximately one third of all chiefs had to be replaced post-conflict).
193
 It also 
proposed to establish guidelines for the exercise of power by paramount chiefs, although this 
key component was never instituted.
194
 The institution was thus restored but not reformed, in 
a move reminiscent of Colonial Office efforts to attain order through chiefs and indirect rule. 
 
Problems arose when the houses being constructed resembled ‗mud huts‘ rather than what is 
locally considered appropriate paramount chief housing.
195
 The British opted for more 
traditional ‗sandcrete‘ constructions of four rooms.196 The paramount chiefs argued, however, 
that their houses needed to be substantially larger to accommodate their families (often made 
up of several wives and their children) as well as visiting guests who chiefs are obliged to 
house.
197
 There was the added complication of where to build the houses within the 
chiefdoms. As paramount chiefs are derived from ruling families, and there are a few ruling 
families within each chiefdom residing in different locations, houses being constructed for 
current chiefs would not prove useful for future paramount chiefs who might live in a 
different town.
198
 Unless houses were built in each of the towns where ruling families resided, 
the constructions would appear biased. State politics also interfered, with the All Peoples 
Congress opposition party (at the time) claiming that the UK was building houses only in 
chiefdoms in the Southern and Eastern provinces, which were SLPP government stronghold 
areas.
199
 In fact, it was the Southern and Eastern areas that were most accessible during 1999-
2001, due to ongoing rebel fighting in the North. Instability in the Northern province (the 
traditional stronghold of the APC) thus prevented DFID from penetrating these areas. In the 
end, about 50 houses were built, some of which chiefs refused to live in. After an evaluation 
of the project by an external consultant, and a lack of support amongst the chiefs themselves, 
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the CGRP was terminated and deemed a failure.
200
  
 
Interestingly, this project represents the UK‘s only direct engagement with informal 
governance structures in Sierra Leone. It is indicative both of the complexities inherent within 
the chieftaincy system and of DFID‘s lack of understanding of how this system actually 
works and its failures that contributed to the very grievances over which the war was fought. 
Richard Fanthorpe, in reviewing the project notes: 
 
It had become apparent early on that chiefdom administration in general had deep-rooted 
problems that no single donor programme was likely to resolve. Public consultations 
facilitated by the CGRP and relief agencies yielded a plethora of local complaints against 
chiefs of all ranks. Foremost amongst these grievances were that chiefs controlled a local 
judicial systems regularly handing down fines that were grossly incommensurate with the 
offences committed, [and] that chiefs frequently compelled their subjects to work farms for 
them without pay.
201
 
 
It also did not account for the adaptiveness of the chiefs, who ended up returning to their 
communities without UK-supplied housing
202
 and also failed to understand the chief‘s 
modern-day needs (as hosts to guests and extended families) and practices (of moving the seat 
of the chiefdom depending on the location of the incumbent ruling family). The basic housing 
provided also risked representing the chiefs in a purely ‗traditional‘ light, rather than as the 
modern authorities that they have become. The failure of this project ended the UK‘s direct 
engagement with informal governance structures. It seems that, similar to colonial 
prerogatives, the British were keen to engage the chiefs on the basis that they were a quick-fix 
solution to re-establishing order and stability, upon which other reform efforts could then 
capitalise. When this engagement failed to deliver its intended results, the programme was 
dropped and one of the original intentions - to establish guidelines for the extent of chief‘s 
authority - was not pursued. It seems that the British did not appreciate the failings of the 
chieftaincy system that were in fact integral to undermining (rather than supporting) order in 
the provinces. 
 
In DFID‘s defence, it should be acknowledged that its staff have been upfront about the 
programme‘s failure and the role that their lack of knowledge of the chieftaincy system 
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played in this.
203
 The lesson learned from the programme, however, seems to be to steer clear 
of informal actors, rather than to learn more and attempt to engage in a more sustained and 
transformative manner. The growing policy focus, however minimal, regarding informal 
actors suggests that this is an area that DFID is realising is of importance to its reform efforts. 
This realisation appears to have taken place in different parts of the organisation at different 
times. Certainly, the recognition of informal actors is more sustained within policy regarding 
justice reform, as opposed to more general security sector reform. Yet overall, the mentions 
read as caveats and footnotes to the more dominant narrative – that state failure was the cause 
of conflict in Sierra Leone and that in strengthening the state so as to ensure peace and 
development, informal security actors may need to be taken into account. Failings within 
informal systems are not regarded as a cause of conflict, but rather as side issues that may 
need consideration within broader efforts to rebuild the state. This position fails to recognise 
the importance of failures within informal systems and the manner in which formal (state) and 
informal systems bind together to create a modern security and governance matrix in Sierra 
Leone. 
 
Conclusion 
This chapter has detailed the chieftaincy system in Sierra Leone and how its failings 
contributed to the civil war. This provides a thicker account of the causes of war than DFID‘s 
diagnosis, which points to failures of just the state. As Robert Egnell and Peter Halden warn, 
‗the effectiveness of the measures taken by external actors in Sierra Leone may be questioned 
since they are aimed at formal loci where governance is not exercised, instead of the informal 
structures, with real clout.‘204 The point is simple, but important: understanding the locus of 
failure is essential if the failure is to be fixed. Failure, in Sierra Leone, was not merely of the 
bureaucratic state, because the bureaucratic state is merely one level of the governance matrix. 
It is largely Freetown-centric, neglecting approximately 80 per cent of the population who 
rely much more heavily on the chieftaincy system in their daily lives. Understanding the 
failure of the chieftaincy system is crucial to ensuring sustainably better governance and 
security for Sierra Leone in the future. What is advocated here, then, is a fuller understanding 
of the causes of war, providing a ‗thick‘, rather than ‗thin‘, depiction of failures. The power of 
the chiefs is not necessarily apparent at surface level and it is certainly not apparent in 
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Freetown, where UK staff are based (in fact, DFID only opened its Freetown office in 2005). 
Chiefs downplay their own power and often administer it in closed settings (such as secret 
societies).
205
 Interviews with Sierra Leoneans for this research suggested that they respect 
their chiefs – yet closer discussion also revealed dissatisfaction and the desire for reform of 
many of their powers.
206
 Failure has been demonstrated within this system alongside the state. 
Only by examining these deeper layers of practice can the antecedents to the conflict be 
appropriately understood, and engaged with.  
 
In focusing on the bureaucratic state as the locus of failure, DFID‘s SSR programme has 
engaged overwhelmingly with state institutions, such as the police, armed forces, intelligence 
services, and other components of the civil service. These efforts are clearly laudable and 
have undoubtedly produced some good results (some of which will be uncovered through the 
case studies). Yet the state is merely the surface of governance practices in Sierra Leone. 
There are significant informal governance mechanisms that are essential in providing goods 
and services (including security) to the population and these also need reform. As Pierre 
Englebert argues, ‗civil service reform … is doomed to fail if the formal state is but a 
decoy.‘207 In this instance, the state is not a ‗decoy‘ as such, as it is also in clear need of 
reform. However the visibility and tangibility of the state may render it the preferred vehicle 
for reforms, at the expense of the more utilised, but less perceptible informal systems, such as 
chieftaincy. In the singular instance when the UK did attempt to engage with the chieftaincy 
system, through the Chiefdom Governance Reform Programme, the system was superficially 
understood as a traditional authority that might offer a reassuring presence to communities, 
rather than a modern and complex governance structure, itself culpable of the injustices that 
led to conflict and thus in need of reform. The result was that the CGRP failed and largely 
ended UK engagement with informal governance in Sierra Leone. DFID policy on SSR also 
reflects a delayed and patchy cognisance of the importance of informal actors in security and 
governance in Sierra Leone. 
 
This brief (and fumbling) flirtation with chieftaincy aside, engagement with informal actors 
has been lacking. This can be traced back to the UK‘s understanding of the war as a 
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manifestation of state, rather than broader governance, failure. This chapter has highlighted 
the central role played by chiefs in day-to-day life in Sierra Leone. It then went on to 
demonstrate how a crisis within informal governance can be seen as one of the causes of the 
war. Such a crisis cannot be resolved by simply strengthening the state. Rather, the 
interwoven nature of the state and chieftaincy system requires that both be engaged. Finally, 
DFID policy was revisited to assess its ability to account for informal governance 
mechanisms, overwhelmingly suggesting that this aspect of governance has been overlooked.  
 
These discussions pave the way to investigating how successful particular reform 
programmes in Sierra Leone have been in taking informal actors into account. An 
organisation‘s policy represents only one facet their overall approach. In order to gain a fuller 
understanding of DFID‘s failure to engage informal actors, its practices also need to be taken 
into account. This fits with the turn to practice underway in the social sciences more 
generally, and is supported by the views expressed by DFID staff as well. Regional Conflict 
Advisor for West Africa, Mark White suggests that ‗there is a difference between what DFID 
says in terms of its policy on security sector reform, which is very much headquarters-led ... 
and then what takes place on the ground itself.‘208 Thus, in order to make a full assessment of 
DFID‘s engagement with informal actors through SSR, its programmes as well as its polices 
require consideration. 
 
Both of the case studies to follow exemplify sites of contestation between the jurisdictions of 
the formal and informal. Of interest here is how effectively DFID‘s projects have dealt with 
such contestation and whether they have been able to institute reforms at both state and 
informal levels. Only by understanding the conflict in Sierra Leone as a violent response to 
wider governance, rather than merely state, failure can the reform programmes below 
comprehensively address the antecedents to the conflict.  
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3  
The Thickening Blue Line:  
Challenges of informal policing for DFID’s Family Support Units 
 
 
The purpose of security sector reform (SSR) is to create a disciplined, effective and 
democratically controlled security sector that will protect the rights of citizens, thereby 
creating a just society that adheres to the rule of law.
1
 Such a society, SSR advocates argue, is 
better placed to attract investment and development, in turn reinforcing peace. One aspect of 
DFID‘s SSR programme in Sierra Leone is the reform of the Sierra Leone Police (SLP), and 
within this the establishment of the Family Support Units (FSUs) has been a landmark 
project. The Units contribute to the overall SSR agenda by seeking to protect the rights of 
women and children as distinct vulnerable categories. This chapter examines the FSUs within 
the context of broader policing reform and assesses how their success in fulfilling their 
purpose of protecting the rights of women is limited by the approach DFID adopts towards 
informal policing providers, such as chiefs and secret societies.
2
 It is argued that because 
DFID has understood the causes of conflict in Sierra Leone in overwhelmingly state failure 
terms and thus sought to reform state security forces, its ability to provide improved policing 
to women through the FSUs is limited by the challenges posed by informal policing actors. 
DFID‘s goal of providing improved policing to women would be better served by engagement 
not only with the formal providers of policing to women in Sierra Leone, but also the 
informal. 
 
The dominance of men and elders within Sierra Leonean society renders women and children 
especially vulnerable to exploitation and injustice.
3
 They are generally excluded from 
decision making or prescribed limited jurisdiction and viewed as submissive possessions of 
husbands, fathers, brothers or uncles.
4
 Their rights are often curtailed in the name of ‗culture‘ 
or ‗tradition‘ in a manner that fortifies their subservience to elders and men, thus 
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simultaneously protecting the power of those who have historically held it.
5
 This inequality 
was clear at the end of the civil war when women, who had been subjected to informal 
marriages during the war, often by coercion or force, attempted to reassert their independence 
from their former-combatant husbands.
6
 Many women were violently prevented from leaving 
by their partners.
7
 The situation led to a dramatic rise in rates of domestic violence within 
Kissy, an area of Freetown heavily populated by former-combatants, and prompted the 
establishment of what have become known as FSUs within the Sierra Leone Police.
 8
 The 
Units deal exclusively with crimes involving women and children and have been hailed as one 
of the major success stories of the UK-led SSR programme. Similar initiatives have since 
been set up in post-conflict Liberia and the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), based 
upon the original Sierra Leonean model.
9
  
 
Undoubtedly, the FSUs promote improved rights for women and children, based upon 
international treaty law. Yet the success of the FSUs in providing effective policing to women 
and children is limited by their inability to confront challenges posed by informal policing 
actors, such as chiefs and secret societies, prevalent throughout Sierra Leone. Without 
addressing these challenges, the FSUs (and by extension, DFID‘s goal to provide improved 
policing to women) will continue to be a success story limited to urban areas, Western 
audiences and the pages of donor reports, rather than being a success for the daily lives of the 
majority of women and children in Sierra Leone, whose access to justice is still mediated by 
informal policing providers. The FSUs need to engage with these informal forces in order to 
improve the policing available outside of urban areas and therefore to the majority of their 
target beneficiaries. 
 
Through the FSU case study this chapter demonstrates the lack of DFID‘s engagement with 
informal policing mechanisms, hinting also at their underlying understanding of the causes of 
conflict as located in state failure. In so doing, the chapter will begin with an explanation of 
DFID‘s involvement in the FSU project, before providing some historical background to the 
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Sierra Leone Police. Third, an overview of the UK police reform programme, in which the 
FSUs are embedded will be set out to highlight the goals and challenges of reform efforts. 
Fourth, the specific evolution, purpose and procedures of the FSUs will be laid out, before 
examining the potential problems posed to the Units by informal policing alternatives. 
Finally, the case study will demonstrate why engagement with informal actors is necessary in 
order to sustainably improve policing. Ultimately, it is argued that while the FSUs represent a 
laudable and, in urban areas, relatively successful attempt to improve the rights of women, the 
policing service that they provide is limited by challenges posed by informal policing 
providers. Without overcoming these challenges, the FSUs may be a successful story on paper 
and in urban areas, but of limited relevance to the lives of ordinary women in provincial 
Sierra Leone. Given DFID‘s understanding of the causes of war, which lead it to engage with 
only state policing providers, a significant component of the policing puzzle remains 
unreformed, limiting the ability of the SSR programme to sustainably reform post-conflict 
security. 
 
DFID Involvement with the FSUs 
DFID‘s involvement in the FSU project derives from two main sources. First, the 
Commonwealth Community Safety and Security Project (CCSSP), which took over in 2000 
from the initial police reform programme, the Commonwealth Police Development Task 
Force (CPDTF), supported the establishment of the first FSU (then known as the Domestic 
Violence Unit in Kissy) and the roll out of the FSU project countrywide. This 
‗Commonwealth‘ Programme was staffed and directed overwhelmingly by British 
personnel.
10
 The head of this deployment, retired British police detective Keith Biddle had 
also, at the time, been appointed by the Sierra Leone Parliament as Inspector General of the 
Sierra Leone Police (IGP). It was IGP Biddle and British consultant Bill Roberts, who 
assisted the Sierra Leonean Commander of Kissy Division, Kadi Fakondo in implementing 
the FSU model.
11
  
 
Second, the UK was heavily involved in the FSU project by way of funding. DFID was the 
primary donor to the project, with the UK Conflict Prevention Pools, drawing upon DFID, 
Foreign and Commonwealth Office (FCO) and Ministry of Defence (MoD) funds, later 
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stepping in. As Peter Albrecht and Paul Jackson note, ‗[a]lthough initially referred to as a 
―Commonwealth Project‖, in reality funding for the project was provided entirely by DFID 
and, after 2001, through additional funding from the UK‘s Africa Conflict Prevention Pool.‘12 
Many of the FSU buildings were constructed and fitted out by the DFID-funded Justice Sector 
Development Programme (JSDP), established in 2005, which is where donor responsibility 
for the FSUs is currently housed.
13
 While UK funding to the FSUs is now limited (as the 
Units across 26 police divisions are now meant to be self-sustaining), the JSDP continues to 
monitor their progress and assist in updating training manuals and data recording systems.
14
 
Thus, the FSU project, whilst the brainchild of Commander Kadi Fakondo, has been 
facilitated (both administratively and financially) by the UK, and DFID specifically, as part of 
their police and, later, justice reform programmes.  
 
History of the Sierra Leone Police 
‗The story of policing in Sierra Leone is not the most pleasant of tales.‘15 
The dismal state in which the SLP found itself at the end of Sierra Leone‘s civil war and 
which prompted the need for the FSUs was attributable to a long history of poor policing 
culture. The police force, as it was in the aftermath of the war, ‗did not spring, fully formed, 
from independence in the 1960s or from conditions of conflict in the 1980s [and 1990s].‘16 
Rather, the force that existed by the mid- to late-1990s was a product of the various 
transformations that both the state and the police had gone through since their inception. 
Rather than the colossal failure of the police coming as a surprise, it was, given its 
antecedents, entirely expected. This section will provide a brief history of the police, in order 
to situate the FSU, and explain its perceived success, in the context of Sierra Leone‘s broader 
policing experience.  
 
Colonial Policing 
Like many African police forces, the SLP evolved from the colonial police and thus began 
                                                 
12
 Albrecht and Jackson, Security System Transformation in Sierra Leone, 35. 
13
 Kadi Fakondo, quoted in Albrecht and Jackson, Security System Transformation in Sierra Leone, 142. 
14
 Author interview with Peter Viner, Coordinator, Justice Sector Development Programme, 27 February 2009. 
15
 Sarah Meek, ―Policing Sierra Leone,‖ in Sierra Leone: Building the Road to Recovery, eds. Mark Malan et al, 
Institute for Security Studies, Monograph No. 80, 1 March, 2003, 105; David Killingray, ―The maintenance of 
law and order in British Colonial Africa,‖ African Affairs 85, no. 340 (July 1986): 413; Mercedes S. Hinton and 
Tim Newburn, ―Introduction: Policing Developing Democracies,‖ in Policing Developing Democracies, eds. 
Mercedes S. Hinton and Tim Newburn (Abingdon: Routledge, 2009), 7. 
16
 Alice Hills, ―Towards a Critique of Policing and National Development in Africa,‖ The Journal of Modern 
African Studies 34, no. 2 (1996): 286. 
  
101 
 
with a skewed policing agenda that favoured regime, over citizen, security and focused on the 
maintenance of order, rather than the rule of law.
17
 As Osman Gbla notes, ‗during colonialism 
the security forces were used to suppress the population from rebelling against British 
authority.‘18 Sierra Leonean officers in the Frontier and Court Messenger Forces (the former 
represented the Colonial government and the latter the colonially-sanctioned chiefs) were thus 
responsible for putting down disturbances and uprisings of their fellow countrymen against 
their shared colonial oppressors.
19
 For instance, it was the Frontier Force that fought against 
chiefs and their supporters in the Hut Tax War of 1898.
20
 Such seemingly treacherous actions 
laid the foundations for public mistrust of the police that was only to deepen throughout the 
1900s. The ethnic constitution of these colonial police forces was also significant.
21
 The 
Frontier Police were largely made up of Krio officers (with some indigenous ethnic groups 
filling the lower ranks) and it was thus predominantly settler Sierra Leoneans who enforced 
British colonial laws against the indigenous population.
22
 This reinforced the colony-
protectorate divide and did little to encourage indigenous communities to utilise the colonial 
police forces, which represented to them a double colonisation (by both the British and the 
settled Krios). This, in turn, reified ideas that ‗modern‘ policing was for the Krio population 
in Freetown, whereas the indigenous population upcountry continued to rely upon informal 
customary policing, linked to chiefs.
23
 
 
The Sierra Leone Frontier Force and the Court Messenger Force were merged in the 1920s 
and renamed the Sierra Leone Police Force.
24
 Sierra Leonean officers in the civilian and 
frontier police were not permitted to hold ranks of Assistant Superintendent or higher and thus 
severely lacked managerial experience upon assuming leadership positions after 
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independence in 1961.
25
 Interestingly, the first Sierra Leonean Inspector General of Police, 
L.W. Leigh, was not appointed until 1963, with a British officer continuing to fill this role for 
the first two years of independence.
26
 Gbla points out the difficulty, ‗[a]t independence, on 27 
April 1961, Sierra Leone inherited security forces that were incapable of meeting the post-
independence security challenges of a democratic, pluralistic and multi-ethnic state.‘27  
 
The Police under Independence 
Indigenisation of the leadership of the police did little to alter its deservedly poor reputation. 
The short-lived Sierra Leone People‘s Party (SLPP) regime of Sir Albert Margai, followed by 
the longer-term All People‘s Congress (APC) dictatorship of Siaka Stevens and (later) Joseph 
Momoh, began to politicise the security forces through employment procedures. As Gbla 
explains: 
 
Recruitment, appointment and promotions in the military and police were based on political 
and ethnic connections rather than qualification and merit. Under Albert Margai there were 
attempts to involve members of the police and military in the contest for political power as 
well as to fill the rank and file with relatives, friends and cohorts of those in power. The APC 
regime of Siaka Stevens ... intensified the politicisation and ethnicisation of the security 
forces. In an attempt to put the forces under his firm personal control, the regime introduced a 
recruitment policy that encouraged its supporters to enlist in the police and the military. Semi-
literate people, many with criminal backgrounds, were recruited by the security forces, thus 
further undermining their professionalism.
28
  
 
Corruption, nepotism and lack of professionalism reinforced one another, and the skills 
necessary for a functioning and effective police force were increasingly not sought.
29
 The 
purpose of the police had degenerated to a regime-serving institution that ensured loyalty by 
offering opportunity on the basis of kin, and providing benefits such as monthly rice quotas  
to its staff (which were bought from import companies in which Stevens had financial 
interests, thus providing a dual pay off to the President in both security and profit).
30
  
 
In efforts to further bolster regime security, Stevens established the Internal Security Unit 
(ISU) in 1970. This was an armed division within the otherwise unarmed police force, 
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explicitly intended for riot control and, implicitly, for regime support and protection.
31
 The 
ISU was responsible for attacks on political opponents and for the, at times lethal, violence 
unleashed against student and trade union protests in the 1970s and 1980s.
32
 The reputation of 
the ISU soon preceded itself, with the public nicknaming the acronym ‗I Shoot You‘, due to 
their pre-emptive and excessively violent tactics.
33
 The reputation proved difficult to shed. 
After Stevens changed its official name to the Special Security Division (SSD), the nickname 
simply adapted to ‗Siaka Stevens‘ Dogs‘.34 
 
Even greater politicisation of the police lay ahead. In the 1970s Stevens amended the 
Constitution, appointing the IGP as a permanent member of the Sierra Leone Parliament 
(along with six others, including the head of the military).
35
 Excessive political interference 
and nepotism resulted in a breakdown of command structures within the police, and 
plummeting efficiency.
36
 The economic crisis in which Sierra Leone found itself by the 1980s 
also had repercussions for police funding, which was severely limited – with virtually no 
functioning equipment and police officer salaries of approximately USD 15 per month.
37
 This 
situation was not necessarily entirely unsatisfactory as far as the APC government was 
concerned. As Alice Hills explains: 
 
If the police do their job well, they could threaten their regime. They might launch their own 
coup or, if they were truly independent, they would investigate regime officials suspected of 
violating the law. It is thus not in regime interests that the police should become efficient, 
effective, or provide citizen protection. In general regime concerns ensure that African police 
forces remain urban, underresourced, brutal, and stagnant.
38
 
 
A weak police force provided the necessary space for the Stevens (and from 1985, Momoh) 
regime to continue exploiting their office and country. It was with this police force that Sierra 
Leone entered its 11-year civil war.  
 
The Sierra Leone Police Force and Civil War 
Rosalind Hanson-Alp aptly illustrates the role played by the weakness of the Sierra Leone 
                                                 
31
 Meek, ―Policing Sierra Leone,‖ 107. 
32
 Gbla, ―Security Sector Reform Under International Tutelage,‖ 79. 
33
 Author interview with Member B, Promoters of Peace and Justice Freetown, 3 March 2009. 
34
 Ibid. 
35
 Sierra Leone Police, ―The Brief History of the Sierra Leone Police Force‖; Gbla, ―Security Sector Reform 
Under International Tutelage,‖ 79. 
36
 Gbla, ―Security Sector Reform Under International Tutelage,‖ 79. 
37
 Meek, ―Policing Sierra Leone,‖ 105-106. 
38
 Alice Hills, Policing Africa: Internal Security and the Limits of Liberalisation (London: Lynne Rienner, 
2000), 41. 
  
104 
 
security sector, including the police, in responding to imminent conflict: 
 
In September 1990, a refugee walked into Sierra Leone‘s Police ‗Special Branch‘ … and filed 
a 13-page report about an alleged plan to attack Sierra Leone. While the report was passed on 
through the security structures, there was no response in preparation for a potential attack. Six 
months later, in March 1991, a Sierra Leonean soldier made a 17-page statement confirming 
the threat of an imminent border attack. As in 1990, the report passed through the security 
structures but there was no response. Days later, attacks from the Liberian border in the east of 
Sierra Leone ensued, plunging the nation into more than ten years of a brutal war that claimed 
thousands of lives and devastated the country.
39
 
 
The inability of both the police and the broader security sector to respond to such reports is 
indicative of the state of chaos and mismanagement that reigned within them at that time. 
State security forces were unable to resist what was a small and disparate attack from no more 
than 200 rebels along the Liberian border.
40
 The ineffectiveness of the police was one 
manifestation of the corroding security systems within the country, which failed to prevent or 
halt civil war. As Bruce Baker attests: 
 
The Truth and Reconciliation Commission describe the Police before the war as 
―incompetent‖, ―corrupt‖, ―a ready tool for the perpetuation of state terror against political 
opponents‖, and as engaged in ―extortion of money‖ and ―the violation of basic human 
rights‖. Predatory state policing … [was a] contributory factor … to the outbreak and 
continuance of conflict.
41
 
 
State security forces were so poorly trained and ill-equipped that the government ultimately 
had to rely upon civil defence forces (CDFs) and external military support to repel the rebels. 
This was also, in part, due to the tendency of some state security forces to connive with the 
RUF in order to gain personal benefit through looting of the civilian population.
42
  
 
Their perceived involvement in state corruption meant that the police suffered substantially at 
the hands of the RUF. Throughout the war, police were targeted by the rebels due to their 
history of corruption and cronyism (that the RUF claimed to be fighting against) and their 
support for the government.
43
 It has been estimated that during the war ‗approximately 900 
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police officers were killed and a considerable number suffered amputation. As a result, the 
size of the police was reduced from 9,317 to 6,600.‘44 This devastation included 300 deaths 
during the 1999 rebel attack on Freetown alone, which left all but two police stations in the 
capital destroyed.
45
 
 
Beginnings of Police Reform 
Throughout the 1990s, the United Kingdom began attempts at police reform in Sierra Leone. 
An adviser was initially sent out in 1991, with others deployed in 1996 at the request of the 
newly-elected President Kabbah.
46
 Their mission, however, was disrupted by the Armed 
Forces Revolutionary Council (AFRC) coup of 1997.
47
 In highly insecure environments, often 
with the pervasive threat of being singled out for attack, the poorly trained and ill-equipped 
police were unable to make strides towards fulfilling their purpose of maintaining law and 
order. They also did little to win civilian support, relying on corruption and looting to make 
their living. Their reputation amongst the community as being ‗synonymous with 
politicisation, inefficiency, rampant corruption, poor conditions of service and a lack of basic 
facilities and equipment‘,48 rendered them a force with little support in civilian quarters. 
Albert Pacey‘s quip that ‗the worst recruits receive the worst training and become the worst 
policemen‘49 was compounded in Sierra Leone by also operating in the worst environment – 
where they were the targets of attacks by the rebels and of distrust and disrespect by the 
civilian population.  
 
At the close of the civil war in 2002, international reform packages provided hope for the SLP 
and the community they are intended to police that transformation was possible. Chuck Call 
and Michael Barnett caution of these reforms: 
 
Many countries in the throes of a democratic transition have focused exclusively on ballots 
and on encouraging the military to return to the barracks. Meanwhile the police, who hold 
most responsibility for public order and who are the state institution most in touch with the 
people, are rarely discussed in political reform proposals.
50
  
 
The United Kingdom‘s comprehensive security sector reform programme did not make this 
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mistake. Police reform became a key agenda within SSR efforts and the Family Support 
Units, a landmark project within this. The reforms have not been without their challenges, and 
it remains apparent that ‗legacies of mistrust are difficult to overcome; [and that] a culture of 
reliance on and trust in the police is difficult to create.‘51 The unhappy history of the SLP 
cannot be entirely wiped clean by SSR efforts, but only learned from and slowly built upon, in 
order that more effective policing might be established for the post-conflict environment. 
 
UK Police Reform Efforts 
Reform of the Sierra Leone Police has occurred in the face of a dismal reputation of the force 
amongst the public. A small survey carried out in 1998 revealed that 100% of respondents 
viewed the police as corrupt, 83.3% said the police are generally bad, 90% claimed the police 
victimise people and 100% said the police ask for money in police stations.
52
 Initial 
investigations by reformers also revealed that 87% of police personnel had never seen the 
Police Force Standing Orders, which set out official procedures.
53
 The road to recovery was 
clearly daunting. 
 
A framework for a new police service 
Upon democratic election in 1996, President Kabbah invited the UK to assist with reforming 
the SLP.
54
 Through the Commonwealth Secretariat, DFID sent their initial CPDTF 
deployment to Sierra Leone in 1997. The AFRC coup of that year, as well as the rebel 
invasion of Freetown in 1999 disrupted reform efforts, and the ability of the programme to 
make substantial progress was thus limited. However, important policy advancements were 
achieved in this time. In 1998 the Government of Sierra Leone published its Policing Charter, 
detailing the future role of the police in relation to both the government and the community. 
The Charter emphasises that equal opportunities and merit will govern recruitment procedures 
within the police and that behaviour will be professional and respectful of human rights.
55
 The 
aim, the Charter states, ‗is to see a reborn Sierra Leone Police, which will be a force for good 
in our Nation.‘56 A ‗force for good‘ has since become the slogan of the post-war SLP.  
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Aside from the broad mission statement provided by the Policing Charter the reform team 
were aware that the SLP also needed a strategy for operationalising the Charter‘s goals. The 
formulation of this strategy was typical of decision making throughout the initial SSR period. 
It is important to note that DFID did not have a devolved office in Sierra Leone at this point. 
The DFID Sierra Leone office was not opened until 2005. This meant that personnel deployed 
to Sierra Leone had no in-country supervision. DFID, and the UK government more 
generally, also had no actual policy setting out what SSR was. The concept, first coined in 
1997, was rather a loose and ill-defined catch-all category that held little content itself. Thus, 
a surprising revelation to come out of the SSR programme in Sierra Leone was that the 
various reform programmes which, over time, came to be conceptually bundled together as 
SSR were initially quite disparate.
57
 Decisions were taken by individuals on the ground, with 
little input from headquarters in London.
58
 The formulation of a policing model to 
operationalise the Policing Charter‘s goals was developed in this way. Following the latest 
trends in international policing, initial discussions centred on the concept of community 
policing. Mike Brogden, in an article criticising the community policing ‗missionaries‘, 
suggests that community policing is not nearly as value-free as suggested and often becomes 
the policing model of choice by default, when faced with policing practices that lack 
legitimacy, and few other workable solutions in ‗failed state‘ environments.59 In Sierra Leone 
this term was rejected on the basis of other weaknesses, as explained by IGP Biddle 
recounting a meeting in which the idea of community policing was being put forward: 
 
I said ―okay I don‘t know what it [community policing] is. You tell me what it is, you tell me 
what it is, you tell me what it is.‖ And no matter how many people you put in the room, you‘ll 
get more opinions on what community policing is from them than the people who are giving 
opinions. So I said ―right if we don‘t know what it is, we ain‘t doing it.‖ … So let‘s lose the 
term Community Policing. Now you go to the British police college at Bramshill and ... two 
thirds of the books in that are about Community Policing and not one of those books agrees 
with the other, so that‘s where I came from. I said ―look if we are going to do it from scratch 
we are not doing it on anybody‘s theory from Canada, some backwards town in West Virginia 
or whatever, we are going to start this from scratch‖.60 
 
On this basis, Biddle, as head of the CPDTF along with Project Manager Adrian Horn (also a 
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retired UK police officer) set out to develop a Sierra Leone-specific model of policing. Left to 
their own devices, their in-country decision making took place whilst cooped up in a hotel 
room, along very different lines from the structured policy making processes within DFID 
headquarters. Adrian Horn recounts the experience: 
 
Oh God we were ill ... We sat in a hotel room, I went out scavenging and came back with 
some cheese … some cream crackers, some chocolate ... We sat and had a banquet. We sat 
there crying into our beer and thought what the hell are we going to do? … What‘s the model 
of policing going to be? What are we talking about here?
61
  
 
It was this style of on-the-ground decision making with little access to outside resources, 
rather than carefully enunciated policy derived from the research branches of the British civil 
service that resulted in Local Needs Policing (LNP), the philosophy that guided DFID‘s 
policing reform programme in Sierra Leone. Gordon Peake, Eric Scheye and Alice Hills have 
noted the prevalence of an ―anaemic relationship between headquarters and field personnel‖ 
in several SSR programmes including Sierra Leone. They note that: 
 
policy guidance on SSR either did not exist at headquarters or, when it did, was not 
communicated to practitioners who improvised instead. This situation owed much to the 
manner in which donors are organised; high personnel turnover causes information to 
hemorrhage. It also resulted from the form in which advice was presented by headquarters 
staff; it was usually non-specific and unrelated to the practical challenges of fieldwork.
62
 
 
Policing staff in the field therefore made decisions and operated on a surprisingly independent 
basis. 
 
Returning to his hotel room, Horn spent the evening stripping back various policing models – 
community policing, intelligence-led policing, zero tolerance policing – to their bare bones 
and asked, ‗what are we all getting at?‘63 He concluded: 
 
We are talking about a system of policing that meets the needs and expectations of the local 
community, but delivered within national standards and guidelines. That‘s it, and one of the 
reasons why it‘s about ―local community‖ and ―meets the needs and expectations‖ is because 
the needs of people in Freetown are very different to the needs in Makeni, the needs out in Bo, 
wherever. Because the needs and expectations change through time and through geographical 
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positions, so if you are in the … diamond [mining] region [there are] very different needs to 
when you are in the palm oil growing areas.
64
 
 
The policy of Local Needs Policing thus came to guide the operationalisation of the Policing 
Charter. LNP was to be delivered through Local Command Units (LCUs), which were 
defined as ‗bod[ies] of people, effectively and efficiently managed, accountable and with 
devolved authority designed to deliver the policing needs of the local community.‘65 In order 
to tailor policing to the needs and requirements of local communities, it was deemed 
important to devolve authority as much as possible to avoid over-centralised and thus uniform 
policy prescriptions that would mask regional differences. This was particularly important 
given over-centralisation of government functions in Freetown under the APC‘s one-party 
rule. There are now 26 LCUs across Sierra Leone, offering policing based upon localised 
needs, rather than centralised command.
66
 Yet as the FSU case study below will demonstrate, 
this attempt to police on the basis of local needs does not always take local conditions (in this 
case, the presence of informal policing providers) sufficiently into account.  
 
Police Reform Achievements 
Upon reassembling the CPDTF in August 1999 after the rebel invasion of Freetown, there 
was greater recognition within the UK civil service of the need to incorporate the police 
reform programme more fully into the concept of SSR.
67
 As Albrecht and Jackson note: 
 
It was clearly and urgently understood, that while the SSR process initially had been started 
out of concern over the role of the armed forces in politics, the brunt of security tasks in a 
stable Sierra Leone would fall on the SLP. This line has been consistently followed ever 
since.
68
  
 
Police reform was thus formally unified with other elements of SSR under the Sierra Leone 
Security Sector Reform Programme (SILSEP), funded by DFID and, as of 2001, the Africa 
Conflict Prevention Pool.
69
 Police reform was also recognised from 1999 as being as critical 
as other areas of SSR, given its contribution to law and order, peace, and thus development. 
As DFID notes, ‗[i]mprovements in the economy and quality of life are urgently required to 
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underpin support for democracy and the rule of law. In this context Police Reform with its 
aim of improving security and safety is a key area.‘70 
 
In November 1999, President Kabbah, with the sanctioning of the Sierra Leone Parliament, 
appointed Keith Biddle as the IGP for an initial two year period. Whilst potentially an 
unpopular decision in the face of calls for greater local ownership, Biddle represented a 
politically neutral choice at a time when the position of IGP was highly politicised. Biddle 
thus led the SLP through its fledgling years, before being replaced by a Sierra Leonean IGP, 
Brima Acha Kamara in 2003. Initial reform efforts focused on readying the SLP for security 
provision during the 2002 national elections. Reforms included provision of uniforms, 
equipment and basic necessities such as medicines, clean water and sanitation.
71
 These 
adjustments, whilst not revolutionising the way the SLP functioned, boosted morale and was 
an important step in being seen to be ‗doing something‘ and thus gaining support from within 
and outside of the SLP.
72
 The resourcing also improved the visibility of the police, as officers 
were now identifiable by their uniforms and were increasingly mobile thanks to transport and 
radios.   
 
More institutional changes were also made. Under Biddle‘s leadership the rank structure was 
overhauled in order to flatten the hierarchy and shorten lines of communication.
73
 The number 
of ranks dropped from 22 to 10, with those affected demoted to the next lower rank. This 
change ‗provided much needed space to clarify and redefine the roles and responsibilities of 
police personnel, a significantly politically sensitive process.‘74 Other key reforms included 
the institutionalisation of the Complaints, Discipline and Internal Investigations Department 
(CDIID). This was the first initiative within the history of policing in Sierra Leone that 
provided channels for public complaints of police malpractice. The CDIID has led to 
improved discipline and the dismissal of unfit officers.
75
 The impact has been a behaviourally 
improved SLP that is more professional and trustworthy in the eyes of the community.
76
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More controversially, the Special Security Division was reinvigorated in the late 1990s. 
Albrecht and Jackson explain the shift in attitude towards the SSD: 
 
Up until the 1992 coup, the SSD had been Siaka Stevens‘ personal security force and indeed 
there was a strong inclination in the executive to dismantle the SSD altogether. However, 
when the RUF and remnants of the AFRC attacked Freetown in January 1999 the SSD came 
to play a vital role in the defence of the city. This loyalty led to a complete shift in perceptions 
of the force.
77
 
 
It was also recognised that if the SLP was to act as a serious deterrent to violent crime and 
disorder, it would require an armed division.
78
 The Operational Support Group (OSG) was 
thus formed as a sub-section of the SSD. The OSG have approximately 2,500 personnel (of 
which approximately 1,000 are support staff) of a total SLP force capacity of approximately 
9,500.
79
 DFID provided non-lethal force equipment and training – such as teargas and batons, 
whilst lethal force requirements were deemed inappropriate for poverty reduction spending, 
and passed on to the FCO.
80
 The OSG went on to play an important role in the establishment 
of post-conflict peace, filling the security vacuum created by the withdrawal of the Economic 
Community of West African States Monitoring Group (ECOMOG) in 2000, which had 
intervened in 1998 to eject the AFRC coup leaders and reinstate President Kabbah in office. 
Given the high numbers of former combatants roaming the streets of Freetown at this time 
and the history of RUF targeting of police, unarmed SLP officers were unwilling to patrol the 
streets.
81
 In this situation, the OSG was vital. It was, however, not uncontroversial, with many 
in London, including DFID‘s Permanent Secretary and Clare Short, concerned about straying 
beyond a development mandate.
82
 Ultimately, however, the pragmatic argument of those on 
the ground won out. As Keith Biddle explains: 
 
these people [arguing against the OSG in London] weren‘t there ... We were getting shot at 
everyday ... and they wanted the army off the streets ... but the police had to be sufficiently 
robust that they could deal with the incidents and make the arrests. If everybody is carrying 
AK-47s there is no point in sending policemen round with a piece of wood in their pocket 
saying ―please would you put your AK-47 down‖. It doesn‘t work.83 
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At the other end of the policing spectrum, softer community policing tactics were also being 
established. Local Police Partnership Boards (LPPBs) were set up in every division. These 
operate in a similar way to Neighbourhood Watch schemes, allowing ‗local communities a 
voice in how they want to be policed.‘84 The LPPBs meet every month and are attended by 
local SLP representatives and a mixture of traditional authorities, women and youth 
representatives, as well as other interested community members. Their success appears to 
vary across the country, as well as from division to division.
85
 The initiative overall, however, 
fits well with Sierra Leone‘s post-conflict goal of ensuring that ‗security na la man bizness‘ 
(security is everyone‘s business).86 It also appears cognisant of the historical problems the 
police have faced as an imposed institution (first by the colonial government and later by 
post-independent governments). This history bequeathed a police force that was apart from 
the community and served institutional or regime, rather than citizen, interests. The LPPBs 
represent a turn towards more localised, community-embedded policing that will protect 
citizens and enforce their rights according to local needs.  
 
Additionally, the police reform programme has reformed the Police Council that provides 
oversight of the SLP. Reforms have also ‗created audit and inspection systems … introduced 
a shift system, reduced absenteeism and fraud, and reduced the inappropriate treatment of 
suspects and crime victims.‘87 By 2002, SLP reforms were being rolled out in the provinces, 
with the war in Sierra Leone officially declared over in January of that year.
88
   
 
Achievements have clearly been impressive. To contrast the survey results at the beginning of 
this section, a survey commissioned by the SLP in 2004 suggests striking progress: 
 
Being carried out in 4 urban areas (Freetown, Makeni, Bo, Kenema) it [the survey] gives a 
snapshot of urban perceptions. Importantly only 15 per cent felt that there had been ―no 
improvement‖ in SLP behaviour, whilst 46 percent thought there had been ―a great 
improvement in police attitude‖, particularly as regards human rights and ―rudeness‖.89 
 
This turnaround in public perception is based not only upon good public relations campaigns, 
but also improved behaviour, professionalism and service by the SLP. Their successes have 
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also been recognised internationally with SLP officers now serving with United Nations 
Peacekeeping Operations in Haiti and Darfur.
90
 
 
Yet there are also challenges. Funding is a recurrent problem for all social services in Sierra 
Leone, a country where the government remains excessively donor reliant.
91
 As SSR 
programmes wind down, with complete pull out expected by 2011, public services such as the 
police have to vie with traditional development programmes in order to attract donor funds. 
This is no easy task, with DFID, for example, shifting its agenda away from security towards 
human development and capacity building in early 2009.
92
  
 
Many people in Sierra Leone also still view the police as corrupt, and they are not necessarily 
the first port of call for those with crimes to report, particularly outside of urban areas.
93
 
Osman Gbla claims that ‗[i]n 2003, people continued to see the police as the weakest link in 
the security system.‘94 This view must also be tempered, however, by the fact the SLP are the 
most visible of the security forces, and those with most contact with the public. Other parts of 
the security sector may merely escape such criticism because their behaviour is not on such 
public display. There is a danger too of unrealistic expectations. As Gordon Peake aptly 
highlights: 
 
one should not expect too much too soon from new police forces. These are for the most part 
inexperienced forces, operating within politically uncertain contexts, where there is no recent 
experience of a legitimate local force. Police forces tend to be among the most visible symbols 
of the transition from conflict to peace, and are therefore almost always burdened with high 
expectations. It is hardly surprising that under-paid, under-equipped, under-trained and under-
staffed forces almost always find such hopes difficult to fulfil. That these police forces may 
not live up to expectations is perhaps less a function of their own failings than a reflection of 
the multiplicity of demands placed upon them.
95
 
 
Undoubtedly there will be aspects of the Sierra Leone police reform programme that prove to 
be more and less effective. On the whole, it seems indisputable that the SLP now provide a 
markedly improved service to the community than they did prior to reforms. There is little to 
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be gained from criticising the less successful aspects of reform. It is relatively easy to poke 
holes in the professionalism of the SLP by pointing to the petty corruption of the traffic 
police, for instance. There is a greater need and greater merit in critiquing the policing success 
stories, which have to date received only brief academic attention, and even then only to be 
singled out for praise.
96
 It is these success stories that are the likely candidates to be included 
in future SSR programmes and thus their challenges and lessons that are more practically 
useful in terms of institutional learning. It is for these reasons that the Family Support Units 
will be the focus of the remainder of this chapter. They are perceived as a success story of 
Sierra Leonean police reform and are representative of the new style of policing that DFID 
has sought to promote in Sierra Leone – bundling together concepts of local ownership, 
human rights and security in a hard-not-to-like programme.
97
 This is evidenced by the large 
numbers of donors and NGOs keen to support the FSUs, at least in their initial years of 
operation.
98
  
 
The Evolution of the Family Support Units 
Women and children have been recognised since the 1990s as the most vulnerable group in 
conflict situations, constituting 90 per cent of casualties.
99
 Their vulnerability also lingers into 
the post-war environment, when pre-war power structures, such as patriarchy, seek to reassert 
themselves in peacetime.
100
 This was apparent at the close of the conflict in Sierra Leone, 
particularly amongst groups of former-combatants and their dependents. The dire situation in 
which women often found themselves at the end of the war should not be underestimated. It is 
not only that women in Sierra Leone live in a highly patriarchal society but that this 
oppression is now taking place in a post-conflict society where the bonds that previously gave 
women some form of protection have been shattered. As families were destroyed or forced 
apart by conflict, women became terrifyingly disaffiliated – without parents, brothers or other 
familial elders to ensure that their husbands did not treat them excessively harshly.
101
 The 
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extreme violence that women suffered both during and post-conflict was thus facilitated by 
social disaffiliation and goes far beyond ‗normal‘ levels of oppression or violence.  
 
Kadi Fakondo has been a police officer in Sierra Leone since 1984. As a cadet she was the 
only female in her intake and was ridiculed by her male colleagues as she awkwardly 
scrambled in and out of police trucks in her SLP-issued skirt – trousers were not allowed for 
female officers.
102
 Twenty-five years later, she is the highest ranking female in the SLP, 
holding the position of Assistant Inspector General. In 1999, after the rebel invasion of 
Freetown, IGP Biddle appointed Fakondo Commander of Kissy Division. Kissy, in the east of 
Freetown, was a rebel stronghold throughout the RUF-occupation of the city. Since then, it 
has been a melting pot of former-combatants and their dependents – wives, children, other 
relations and clients.
103
 Former-combatants have struggled with the return to peacetime and 
the changes to their power and status that this has brought. No longer able to wield power 
through the gun, former-combatants risk losing the very things that power was able to bring 
them – respect, resources and ‗wives‘. Throughout the civil war in Sierra Leone, combatants 
from all factions entered into informal marriages, which created the category of ‗bush wives‘. 
These women were both abductees and volunteers, who joined the fighting forces and often 
travelled with them. While it has been suggested that some of these unions were 
consensual,
104
 there are many reported incidences of coercion – including rape and gang 
rape.
105
 Some of these attacks on women were particularly pernicious as an Amnesty 
International Report graphically demonstrates:  
 
A 14-year-old girl was stabbed in the vagina with a knife because she had refused to have sex 
with the rebel combatant who abducted her. Another woman had small pieces of burning 
firewood inserted into her vagina. One 16-year-old girl was so badly injured after repeated 
rape that, following her escape, she required a hysterectomy.
106
 
 
Women were either forced into informal marriages, or sought the relative protection of 
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pairing with one man, to avoid assault by others.
107
 Women were generally perceived as being 
lower down the pecking order than men in terms of access to often limited resources of food, 
water and medicines. Informal marriages also offered a way, then, of securing access to these 
valuable commodities.
108
 The ‗marriages‘ were thus as much about survival as they were 
about choice, involving little more than the informal pairing of men with women on the basis 
of mutual (although rarely equal) benefit. In return for the man providing food, water, 
medicines and protection from others, his ‗wife‘ would cook for him, sleep with and tend to 
him.
109
  
 
At the end of the war, when former-combatants‘ access to resources and ability to protect was 
no longer a necessity, women did not always feel compelled to continue providing their 
services either (which have been characterised in some circumstances as domestic and sexual 
slavery).
110
 Many sought to make themselves independent from their partners, often 
attempting to take their children with them. In an effort to maintain whatever resources 
(including women and children) they had left, former-combatants often violently prevented 
their dependents from leaving. As Fakondo explains: 
 
As their so-called ‗wives‘ struggled to regain their freedom (for jungle justice was no longer 
applicable in the city) there was stiff resistance on the part of the ex-combatants who wanted 
to retain them. This precipitated a dramatic rise in domestic violence cases, which 
overwhelmed my personnel. I decided to create a special unit to handle them.
111
 
 
Originally launched as the Domestic Violence Unit in just Kissy, by 2001 the Unit was 
transformed into the Family Support Unit with the help of IGP Biddle and UK advisers.
112
 
The FSU, unlike the Domestic Violence Unit, was intended to respond to all crimes involving 
women and children, not just sexual and domestic violence offences.
113
  
 
The Family Support Units: Purpose and Procedures 
The purpose of the FSUs has evolved from the original aim of providing a legal response 
mechanism against domestic violence. As part of gender mainstreaming efforts within 
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international reform programmes more generally, the FSUs recognise that women and 
children face different threats and thus require a different manner of policing to men. The 
FSUs tailor their policing style to the needs of women and children. For instance, each Unit in 
theory has toys and spare clothes for children to assist in providing a safe and comfortable 
space for them to be interviewed. In practice, however, many Units do not have the funding to 
maintain these facilities.
114
  Each Unit is also meant to have a dedicated social worker, in 
recognition of the fact that many crimes involving women and children are characterised by 
trauma and abuse. However, again, in practice only about 30 per cent of FSUs provide a 
social worker, although this rises to 75 per cent in Freetown and the Western Area.
115
 This 
tailored policing style seeks to encourage greater reporting of crimes involving women and 
children, in order to end the ‗culture of silence‘, as one Officer in Charge of an FSU termed 
it.
116
 This ‗culture of silence‘ refers to the tolerance of women and children as second class 
citizens within Sierra Leone and the tacit acceptance of violence (both physical and 
emotional) against them.
117
 A case study on Sierra Leone by the United Nations Population 
Fund found: 
 
The causes of domestic violence are embedded in customs and traditions and in people‘s 
attitudes and acceptance of gender inequity and inequality as the norm. Participants in the 
focus-group discussions confirmed that acts such as wife-battering, sexual assault and marital 
rape between intimate partners or the maltreatment of children by parents or other caregivers 
were common.
118
 
 
Not only were these practices found to be commonplace, more concerning still was the fact 
that many women also thought such practices were acceptable. For instance, the case study 
draws upon an unpublished Human Rights Watch report which revealed that, based on 
interviews with urban women between 1998 and 2000:  
 
more than 60 per cent still believed that a man had the right to beat his wife if she disobeyed 
him. Other empirical evidence indicated that it was a wife‘s duty to have sex with her 
husband, even if she didn‘t want to … Other common beliefs include the following: 
 
 Beating one‘s wife or partner is a man‘s way of showing that he loves her; 
 A married man who does not have extramarital affairs is weak and abnormal; 
 A wife who speaks out about her family is a disgrace to that family; 
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 A good wife is expected to accept patiently whatever treatment is meted out to her by her 
husband and his relatives; 
 A survivor of gender-based violence who reports an incident to the police is blamed for 
embarrassing her husband; and 
 Reports made by a woman against her husband may not be addressed or validated by the 
police because they consider such cases to be family matters to be settled at home.
119
 
 
Family Support Units attempt to confront such misinformation, often believed to be a part of 
‗tradition‘ or ‗culture‘. In providing a legal avenue for reporting, investigating and 
prosecuting crimes against women and children, the FSUs are demystifying beliefs about the 
acceptability of abuse and exploitation. The aim is to create safer households and 
communities for women and children. As one FSU staff member told me, establishing peace 
countrywide is dependent first of all on establishing domestic peace.
120
 This will form the 
bedrock for a peaceful future. 
 
In achieving this aim, the FSUs have established themselves as Units separate from police 
stations. While often housed within the same grounds, FSUs are located in a separate 
building, and FSU police officers do not wear uniforms. The number of staff in each Unit 
varies, but ranged from nine to 15 police officers, plus one social worker in the Units I visited. 
The police officers are provided with specialist training to work in the FSUs. Whilst women 
in particular are urged to apply there is no quota system and FSUs are still male-dominated 
countrywide.
121
 This is reflective of the sex breakdown of SLP staff more generally, with 
approximately 1,550 women in a force of 9,500.
122
 Social workers are provided by the 
Ministry of Social Welfare, and train with the police in techniques for joint investigations of 
abuse.
123
  Training covers awareness raising, human rights, media and communication skills, 
record keeping and sexual investigation.
124
 The social workers are available to FSU 
complainants from the time they enter the Unit, through to the prosecution stages, when the 
case has technically left the FSU‘s mandate and been passed onto Public Prosecutions.125 
 
Upon entering the FSU, complainants are interviewed by the Non-Commissioned Officer in 
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Charge of Crime (NCOIC), in the presence of the social worker (in the case of children, 
interviews are conducted solely by the social worker).
126
 On the basis of this interview, the 
NCOIC decides whether there is cause for criminal investigation. If not, the complainant is 
referred to alternative services, provided (at least in theory) by the Ministry of Social Welfare, 
Local Court or civil society.
127
 If it is found that there may be a criminal case to answer, the 
interview is recorded at the Police Station, and the case is passed on to an FSU Investigator, 
who carries out their investigations in conjunction with the social worker.
128
 This may involve 
referral to hospital for medical examination (escorted by a female police officer if the 
complaint is of a sexual nature), interviews of witnesses and the accused, background 
research and checks, as well as collection of evidence.
129
 If a case can be made, it will be 
charged to the Magistrates Court under formal English law (rather than customary law).
130
 
Since their countrywide roll-out in 2001, the FSUs have been actively promoted through 
awareness raising activities within communities and on the radio. Sensitisation campaigns 
have also been held in order to generate understanding of the FSUs role and realisation of the 
unacceptability of violence against women and children.
131
  
 
The FSUs have received widespread praise as a success story of Sierra Leone‘s security sector 
reform programme. In fact, mention of the FSUs is almost entirely limited to brief statements 
about their success, gender awareness or local innovation. There is no in-depth examination 
of their working procedures and even less empirical investigation of their impact upon women 
and children. For instance, a consultant report notes: 
 
A particularly successful intervention within the Sierra Leone police has been the 
establishment of Family Support Units. These units provide improved service to victims of 
sexual and domestic abuse and also begin to prevent such crimes by raising their profile. The 
units are staged jointly by police officers and social workers who together deal with family 
issues and child protection.
132
  
 
This is the extent of their examination of the FSUs. Albrecht and Jackson, whilst providing 
‗information boxes‘ that draw upon primary sources to explain the problems that led to the 
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FSUs and their later co-option by Liberian police reform, also limit their own analysis to a 
brief statement: 
 
One of the key innovations in the immediate aftermath of the conflict was the setting up of 
Family Support Units (FSUs) within the SLP. They were a direct response to urgently needed 
public services, which were led by one of the SLP‘s key figures in post-conflict Sierra 
Leone.
133
 
 
Other publications restrict their assessments of the FSUs to ‗particularly successful‘134 or an 
example of good gender awareness.
135
 The Units seem to largely escape a critical lens. Their 
success is not probed or tested, but claimed on no apparent evidential basis. It seems that by 
ticking the donor-friendly boxes of local innovation, gender awareness and the rights of 
women and children, the FSUs are presumed successful.  
 
Limited criticisms of the FSUs have been made, although these seem to be in passing, rather 
than constituting an in-depth investigation. It has been claimed, for instance, that the FSUs 
lack familiarity with the Gender Act
136
 and police remain largely insensitive to gender 
issues.
137
 These criticisms do not point to problems with the FSU structure or procedures 
themselves. The only publication to provide substantial analysis of the FSUs (two paragraphs) 
is an International Alert study on gender-based violence in Sierra Leone. It determines that 
the FSUs face substantial organisational barriers – such as insufficient office space to provide 
privacy for complainant interviews and lack of office supplies.
138
 More revealingly, it also 
claims on the basis of conversations with women‘s groups in Sierra Leone that gender-based 
violence remains a taboo issue, in spite of FSU sensitisation campaigns.
139
 Overwhelmingly, 
however, the small literature that makes mention of the FSUs does so in a positive light. 
Criticisms are brief and under-examined. Despite the rare recognition that ‗the empirical 
success [of the FSUs] is in fact rather ambiguous‘, no research down this track has as yet been 
pursued.
140
 
 
The criticisms made here differ from those above, reaching to the heart of FSU operations. 
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They point to the FSUs‘ failure to take into account challenges to their very purpose from 
informal policing mechanisms, such as chiefs and secret societies. These criticisms are 
intended to be constructive. Whilst the success of the FSU project is currently limited in 
significantly impacting the majority of women in Sierra Leone, the potential and motivation is 
apparent. By recognising and engaging with the challenges posed by the informal, the work of 
the FSUs will reach their target beneficiaries more directly, improving the effectiveness of 
DFID‘s policing reform programme more broadly.  
 
Challenges to the FSUs 
The FSUs have been set up to protect the rights of women through crime response, as part of  
DFID‘s broader SSR efforts to democratise and improve security sector practices. They aim 
to be the primary provider of policing in this regard. Currently however, they are challenged 
by chiefs and secret societies who remain the primary dispensers of policing for as much as 
85% of the Sierra Leonean population,
141
 particularly relating to the subjugated categories of 
women and children.
142
 As a consequence, the ability of the FSUs to achieve their aim of 
improved policing for the majority of women is limited and the historic divide between 
‗modern‘ state policing for some and ‗traditional‘ informal policing for others remains. Thus, 
DFID‘s engagement with state security forces to the exclusion of informal security forces, on 
the basis of its understanding of the conflict as caused by state failure, limits the ability of 
DFID‘s SSR programme to achieve its aims. 
 
Chiefs and secret societies provide significant services in terms of resolving conflict and 
maintaining order within their communities. This is particularly so regarding issues of 
domestic violence and crimes of a sexual nature, which the FSUs claim as falling within their 
mandate. The stronghold possessed by informal mechanisms in the field also claimed by the 
FSUs, suggests that the ability of the Units to have a lasting impact upon the rights of women 
requires accommodation of or engagement with chiefs and secret societies. This is not 
necessarily straightforward. The policing provided by these two alternatives are strikingly 
different, with FSUs representing Western-style policing based upon universal human rights, 
and chiefs and secret societies frequently portrayed as promoting ‗traditional‘ customs, which 
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often oppress women. Not only do chiefs and secret societies respond (at times 
inappropriately) to crimes against women, they are also at times complicit in rendering 
women insecure, for instance through clitoridectomy (female circumcision). This makes FSU 
engagement with these providers a thorny issue. Yet these informal mechanisms remain the 
primary policing providers due to the high costs involved with FSU complaints procedures 
and cultural bias. Not engaging with them risks continuing the historical divide in Sierra 
Leonean policing whereby ‗modern‘ policing pertains to those living in urban areas, while 
those in rural areas continue to rely upon ‗traditional‘ policing that denies fundamental human 
rights. Policing reform needs to work towards overcoming this bifurcated policing system and 
indeed, those leading DFID‘s policing reform programme seem to be attempting this through 
making the state police more locally-relevant, community-based and rights-respecting. Yet, in 
practice, the SLP are still limited in a financial, geographic and cultural sense and thereby fail 
to overcome the two-tier system of policing. Given their current position as primary providers 
of policing in this area, improving the rights of women in a practical, everyday sense, as 
DFID‘s FSU policing project aims to do, depends upon changes to chieftaincy and secret 
society practices. If such changes are to be sustainable they must be the outcome of a dialogue 
involving the problematic institutions themselves.  
 
Financial Barriers of FSUs 
Each of the FSUs visited indicated that the costs accrued by complainants in utilising the 
FSUs were often prohibitively expensive. There are, first of all, costs of travelling to a police 
station that has an FSU attached. Currently there are only 26 FSUs across Sierra Leone (with 
8 of these located in the Western Area).
143
 This means that, particularly in rural areas, many 
communities are a reasonable distance from FSU assistance. After initial travel to the FSU to 
lodge a complaint, victims reporting cases of rape or assault must obtain a medical report to 
file charges.
144
 Medical reports by government doctors cost approximately 35,000 Leones 
(USD 11).
145
 If the case is charged to court, there are also costs of travelling to the nearest 
Magistrates Court, which are located only in the major urban centres of each of the 14 
Districts (for instance, in Bo District, the Magistrate Court serves 15 chiefdoms, the closest of 
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which is approximately 8 miles from the Court).
146
  Currently, due to shortages within the 
formal legal system, there is only one Magistrate for each District, causing excessive 
overburdening. This shortage is compounded when a District Magistrate is unable to perform 
their duties. As Castillejo highlights: 
 
the Magistrate based in Makeni was also covering the court in Kabala, because of the lack of 
qualified Magistrates. Although she was supposed to visit Kabala once a week, the Magistrate 
had not been for almost two months because there was no money provided for her petrol. This 
meant that the prison was crowded with remand prisoners and struggling to cope and that the 
JPs [Justices of the Peace] were being forced to bail prisoners who were on remand for serious 
offences.
147
 
 
The shortages and resultant overburdening of the justice system mean that delays in hearing 
cases are common. This adds to the costs incurred by a complainant, who must travel to court 
only to hear that their case has been adjourned and rescheduled. If complainants are not 
present when a case is called to be heard, the matter is dismissed.
148
 The financial burden of 
travelling to court must also be considered. Costs accrued not only involve transport to the 
court, but also accommodation and food for the complainant and any witnesses that they 
bring. There are also lost earnings over the time a complainant (and their witnesses) are 
absent from work. In the provinces, where many survive on subsistence agriculture, this 
means that lost earnings directly correlate to lost food supply.  
 
Compounding these high costs, FSU complainants tend to come from low-socioeconomic 
backgrounds, in a country already dogged by severe underdevelopment.
149
  It has been 
estimated that 75 per cent of women in Sierra Leone live on less than USD 0.50 a day, 
compared to 54 per cent of men.
150
 It is therefore the target population of the FSUs that are 
the least likely to be able to afford their services. This means that those suffering the greatest 
abuses are also those most likely to have to rely upon the informal policing options of chiefs 
and secret societies. Many complainants who do opt to take their allegations to the FSUs 
subsequently drop them prior to going to court due to the high costs involved.
151
 Women who 
press charges against their husbands also often settle their disputes out of court, when faced 
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with the prospect of loss of their partner‘s income, which has substantial follow-on effects, 
such as paying children‘s school fees.152 The informal justice system of the chiefs and secret 
societies is perceived as being less costly than the procedures of the FSUs, and thus provides 
a more financially accessible service to women in Sierra Leone. 
 
Limits of FSU Justice 
The costs involved with FSU procedures are also correlated to the modicum of justice 
achieved. For instance, those who can afford lawyers receive better representation. Those who 
cannot afford a lawyer must navigate the often foreign world of formal English law unaided. 
This is no easy task given the lack of education provided to most Sierra Leonean women, 
amongst whom illiteracy is greater than an overwhelming 80 per cent.
153
 The Office of the 
Director of Public Prosecutions is meant to provide complainants with a legal representative 
where the complainant cannot afford one, but this rarely happens in practice.
154
 As men are 
generally the guardians of household finances, it is usually men who can afford 
representation, and thus increase their chances of escaping conviction.
155
 The FSUs do not 
appear to keep accurate records of convictions, but all those I spoke with suggested the rates 
were disappointingly low.
156
 The Lumley FSU (in the West of Freetown) indicated that in 
2007 there had been only two successful convictions in the entire Western Area.
157
 Further, a 
United States Department of State Human Rights Report indicates that, as of October 2008, 
FSUs had ‗reported 136 cases of child cruelty, of which only nine had been charged to court. 
There were no convictions‘.158 The Report goes on to note that of 1,186 sexual assault cases 
in 2008, only 437 perpetrators were charged (555 are still under investigation), with 25 cases 
resulting in convictions.
 159
  
 
FSUs also face the challenge of delivering meaningful justice to their complainants. Whilst 
ensuring a perpetrator is imprisoned is important to some complainants, FSU staff suggested 
that the lack of financial compensation available to victims under formal, English law deters 
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some from utilising the FSUs.
160
 It may be the case that, aside from FSU legal procedures 
being prohibitively expensive, the justice that they have the potential to deliver may not 
represent the locally valued currency of justice meaningful to women in Sierra Leone. 
Alternatively, the justice system of the chiefs and secret societies usually results in the guilty 
party paying the aggrieved party. Thus, while the problems of attaining justice through the 
FSUs may be due in part to limitations of the legal system, rather than due to FSU procedures 
per se, the costs involved in seeking justice and the kind of justice available, render the FSUs 
an unviable or less appealing option for many potential complainants.  
 
Cultural barriers of FSUs  
‗The law says you [a woman] are like a table in my house. So I can treat you like that.‘161 
There is a cultural bias against women in Sierra Leone that socialises both men and women 
into believing that women are inferior to their male counterparts. This is most aptly 
demonstrated by women‘s status as minors under customary law in Sierra Leone.162 They are 
thus viewed as the equivalent of children, with subsidiary rights to those males (fathers and 
husbands) with authority over them. Women married under customary law are legally 
regarded as ‗chattel‘.163 As the US Department of State notes in a Human Rights Report on 
Sierra Leone, ‗[a] woman was frequently perceived to be the property of her husband, to be 
inherited on his death with his other property.‘164 This legal culture leads to opinions such as 
the one demonstrated by the quotation at the beginning of this section, that women are the 
possessions of men, rather than independent people with equal rights.  
 
More surprising perhaps than the tendency of men to fortify their powerful position by 
suppressing women, is the fact that many women view their position as acceptable. A 
UNICEF study in Sierra Leone has revealed that 85 per cent of women between the ages of 
15 and 49 view violence as an acceptable means of resolving inter-marital disputes.
165
 The 
internalisation of inferiority is not only debilitating in itself, it also results in women tolerating 
the injustices of the informal policing system, and not pursuing the services available to them 
through the FSUs. As Karen Barnes, et al reveal: 
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Many women indicate that physical violence perpetrated against them by their male partners is 
permissible, as they have been socialised to see this behaviour as acceptable and expected. 
Pursuing recourse against the perpetrators is rarely an option due to stigma, social pressure, 
expense, lack of awareness and generally prohibitive legal structures.
166
 
 
Women in Sierra Leone do not appear to be entirely convinced that they should be able to 
press charges against their partners or men within their families or communities.
167
 This view 
appears to permeate even the high echelons of the Sierra Leone government. In a story 
recounted to me in interview, the Sierra Leonean Minister for Gender Affairs admonished a 
group of Western women for their concerns regarding domestic violence.
168
 The female 
Minister insisted that a man in Sierra Leone is entitled to beat his wife because that is what 
their culture says. This seemingly ‗traditional‘ statement from a representative of the 
‗modern‘ state with a progressive portfolio drew the response, ‗you can‘t say that! For 
Christ‘s sake you‘re the Minister for Gender Affairs!‘169 Further to this, women are aware that 
if they did choose to assert their rights against abusive men, and somehow could overcome 
the financial obstacles involved with FSU procedures, they would face stigmatisation by their 
family and community. The women may be viewed as ‗spoiled‘, if they suffer abuse prior to 
marriage,
170
 or else married women who report their husbands may be viewed as bad mothers, 
wives and daughters.
171
 Not only does such stigmatisation bring disgrace upon one‘s family, it 
can, in extreme cases, lead to expulsion from the chiefdom.
172
  
 
The FSUs also represent an unknown and foreign complaints system that women are not 
familiar with. The informal complaints mechanisms provided by chiefs and secret societies, 
however, while far from perfect, represent a system that Sierra Leoneans know and 
understand. This knowledge and familiarity is particularly important when disclosing highly 
personal or traumatic incidents. Such disclosures are difficult enough without the added stress 
of an alien environment and unfamiliar procedures and personnel. The informal system thus 
has the benefit of being known to the community it serves – in terms of both the individuals 
who administer these systems and the processes they use. The FSUs also operate 
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predominantly in English, the official language in Sierra Leone, which is not uncommon in 
Freetown but rarely known outside of the capital, except by the educated elite. Whilst 
complainant interviews may be conducted in local languages, as the formal court system 
operates in English the majority of Sierra Leonean women are at a supreme disadvantage. As 
Bruce Baker and Eric Scheye have noted, in support of informal policing mechanisms: 
 
There are many reasons for the vitality and strength of non-state service delivery, including 
their: physical, linguistic and cultural accessibility; legitimacy; efficacy; timeliness of 
decisions; low transactional costs; support for restitution and restorative justice rather than 
punishment and incarceration; and degree of participation afforded to disputants. For these 
and other reasons, in the great majority of circumstances, people look first to non-state 
agencies for crime protection and crime response.
173
 
 
There are thus strong cultural forces working against the FSUs, making their policing service 
inaccessible to women in rural Sierra Leone. Women are rendered inferior to men through 
customary law, which breeds a culture of oppression that women themselves often tacitly 
accept. There is also a fear of stigmatisation of recalcitrant women who break cultural taboos 
by seeking justice against male counterparts, thus silencing women who might otherwise 
speak out. Finally, a cultural bias also emerges from the familiarity with informal justice 
procedures vis-à-vis the comparatively foreign practices of the FSUs, further inhibiting 
women from relying upon the latter. As the staff from the Kenema Family Support Unit told 
me, ‗culture dies hard‘.174 These cultural obstacles, combined with the financial barriers and 
justice dividend set out above, ensure that women continue to depend overwhelmingly upon 
informal policing mechanisms. The FSUs must address these obstacles if they are to improve 
the rights of women within policing practices in a meaningful way, as intended by DFID‘s 
SSR programme.  
 
Policing by the Chiefs 
Existing alongside the FSUs are alternative policing practices administered by informal 
security actors, such as chiefs and secret societies, complicating the image of policing for 
women in Sierra Leone. Whilst under the Local Courts Act of 1963, it is technically only the 
Local Courts who have customary law jurisdiction, in practice chiefs have traditionally 
administered these laws to their subjects.
175
 It is to their town or village chiefs that families or 
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communities, unable to resolve their disputes in-house, will turn to with complaints or for 
arbitration.
176
 If the chief is unable to resolve the dispute, or the disputants are not satisfied 
with the outcome, they can refer the dispute up the chiefdom hierarchy to the paramount 
chief, or alternatively pursue the matter through the Local Courts or the state police.
177
 Unless 
the dispute involves a serious criminal matter (and even then, not always), it will generally be 
referred to a chief first.
178
 This means that chiefs are the first port of call for the majority of 
disputes within rural Sierra Leone. As the Town Chief of Tombodou, Kono District, states: 
 
As local chief I deal with 70-80 per cent of the work [disputes]. I see all cases of less than 
30,000 Leones [approximately USD 10]. People come to the Native Authority court because 
they have no respect for the [state] authorities. If people are not satisfied [with the result] they 
go to the police.
179
 
 
In resolving disputes, a chief will work through the chiefdom police who act as messengers 
and personal guards of the chief.
180
 They carry messages, summon subjects to the chief or 
Local Courts, protect the chief and enforce his dictates. They are entirely separate from the 
state police, do not wear uniforms or carry weapons and are paid only through the chief.
181
 
Chiefdom police will summon the parties involved and any witnesses to speak with the chief 
and assist in the investigation. When questioning a woman, a male chief will request a male 
family member to be present with her.
182
 Parties can also bring family or community 
members to ‗vouch for‘ them, that is, to attest to their good character.183 On the basis of these 
discussions, the chief will come to a decision about how best to resolve the dispute. This 
representation of policing by chiefs seems relatively uncontroversial and indeed, does not 
even necessarily contravene the Local Courts Act. However, chiefs also pronounce judgments 
and issue fines or impose prison sentences, as well as requesting payment for their dispute 
resolution services, and these actions render them in contravention of the Act. The most 
common result from chieftaincy policing is that one party is fined. The reasons given for such 
resolution speak to the role that chiefs see themselves as fulfilling in terms of maintaining 
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peace and order within their chiefdoms. Paramount Chief Vangahun explained that if he did 
not fine a man for his misdemeanours, the victims of those misdemeanours would be 
compelled to seek revenge themselves.
184
 This would lead to increased incidents of crime and 
disquiet in his chiefdom. Thus, the fining system appeases the aggrieved parties and serves to 
keep the peace within the chiefdom.
185
 Yet fines issued by chiefs were a central grievance of 
many RUF recruits, and recent research suggests that the frequency and amount of such fines 
has not decreased post-conflict.
186
 This leaves a potential conflict trigger unaddressed. 
 
Furthermore, the manner in which this ‗peace‘ is kept within the chiefdom may come at the 
price of substantive justice, particularly for women and young people. For instance, in an 
effort to ‗keep the peace‘ chiefs often encourage women who are raped (particularly when 
pregnancy occurs) to marry their attackers.
187
 This is in part justified as being for the benefit 
of the woman, who would otherwise be viewed as ‗spoiled‘ within the community and thus 
have difficulty finding another suitor.
188
 It is also permissible, under customary law, for a man 
to ‗discipline‘ a wife for failing to fulfil her domestic duties, providing he keeps in mind that 
‗she was not given to you to beat her like a drum.‘189  Behaviour worthy of chastisement 
includes burning a meal or not having a meal ready on time, going out without a husband‘s 
permission, refusing sex, failing to care for children or the home, questioning a husband, 
talking back or for what is known as woman palava, situations when a man suspects his wife 
of flirting or having an affair with another man.
190
 Such permissibility ‗effectively sanction[s] 
... domestic violence.‘191 In some instances, husbands and chiefs collude to make money by 
pressuring their wives to admit to affairs (real or imagined), which results in the adulterous 
male being fined, to the benefit of both the husband and chief.
192
 Women are forced to 
provide names of likely young men within the community, regardless of the truth of the affair, 
in order to escape or end violent treatment against them. This situation reveals the injustices 
towards both women and young people, the latter of whom suffer financial oppression from 
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male elders, which in turn limits their lifestyle options (such as taking a wife of their own, 
buying land or undertaking training) and have been demonstrated as lying at the heart of 
grievances that led to conflict. Women are also, at times, made to suffer for problems within 
their marriage, with reports in Kenema District of chiefs resolving domestic disputes by 
locking up the women.
193
 Joe Alie explains these injustices within husband-wife relations: 
 
The justice system is heavily tilted against women, especially in husband-wife relationships, 
and against young people. It is not considered in the best interest of the family to wrong a 
husband even if his guilt is clearly evident. Instead, the elders would attempt to say soothing 
words to the wife and later privately rebuke the husband for his misdeeds. While this may 
look like an injustice to the woman, there is an important social element here. The main 
interest is to hold the marriage together, not to create a situation where the woman will ―win 
the war but lose the peace‖.194 
 
The value of a solid family unit is key then to maintaining the peace and order that Paramount 
Chief Vangahun spoke of in interview, mentioned above. The value of order appears to 
supersede that of justice in both Alie‘s and the Paramount Chief‘s accounts, and this order is 
seen to be in the greater interests of Sierra Leoneans. For instance, the wife in Alie‘s excerpt 
may not achieve justice against her husband for his misdemeanours, but she will ultimately be 
better served by respecting him and not ‗causing palava‘ so that their marriage remains intact. 
The logic at play here clearly prioritises community order (based upon familial peace) over 
the rights of women on the assumption that marriage, however tainted by abuse or adultery, is 
in the best interests of all. As the US Department of State in its Human Rights Report on 
Sierra Leone highlights, women‘s ‗rights and status under customary law varied significantly 
depending upon the ethnic group to which they belonged, but was routinely inferior to that of 
men.‘195 The idea that the dignity of women may supersede the importance of marriage is not 
considered. In this way, the policing provided by the chiefs does not effectively cater to the 
needs or wellbeing of women, but rather subjugates their concerns.  
 
The chieftaincy system is also not entirely supportive of the new policing provided by the 
Family Support Units. As one Paramount Chief told me in relation to the SLP, ‗they are 
taking our job.‘196 As chiefs make money from their policing role they are thus unlikely to be 
eager to give it up, particularly given their reduction in funding since having to share 
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collected taxes with Local Councils.
197
 Staff at one FSU told me that chiefs have even 
threatened to evict subjects from their chiefdoms if they complain to the FSUs.
198
 Clearly, 
many chiefs are administering a system that fails to serve the interests of women and are more 
interested in collecting revenue and ensuring community order. 
 
Policing by the Secret Societies 
A second informal policing provider that challenges the FSUs is the secret societies. 
Throughout Sierra Leone a number of sex-specific secret societies play a principal role in 
transforming initiates from children into adults. There are also non-sex specific secret 
societies, such as the Humoi, that regulate sexual and marital relationships.
199
 These societies 
wield substantial influence within the community and particularly amongst their initiates, 
playing a determining role in the lives of many women in Sierra Leone. Secret societies fulfil 
a central function in chiefdom politics and were at times complicit in the injustices that led to 
civil war. Policing by these informal providers is thus in critical need of reform. While female 
secret societies exist by different names in different regions of Sierra Leone, for the sake of 
simplicity, Sande will henceforth be used to refer to female secret societies across Sierra 
Leone.
200
 Furthermore, whilst practices across regions are likely to vary, the following 
analysis draws upon research from various regions of Sierra Leone and practices that appear 
to be generalisable. 
 
Girls in Sierra Leone enter into Sande initiation between the ages of approximately six and 
15.
201
 Time spent in the Sande bush (the local English translation for the society‘s sacred 
grove where initiation takes place)
202
 can range from a few days to a few months.
203
 Initiation 
is intended to provide guidance and schooling in a range of women‘s experiences, including 
caring for a husband and children, cooking, sex, relations with co-wives and rules concerning 
pregnancy and childbirth.
204
 It also provides the occasion for clitoridectomy, ‗whereby 
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women are invested with fertility, the basis of their own long-term welfare.‘205 Upon 
completion of initiation, the girls have been transformed into adult women, capable of 
marriage and child birth. Initiates are said to form a bond that links them for life in sisterly 
solidarity.
206
 In provincial Sierra Leone, it is estimated that 94% of eligible females are 
members of a secret society
207
 and ‗most suitors insist that their future wives be initiated into 
the Sande, and they themselves usually contribute to the fees.‘208 
 
These societies wield considerable control over women in Sierra Leone. As Anita Schroven 
explains: 
 
Throughout a woman‘s life, Sande rules and leading members exert a large amount of control 
due to ―secret knowledge‖ of fertility and child birth and the power to implement social 
regulations, fines or other punishments. This is part of a larger network controlling especially 
young women due to their productive and reproductive capacities, first exploited by their 
family of origin, later by their husband‘s family, and starting from the beginning of their 
initiation also by leaders of the local Sande society. This control network, intertwined with 
values and beliefs, is able to keep women submissive to any figure of authority.
209
 
 
Through their venerated knowledge of secret society rules and conduct, Sande elders are able 
to police women‘s behaviour. This control is demonstrated through rituals surrounding 
childbirth, which happens largely under female secret society supervision. Fertility and easy 
childbirth are taken as symbols of a woman‘s good behaviour and long or complicated births 
are often blamed on bad behaviour of the labouring woman.
210
 Secret society midwives 
frequently beat labouring women in order to hasten delivery, particularly if adulterous or 
other unsanctioned behaviour is suspected.
211
 Caroline Bledsoe also highlights that the 
midwives ‗use such times of extreme dependence upon them to extract money from women, 
threatening to expose adulterous affairs to their husbands unless compensated.‘212 In this 
situation, women are blackmailed through the birthing process into a form of ‗justice‘ highly 
unfavourable to them. Furthermore, the fear of suffering such treatment has the simultaneous 
effect of policing women‘s behaviour. The horrific irony is that secret society practices, such 
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as beating labouring women or other traditional practices such as jumping on a woman‘s 
stomach or rolling a log down her body can complicate and thus lengthen childbirth.
213
 So too 
can the practice of clitoridectomy, as ‗after a girl has been cut, scar tissue can form and skin 
that has lost its natural elasticity can tear during labour, leading to excessive bleeding.‘214 The 
secret societies thus create the difficult labour conditions which they then, in turn, punish on 
the basis of assumed contraventions of Sande laws. Such punishments and threats, regardless 
of the veracity of the crimes they are punishing, serve to reinforce the power of Sande codes 
of conduct. 
  
The Sande also wield substantial powers in enforcing Sande codes of conduct and prescribed 
behaviours. Contraventions of such codes are punishable by fines and offenders also risk 
spiritual punishments that Sande elders are capable of causing due to their secret knowledge 
of traditional medicine.
215
 Such power is demonstrated through Caroline Bledsoe‘s example 
of Sande elders pursuing a case of abuse of one of their members, not for the woman‘s 
benefit, but for their own. The example suggests that the secret societies operate not so much 
in support of ‗sisterly solidarity‘ or justice for their members, but of traditional elders. 
Bledsoe explains: 
 
I witnessed a major public event in Sierra Leone in which the leaders of the Sande sued a 
Mende man in court for violating a Sande law by ―abusing‖ a young woman – he made 
insulting allusions to her sexual organs – in the heat of a bitter quarrel. Everyone agreed that 
the man would lose, and many people worried about what the Sande might do to him or to 
anyone who dared to support him. Even the male secular chiefs who adjudicated the case 
seemed submissive to Sande wishes, and in the end they fined him the equivalent of about US 
$180. The notion that Sande members maintain a consistent female solidarity against men, 
even in Sande affairs, is difficult to support. In the court case the male chiefs were in league 
with the leaders of the local Sande. Although the head of the Sande publicly expressed moral 
outrage that she said was shared by all women when the man broke this Sande law, she 
gloated privately to me about the large fine that the Sande leadership and the male chiefs 
would share when the man was sued. The ―abused‖ woman actually got very little money 
from the fine.
216
  
 
The justice achieved by the aggrieved woman appears secondary to the financial potential the 
case provided to Sande elders. This suggests that leaders of the secret societies value the 
economic incentive of their privileged position more than their role of protecting the rights of 
their initiates. This is further supported by Bledsoe‘s account that ‗leaders exact heavy tolls of 
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labour from those whom they initiate. Initiates commonly work on leaders‘ farms, increasing 
the leaders‘ wealth.‘217 
 
The societies also maintain a powerful political influence, as Zainab Bangura (the sole female 
presidential candidate in 2002) attests: 
 
A woman from Freetown and the Western Area [where Sande initiation is not common] would 
get no chance to be a successful politician if she were not part of a secret society. Those of us 
who joined the society are expected to support it – we cannot stand out and criticise it, 
otherwise you will be sidelined by the family.
218
 
 
The political power of the Sande was also reinforced during the 2007 Presidential elections. 
In an attempt to sway undecided voters, first lady, Patricia Kabbah, sponsored initiation costs 
of 1,500 young girls, suggesting that secret society participation is a vote-winner in Sierra 
Leone.
219
 Other politicians also organised smaller-scale initiation sponsorship to boost their 
support in almost every district of the country.
220
 Even the Minister of Social Welfare, Gender 
and Women‘s Affairs from 1998-2007 threatened to ‗sew up the mouths‘ of those who 
preached against secret society clitoridectomy.
221
 If these forces are among the strongest in 
the country in terms of policing women‘s behaviour, the FSUs face an uphill struggle in terms 
of promoting women‘s rights and need to engage at these informal sites of resistance. 
 
The above illustration reveals the role that secret societies play in policing the behaviour of 
women in Sierra Leone and how society elders often manipulate their leadership positions to 
encourage fealty to society rules. Ultimately, Sande is influential not so much because of the 
actual rules it promotes, but because of its teachings of obedience to those rules. As Beldsoe 
suggests: 
 
Although Sande leaders may teach their initiates a few techniques for their future lives, the 
most important lesson they learn is that the leaders ultimately control the esoteric medicines 
and ritual techniques that can benefit or harm them. Such outcomes are contingent on proper 
obedience and respect from the initiates, and on appropriate payments.
222
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Thus, the justice that women receive through Sande and the behaviours that they police do not 
serve the interests of women in terms of both their minimal rights and wellbeing. Rather, they 
serve to reinforce the power of Sande elders who benefit financially from enforcing particular 
behaviours that often contravene women‘s rights. The operation of such forms of policing 
without engagement in reform programmes drastically limits the ability of DFID‘s SSR 
programme to improve the quality of policing provided to women in Sierra Leone. 
 
Interactions between the policing systems 
Despite the practices of chiefs and secret societies having adverse consequences for women, 
their position as the primary providers of policing regarding women‘s behaviour and crimes 
involving them, render them an essential component of the policing puzzle in Sierra Leone. 
Efforts to address the causes of conflict (set out in the previous chapter as grievances over 
justice and equitable governance at both the state and informal level) and to improve the 
policing services for women must take these informal mechanisms into account. Given the 
geographic, financial and cultural obstacles preventing the FSUs from accessing rural women, 
efforts need to be focused on engaging with chiefs and secret societies in order to ensure that 
the services most available to women do not cause them greater harm. This means 
confronting undesirable practices within informal policing mechanisms that are often couched 
in terms of culture and tradition (and are often genuinely understood in this way).    
 
To date, the interaction between the FSUs and chiefs and secret societies has been minimal. 
There was initially funding for sensitisation programmes, which some FSUs claim were 
successful in improving relations, with chiefs even referring complaints to the FSUs at 
times.
223
 These sensitisation programmes have not taken place since the first few years of 
FSU establishment (presumably since about 2004).
224
 There has been at least one instance, in 
2009, of FSU staff ‗rescuing‘ girls from the Sande bush, to prevent them undergoing 
clitoridectomy as part of their secret society initiation.
225
 This has fostered a confrontational 
relationship between the FSUs and the secret societies and chiefs who support them. It has 
also positioned the debate about policing and women‘s rights along a false binary, between 
the ‗modern‘ policing system of the FSU and the ‗traditional‘ policing provided by the chiefs 
and secret societies. It is this false (but historically perceptible) binary that policing reform 
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needs to overcome in order to provide accessible and democratic policing for all and to 
comprehensively address the causes of the civil war that go beyond just state failure. 
Understanding policing options in a simplistic, ‗modern-versus-traditional‘ manner is not a 
fruitful way of winning over the majority of rural women, who are socialised in traditional 
customs and often feel uncomfortable with the unknown and foreign environment and 
procedures of the FSUs. Arguments about the modern and the traditional are invoked as 
legitimating claims by both sides to justify their practices, yet both contain aspects that cater 
more and less effectively to the needs of women. Given the importance of tradition in the 
lives of many, particularly rural, Sierra Leoneans, the FSUs should be careful not to align 
themselves against tradition, as this risks pushing women into further dependence upon chiefs 
and secret societies as policing providers.  
 
Why Engagement is Necessary 
This chapter has demonstrated that whilst the chieftaincy system and secret societies are the 
predominant providers of policing in Sierra Leone, they do not always work to the benefit of 
women‘s interests. The argument is likely to be made then that efforts should focus on 
strengthening the state police service in order to overtake the informal as the primary 
provider. This suggests that as the state becomes more dominant, the informal mechanisms, 
with their attendant injustices, will eventually become redundant. Yet it is unrealistic to 
assume that long-standing informal mechanisms will simply wither away in the face of a 
fortified state. These mechanisms are substantially more durable and intrinsic to the Sierra 
Leonean state than is often acknowledged. As Eric Scheye and Gordon Peake note regarding 
international police reform: 
 
In many societies … non-institutional and non-formal regulatory mechanisms have strong 
roots, long histories and proven effectiveness in mitigating the invasiveness of the formal 
security sector … Initiatives to alter the police, military and/or court system may be unable to 
erase or substitute for that reality. Thus there may be much more local adherence and fealty to 
alternative security providers and little enthusiasm to alter current power relations within civil 
society; resistances that could undermine reform efforts regardless of the will of national 
authorities and their ―ownership‖ of the process.226 
 
Looking more specifically to the root of this durability, Olufemi Vaughan writes of the need 
to enquire into the significance of traditional authorities in Africa given the ongoing crisis of 
the state there and the resilience of indigenous structures.
227
 This suggests that the coexistence 
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of formal and informal institutions in countries such as Sierra Leone sprouts from the 
evolutionary path of the state itself. Taking on Vaughan‘s challenge, Pierre Englebert notes 
that state structures in Africa have been deeply influenced by the colonial encounter and 
developed their political culture accordingly.
228
 Britain‘s colonial policy of indirect rule 
allowed for the continuance (and in some cases, strengthening) of indigenous authorities in a 
way that direct rule did not.
229
 The state in Sierra Leone sprung originally from an alliance 
(however shaky) between traditional authorities and the central government and its history 
thus knows only this political configuration. Furthermore, this bifurcated authority structure 
also mimics that of the UK, with a monarchical hereditary power on the one hand, balanced 
by a representative power on the other.
230
 This similarity was aptly pointed out in an interview 
in response to my suggestion that traditional authorities might undermine efforts towards 
‗modern‘ democracy.231 The role of traditional authorities is therefore strongly ingrained by 
culture and historical precedent, as well as being supported by similar structures in the 
colonial power who contributed to Sierra Leone‘s political culture.  
 
The argument that a strengthened state will lead to redundancy of the informal also supposes 
a neat dichotomy between the state as a ‗modern‘ institution and the informal as ‗traditional‘, 
with little blurring between the two. This clear cut distinction does not exist in practice. For 
instance, in relation to policing ‗evidence abounds to show that the police are still somewhat 
hesitant about intervening in domestic assault matters unless the assault is perceived as 
serious as maiming, wounding or disabling.‘232 Further, despite gender training and 
employment of women, Refugees International has noted that ‗female police officers are 
sometimes expected to do little more than cook lunch for the male police officers.‘233 The 
Sierra Leone Police are not outside of the culture or tradition that pervades the rest of Sierra 
Leone and patriarchal attitudes are prevalent here as elsewhere. The institution may resemble 
a ‗modern‘ one, but it is staffed by individuals who are equally woven into cultural fabrics. 
With 94 per cent of women between the ages of 15 and 49 in provinces having undergone 
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clitoridectomy,
234
 for instance, it is highly likely that female police officers and the daughters 
of police officers have participated in secret society initiation. The SLP are not apart from 
society in this regard. In practice, the ‗traditional‘ and the ‗modern‘ (if we momentarily accept 
these categories) are clearly substantially more blurred. 
 
Furthermore, the construction of ‗tradition‘ and ‗modernity‘ as oppositional categories 
misunderstands the malleability of tradition. The informal, traditional, cultural or customary is 
often prescribed a static identity that is perceived as enforcing the status quo over time, rather 
than adapting to change. Much has been written to invalidate this position.
235
 Regarding 
chieftaincy (but equally applicable to all traditional authorities), Abdul Raufu Mustapha and 
Emily Larbi Jones note: 
 
Chieftaincy is not a fixed traditional or religious institution, whose core content remains 
consistent. This is often the erroneous view conveyed when chiefs are described, or describe 
themselves, as ―custodians‖ of culture and tradition. We argue that the very essence of their 
institution changes.
236
 
  
This process of continuity through change is obvious in all societies. Eric Hobsbawm adeptly 
utilises the example of the Catholic Church and its successful adaptation when ‗faced with 
new political and ideological challenges and major changes in the composition of the 
faithful.‘237 While the practices of the Catholic Church might have adapted over many years, 
the general tradition and purpose of the Church has remained constant. In Sierra Leone, 
informal authority structures have survived the arrival and departure of colonialism, 
independence, military coups, dictatorship, civil war and now donor infusions. These 
practices are clearly resilient, but at the same time, they are not as immutable as they are often 
made to appear. Whilst the vast literature on the malleability of tradition is outside the scope 
of this case study, it is enough here merely to note that although the traditions that advocates 
of a strong state approach view as intransigent are resilient, they are also capable of change.  
 
In order to sustainably transform policing, as a part of security provision in Sierra Leone, 
DFID‘s SSR programme needs to engage with informal actors beyond the state, such as chiefs 
and secret societies. A lack of engagement with the informal, demonstrated through the FSU 
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case study, leaves harmful policing practices unreformed. Despite the frequent failure of 
informal policing actors to provide substantive justice to women, they remain the 
predominant policing providers to the majority of Sierra Leoneans. This is due in part to 
accessibility issues faced by the FSUs, but also to a fealty amongst Sierra Leoneans who 
value the role of tradition and culture that pervade informal institutions. It is unrealistic to 
assume that these informal providers will simply disappear with the onslaught of ‗modern‘ 
state policing. Such an argument underestimates how embedded traditional authorities are 
within Sierra Leonean society, ignores the potential positive attributes that informal 
mechanisms have to offer, and creates an unhelpful ‗modern‘ versus ‗traditional‘ dichotomy 
between the SLP and chiefs and secret societies that SSR efforts should seek to transcend. 
Informal practices have proved themselves to be durable and adaptive in the face of change. It 
is this adaptability that needs to be tapped in order to bring informal policing practices into 
line with human rights discourses on women‘s rights. Without doing so, the FSUs will 
continue to limit their vastly improved policing service to urban, wealthy or educated women. 
This means that those women at most risk will continue to rely upon the less-than-perfect 
policing provided by the chieftaincy system and secret societies and that the two-tier system 
of policing in Sierra Leone will continue to divide the country. FSUs have the opportunity to 
set the terms of engagement between state and informal policing, recognising traditional 
practices as evolving forces with the potential for change. Such recognition would also move 
towards addressing failures within the informal, as well as state, system that led to breakdown 
and civil war.  
 
Progress towards improving the rights of women within traditional practices has already 
begun. The Sierra Leone Parliament passed the Gender Acts in 2007, representing a 
commitment towards international standards pertaining to women‘s rights. The Acts cover 
issues of domestic violence, intestate succession (inheritance law) and registration of 
customary marriages and seek to provide women with rights that were either denied or 
ambiguous under customary, Islamic and previous formal laws.
238
 The government of Ernest 
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Bai Koroma, elected in 2007, has also pledged to outlaw clitoridectomy in Sierra Leone, but 
is yet to do so.
239
 In 2009, however, the initiative was taken in Kambia District, in the 
Northern Province, to ban clitoridectomy before the age of 18.
240
 Chiefs, soweis
241
 and 
community members signed an agreement that protects the cultural value of the practice, 
whilst making it optional and giving adult women a choice. This is certainly a positive step. 
Similar changes are being initiated throughout West Africa. In Senegal in 2005, religious and 
traditional leaders from across West Africa agreed to end the practice of clitoridectomy, 
stating that cultural values are not dependent upon cultural practices.
242
 The practices can thus 
be changed and updated, without offending the values that lie beneath. As a Burkinabe chief 
explained at the meeting of traditional leaders in Senegal, ‗it is far more important to me to 
give my daughter a Senoufo [an ethnolinguistic group in West Africa] name than to have her 
be cut.‘243 In Sierra Leone, change may also be assisted by the new breed of chiefs that have 
been elected since the end of the war. Approximately 44 per cent of chiefs had to be replaced 
after the conflict due to casualties and people movements.
244
 As a result, many chiefs are 
relatively young and literate, with some well-travelled and foreign educated.
245
 These new 
chiefs may offer a unique opportunity for updating customary policing practices that older 
stalwarts may feel compelled to defend. As Alice Hills acknowledges: 
 
There is no single ideal model of policing applicable to all states. Cultural, religious, and 
environmental differences must be acknowledged if a system is to be relatively stable and 
efficient. It will certainly be shaped by internal dynamics of hierarchies and cliques, as well as 
by corporate and personal ambitions, and by traditions, to say nothing of political 
judgments.
246
 
 
Securing the most accessible, reliable and just policing service in Sierra Leone will require 
engagement between FSUs and the informal policing mechanisms of the chieftaincy system 
and secret societies. Engagement is certainly not straightforward, and there will be 
disagreements over the balance between authority and rights. This is so everywhere. Sierra 
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Leone has the potential to operate a dual policing system that, if traditional practices are 
adapted so as not to cause harm to women, will be cheaper, more accessible and more reliable 
than the currently divided and competitive system offers. I do not pretend that this way 
forward is simple or quick. Any prescriptions that were would undoubtedly fail, given the 
difficulty of improving policing for a vulnerable group in a post-war society through multiple 
providers. Yet it is the difficult option of seeking to combine the benefits of both the formal 
and informal policing mechanisms that offers the greatest chance of providing the most 
women with improved policing. 
 
Conclusion 
This chapter has examined one of DFID‘s landmark projects within its police reform 
programme in Sierra Leone, highlighting a lack of engagement with informal policing 
providers and how this has limited the overall effectiveness of the FSUs in providing an 
improved policing service to women. In doing so the chapter has situated the FSU project 
within DFID-led police reform efforts more broadly. It has examined the project‘s evolution 
and rationale, as well as highlighting its constraints in terms of economic, geographic and 
cultural accessibility. Confronting the FSUs and addressing a number of their limitations, 
traditional policing mechanisms such as the chieftaincy system and secret societies remain the 
primary providers in provincial Sierra Leone, yet they have not been engaged by the FSUs. 
These informal mechanisms are limited by the harmful and inequitable policing services they 
often provide to women. However, an examination of the durability of these informal 
practices highlighted their longevity alongside strong state practices and thus the need for the 
FSUs to engage with them in order to improve policing available to women. The foreseeable 
permanence of these informal policing providers does not necessarily mean that harmful or 
inequitable policing must also be permanent. The very bases of ‗tradition‘ are malleable 
practices that adapt over time, suggesting that informal policing is not necessarily bound by 
the harmful practices that detract from the services they provide. 
 
In the context of the thesis, this chapter highlights DFID‘s lack of engagement with informal 
security actors. The state-focus of DFID‘s police reform programme suggests consistency 
with the policy-level understanding of the conflict in Sierra Leone as being the result of state 
failure. The failures of informal actors, such as chiefs and secret societies, and the manner in 
which these failures contributed to the civil war remain unacknowledged. Furthermore, the 
lack of engagement with informal security actors as a result of DFID‘s understanding of the 
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cause of war can be seen, through the FSU case study, to limit the effectiveness of DFID‘s 
policing reform. Given the significant accessibility issues that the FSUs face, informal actors 
remain the predominant policing providers and a lack of donor engagement allows them to 
continue to operate with little discretion for human rights or substantive justice. The 
prevalence of such unreformed policing does not bode well for the prospects of sustainable 
peace. 
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4 
Courting Local Justice: DFID’s Justice Sector Development Programme 
 
 
‗Injustice digs into society for a long time. It is invisible until it rears its ugly head and [then] 
it is too late.‘1 
 
Injustice has consistently been pointed to as a cause of the civil war in Sierra Leone. Efforts to 
rebuild the justice system in order that more equitable and rights-respecting justice is provided 
is therefore crucial to ensuring a sustainable post-conflict peace. Critically, any efforts to do 
so in a comprehensive manner would need to address the injustices perpetrated at both the 
state and informal levels of justice provision. This chapter examines DFID‘s Justice Sector 
Development Programme (JSDP), in order to determine whether a comprehensive approach to 
addressing the causes of conflict, recognising the failure at both the state and informal levels, 
can be discerned. It first examines the role of justice reform within security sector reform and 
the current popularity of law reform programmes. Following on from this, the chapter 
spotlights the overwhelming focus of justice programmes in Sierra Leone on high level, 
international legal procedures (as opposed to local law reforms that are more relevant to the 
majority of the population). Third, the history of the judicial system in Sierra Leone will be 
set out, focusing upon provincial Sierra Leone,
2
 highlighting the central role played by 
informal justice systems and how these have functioned. Finally, JSDP‘s primary justice 
programmes will be detailed, before offering an analysis of the effectiveness and challenges 
of engagement with informal justice mechanisms.
3
  
 
This chapter ultimately seeks to provide a contrast to the former policing case study. The 
JSDP represents DFID‘s most extensive efforts to engage with informal actors and thus 
potentially offers the greatest acknowledgement of the need to address failures beyond the 
                                                 
1
 Author interview with Simeon Koroma, Founder and Director, TIMAP for Justice, 12 March 2009. TIMAP is a 
Sierra Leonean NGO providing free legal services throughout the country. 
2
 Judicial evolution was markedly different in Freetown and the provinces. As the civil war started in the 
provinces, considering the evolution of the legal system in Freetown falls outside the scope of this study. That 
being said, there are clearly overlaps, and relevant information will be provided where necessary. 
3
 The term ‗justice refers to both the administration of justice (here referred to as procedural justice) and a 
normative goal (here referred to as substantive justice). When referring to informal justice actors, I am simply 
indicating those actors that carry out judicial functions (arbitrating, sentencing and so forth). I am not making 
any inference as to the quality of substantive justice that they provide. Equally, in speaking of justice reform, I 
am utilising the commonly accepted term for international efforts to improve substantive justice outcomes 
through reform of procedural justice. Where a distinction between the different connotations of justice are 
needed, the terms ‗procedural‘ and ‗substantive‘ justice will be used to clarify. 
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state, residing in informal institutions, which have been pinpointed as a cause of the civil war. 
Yet the terms of the JSDP‘s engagement will be crucial in determining whether the 
Programme is capable of producing the reform necessary to avoid the abuses of the past and 
thus ensure long-term peace. It is argued that while the JSDP has gone further than other 
DFID programmes in engaging the informal, the manner in which they have done so remains 
problematic and aims overwhelmingly to formalise the informal. This suggests that even 
though DFID staff seem aware of the importance of informal actors in the Sierra Leonean 
justice system, they remain inhibited in their engagements with them.  
 
The Rule of Law and Justice Reform – ‘Like apple pie and ice-cream’4 
Justice or rule of law reform has emerged as a key component of SSR and international 
development assistance more broadly. As Vice-President of the Carnegie Endowment for 
International Peace, Thomas Carothers, noted just over a decade ago, ‗[t]he concept [of the 
rule of law] is suddenly everywhere‘.5 Just as development practitioners focused on economic 
and governance reforms respectively in the 1980s and 1990s, legal reform is now a key 
component of security sector reforms, the latest panacea for the global south.
6
 Carothers goes 
on to note, ‗[a]ssistance in this field has mushroomed in recent years, becoming a major 
category of international aid.‘7 While Carothers is sceptical of this latest trend, rightly 
highlighting the often presumed non-ideological and technocratic nature of law,
8
 there are 
also more optimistic readings of its ascendance. The rule of law is perceived as being central 
to sustainable development, supporting a just social order that minimises physical conflict by 
providing peaceful avenues for the resolution of disputes.
9
 This conflict-minimising benefit of 
justice (both procedural and substantive) is described in the UN Secretary General‘s Report 
on the Rule of Law and Transitional Justice in Conflict and Post-Conflict Societies. It states 
that peace cannot be sustained unless, ‗the population is confident that redress for grievances 
can be obtained through legitimate structures for the peaceful settlement of disputes and the 
fair administration of justice.‘10 Pierre Englebert also suggests that ‗the prevalence of the rule 
                                                 
4
 Richard Sannerholm, ―Legal, Judicial and Administrative Reforms in Post-Conflict Societies: Beyond the Rule 
of Law Template,‖ Journal of Conflict and Security Law 12, no. 1 (2007): 66. 
5
 Thomas Carothers, ―The Rule of Law Revival,‖ Foreign Affairs 77, no. 2 (March-April 1998): 95. 
6
 Ibid. 
7
 Ibid, 103. 
8
 Ibid, 99. 
9
 Klaus Decker, Caroline Sage and Milena Stefanova, ―Law or Justice: Building Equitable Legal Institutions,‖ 
World Bank, 2005, http://siteresources.worldbank.org/INTWDR2006/Resources/477383-
1118673432908/Law_or_Justice_Building_Equitable_Legal_Institutions.pdf, accessed 26 October, 2009.  
10
 Quoted in Sannerholm, ―Legal, Justice and Administrative Reforms in Post-conflict Societies,‖ 68. 
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of law has a more significant positive impact on growth than the quality of public 
administration.‘11 This is due to investor concerns regarding stability, as while investment is 
possible under highly illiberal or oppressive political systems, it is less so without an operable 
rule of law (such a model of stability within illiberal settings has been seen to exist in East 
Asia, principally in China).
12
 The rule of law thus contributes to sustainable peace, which in 
turn, following the logic of the dominant international donor agencies, provides fertile ground 
for the investment necessary for economic growth and development.
13
 This seeming ‗silver 
bullet‘ status of law reform has led some commentators to remark that the rule of law is like 
apple pie and ice-cream – a concept that no one can dislike.14 This supposedly universally 
likeable quality is supported by the emergence of justice reform initiatives on the project lists 
of many international donors including DFID, USAid, the UN and World Bank.
15
 
Recognising the connection between conflict and injustice, these agencies are attempting to 
‗re-link‘ justice and peace in the aftermath of conflict.16 This has particular resonance in the 
case of Sierra Leone where injustice is pointed to as a principal cause of conflict.
17
 
 
The Final Report of Sierra Leone‘s Truth and Reconciliation Commission concluded that the 
judicial system was culpable of contributing to the permissive culture of impunity that 
facilitated civil war.
18
 It went on to recommend that resources be devoted to improving the 
judiciary in order to ensure conflict is not rekindled.
19
 Taking on this challenge, the 
Government of Sierra Leone (GoSL) has accepted that ‗the long term decline of the justice 
system preceded and even facilitated the on-set of the conflict‘ and that 11-years of civil war 
further deteriorated the judiciary.
20
 On this basis it recognises that ‗addressing these 
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 Pierre Englebert, ―Pre-Colonial Institutions, Post-Colonial States, and Economic Development in Tropical 
Africa,‖ Political Research Quarterly 53, no. 1 (March 2000): 18. 
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consequences [the deteriorated justice system] are also crucial for the permanent restoration 
of state authority [sic].‘21 This recognition that justice is central to sustainable peace is not 
limited to the corridors of state political power, but also discernible within local politics in 
Sierra Leone. As a villager in rural central Sierra Leone expressed to researchers Steven 
Archibald and Paul Richards, ‗through injustice we have turned our young people to rebels.‘22 
This acknowledgement was also evident in many of the interviews I conducted during 
fieldwork, across a broad spectrum of respondents.
23
 There is thus a unique convergence 
between development policy trends and the realities of the civil war in Sierra Leone that 
provides an ideal opportunity for justice reform. This convergence has allowed space for what 
Stephen Golub calls the ‗rule of law orthodoxy‘ to establish itself as a central component of 
post-conflict peacebuilding efforts.
24
  
 
Justice Initiatives in Sierra Leone: The Special Court and the TRC 
While substantial donor funds have been directed to justice-related programmes in post-
conflict countries, the vast majority of these resources have been mobilised for high level, 
international law efforts, rather than local-level initiatives.
25
 In Sierra Leone, this is most 
obviously reflected in the United Nation‘s Special Court for Sierra Leone, established by 
agreement between the UN and GoSL to prosecute those deemed most responsible for the 
atrocities of the civil war. Whilst the Special Court will undoubtedly have an impact on the 
post-conflict landscape in Sierra Leone, its short-term nature, limited scope and 
overwhelming ‗foreignness‘ renders it less consequential than reforms to Sierra Leone‘s legal 
system – which will remain long after the white four wheel drives and international staff have 
departed. The incredible costs of the Special Court in relation to the Sierra Leonean judiciary 
are most stark in highlighting the divergence in assistance. The Special Court, established in 
2002, has cost over USD 300 million to prosecute nine individuals from the Revolutionary 
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12 March 2009; and Justice Fofana, Justice of the High Court of Sierra Leone, 10 March 2009. 
24
 Stephen Golub, ―Beyond Rule of Law Orthodoxy: The Legal Empowerment Alternative,‖ Working Paper No. 
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United Front (RUF), Civil Defence Forces (CDFs) and Armed Forces Revolutionary Council 
(AFRC).
26
 In 2002, the year the Special Court was established, the total payroll of Sierra 
Leone‘s judiciary was approximately USD 215,000.27 In 2007, the entire budget for the 
Government of Sierra Leone was USD 414 million, of which less than one per cent was spent 
on the judiciary – less than USD 4 million.28 As Niobe Thompson suggested at the outset of 
the Special Court‘s mandate, ‗[t]o those working in Sierra Leone‘s own judiciary, this 
operation will likely seem like an extraterrestrial visit, so disproportionate will be the 
conditions of work of its staff in comparison to its own.‘29  
 
Despite the Court‘s laudable aims of seeking to extend international law by securing 
conviction precedents for forced marriage, wartime rape and recruitment of child soldiers, it 
failed to resonate with the lives of many Sierra Leoneans.
30
 Outside the Special Court 
compound, post-conflict lives have had to adapt to living side-by-side with the overwhelming 
majority of perpetrators and finding reconciliation through alternative means.
31
 In this regard, 
the Truth and Reconciliation Commission offered a more locally meaningful contribution to 
substantive justice, documenting peoples‘ experiences and seeking to heal communities. Yet 
the TRC did not engage with the enduring legal system in Sierra Leone that will determine 
whether justice becomes fairer, more accessible and reliable in future, or whether disputes 
will be settled by more violent means.
32
 International donor investments in justice have 
disproportionately focused on the Special Court and Truth and Reconciliation Commission in 
post-conflict Sierra Leone.
33
In spite of these investments, Erik Jensen notes that ‗in the 
transitional justice literature one finds no empirical proof of the effectiveness of trials in 
deterring human rights violations or truth commissions and amnesties in contributing to 
reconciliation.‘34 These high level, internationally visible achievements clearly contribute to 
justice for some individuals and in some situations. Yet the more pressing need to engage 
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with local justice practices, which would address the country‘s history of grievance and 
violent conflict and provide a long-term legacy of justice (both procedural and substantive), 
has often been neglected.
35
   
 
Engagement with the informal is not only advocated here because failures within the informal 
system were a contributing cause of the civil war, or because they are the predominant justice 
providers. A further reason to engage with informal justice actors beyond the state lies in their 
ability to heal the wounds of the war more effectively than the retributive justice provided by 
the formal state judiciary and Special Court. Increasing academic attention is being paid to 
alternative community justice initiatives that have been initiated at the local level according to 
particular experiences of the war and customary practices.
36
 These have often proved 
successful in resolving injustices at a person-to-person, family-to-family or even chiefdom-to-
chiefdom level.
37
 This micro-level approach aims for restorative, rather than retributive 
justice, in recognition of the fact that it is not sustainable to retributively punish all offenders 
of the civil war, given widespread involvement on all sides of the fighting forces and the 
prevalence of human rights abuses. As Alie notes: 
 
Although retributive justice may have the potential to act as a deterrent, it could at the same 
time create more societal problems as both the victims and the perpetrators may be living in 
the same neighbourhood. Restorative justice, on the other hand, aims to repair and create 
social harmony within the battered communities.
38
 
 
These restorative justice practices have included spiritual ceremonies involving animal 
sacrifice, bathing in consecrated water to ‗cool the heart‘, and the displaying of remorse on 
the part of the aggressor.
39
 These ceremonies have been conducted by local elders, chiefs, 
secret societies, spiritual leaders and community based organisations and have resulted in 
astonishing levels of forgiveness and reconciliation.
40
 Informal justice mechanisms can thus 
be worthy of engagement on the basis of the effective justice outcomes they provide as well 
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as on the basis of their predominance and their contribution to the causes of war. 
  
Recognising the merit of both formal and informal justice practices, DFID has embarked upon 
a wide-ranging justice reform programme in Sierra Leone, the Justice Sector Development 
Programme (JSDP), engaging directly with parts of the indigenous judicial system.
41
 Most 
impressively, this engagement extends beyond the formal judiciary to encompass parts of the 
customary legal system as well (what DFID terms ‗primary justice‘). DFID thus manages to 
overcome arguments that rule of law and justice programming often focus solely on the 
formal sector to the exclusion of the informal.
42
 The breadth of programming undertaken by 
the JSDP is entirely necessary in Sierra Leone and reflects the fact that informal justice 
providers ‗tend to be the predominant method by which the public goods of justice and safety 
are delivered.‘43 In order to provide background to the longevity of the formal/informal divide 
in justice provision in Sierra Leone and the projects of the JSDP, a history of the judicial 
system is instructive. By examining the historical development of systems of justice in Sierra 
Leone, the prevalence of the informal, its centrality to the lives of the majority of Sierra 
Leoneans and its need for reform becomes apparent. Given the focus here, the following 
histories will concentrate on informal justice and customary law, applying to the vast majority 
of the population. 
 
Evolution of the Justice System in Sierra Leone 
Sierra Leone‘s legal history has received little scholarly attention, with one source claiming 
there to be only four published academic texts on the subject.
44
 While this may exaggerate the 
paucity of the literature, it is true that this is an overlooked area of study. Since the increasing 
donor focus on rule of law programmes post-conflict, however, significant contributions have 
been made, predominantly through development agency reports.
45
 While this new literature 
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provides some excellent insights into colonial law onwards, very little exists in the way of 
pre-colonial accounts of legal structures that are generalisable across the region that 
constitutes modern day Sierra Leone.  Pre-colonial law was particular to specific regions and 
varied from kingdom to kingdom, presided over by cultural leaders who were considered 
knowledgeable in local affairs.
46
 They were assisted by secret societies in ensuring the 
maintenance of customary law and behaviour.
47
 Yet as Kristin Mann and Richard Roberts 
highlight, ‗there was no single, unchanging tradition. There were, instead, contested and 
continuously reconstituted traditions, best understood as clusters of rules, moralities, 
expectations, and conflicts, which gave rise to changing regulatory practices.‘48 With only 
glimpses of highly contextualised and changing practices on offer, it is difficult to concisely 
summarise the plurality of judicial systems that existed across Sierra Leone. 
 
Colonial Law 
Colonialism was a formative experience for Sierra Leonean judicial practice and through it 
emerged a three-tiered system of formal, customary and Islamic law that endures today.
49
 The 
logic of the British colonisers was to create a neat social order that would be predictable and 
reliable.
50
 Such order would facilitate commerce between the provinces and the Freetown 
colony and ensure peace in the upcountry Protectorate.
51
 So as to establish and maintain this 
order ‗the colonial period gave birth to ―customary‖ law, regarded by Europeans as 
indigenous law, but in fact invented by Africans and Europeans under colonialism.‘52 Under 
the policy of indirect rule, formal English law was to apply to all Europeans and any 
consenting Africans, while customary law applied to matters involving Africans, insofar as it 
was not repugnant to justice, equity and good conscience, or in contravention of Colonial 
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statutes.
53
 District Commissioners administered justice for Europeans in rural Sierra Leone 
(where the formal courts of Freetown were absent), whilst Native Courts resolved disputes 
amongst Africans according to customary practice.
54
 Requiring local representatives to 
administer the customary legal system as part of their indirect rule, Britain relied upon 
community leaders, who were henceforth termed paramount chiefs, section chiefs or town 
chiefs (in descending order of seniority). 
 
Yet the coloniser‘s interest in order meant that customary law was not simply intended to 
allow Africans to continue their own arbitrations or to provide substantive justice. Rather, it 
was intended to facilitate order and British administration of Sierra Leone. As Sandra 
Fullerton Joireman points out, ‗law and administration were regarded as inseparable, a view 
which accounts for the early and vigorous attempts by the British to establish legal systems in 
their colonies.‘55 This ‗inseparability‘ was obvious in practice, as much as policy. Appeals 
from Native Courts in Sierra Leone initially went to a colonial administrative officer, not the 
formal English Courts.
56
 Thus, the judicial powers of the customary law system were 
ultimately capped by administrative power. The administrative potential of customary law 
intones a similar logic to the current ‗rule of law orthodoxy‘ discussed at the beginning of this 
chapter. British colonisers viewed the law as the harbinger of order, and thus of peace, which 
would facilitate commerce, in turn improving the situation of rural Sierra Leoneans, whilst 
simultaneously creating wealth for the empire.
57
 Current rule of law orthodoxy view the law 
as creating stability to attract investment, which will lead to development and thus a more 
sustainable peace. 
 
The ‗customary‘ aspect of customary law was also not an accurate description. While 
customary law was intended to ensure continuity with past indigenous practice, it in fact 
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created a new legal structure that drew upon indigenous law but did not replicate it.
58
 The 
poor mirroring of indigenous law in customary law was due partly to a lack of awareness of 
the diversity of practices throughout rural Sierra Leone. Some colonisers genuinely believed 
that customary law was merely a more formalised continuation of time-honoured local 
practice.
59
 Yet, as Mann and Roberts note, customary law ‗solidified fluid cultural and legal 
ideas and relationships into reproducible ones.‘60 The manner in which knowledge of local 
practices was derived had crucial implications for that which became crystallised into 
‗customary‘ law. Mann and Roberts go on to explain: 
 
When questions arose about custom, officials turned for answers to chiefs and others they 
regarded as repositories of local knowledge and upholders of local authority. Such persons 
were always men and usually elders. The reliance of officials on particular individuals or 
groups to define tradition gave them new advantages in the competition for resources and 
labour and it augmented their power.
61
 
 
Customary law was thus produced by many overlapping power struggles between men and 
women, elders and young people, rulers and ruled, and land owners and slaves.
62
 Not always 
cognisant of, or concerned with, these struggles, colonisers crystallised the versions of 
customary law as reported to them by the powerful, thus enforcing a highly particular version 
of ‗custom‘. 
 
In recognising what local elites described as the existing custom and in pursuit of order, new 
conceptions of custom were introduced that altered rights, duties and relationships.
63
 For 
instance, many colonial Governors noted that chiefship was not hereditary. Yet, as Arthur 
Abraham notes, ‗the colonial officials, eager to create a neat system out of pre-colonial 
dynamics, insisted on or invented principles that were not altogether indigenous‘.64 Stretching 
‗custom‘ even further, where local leaders were not willing to perform the tasks assigned to 
them by their ‗colonial masters‘, the British simply created new leaders who were more 
pliable and imbued them with ‗customary‘ right.65 This was most clearly demonstrated after 
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the Hut Tax War of 1898, when a number of chiefs violently resisted the imposition of a 
colonial tax. As Christopher Fyfe explains:  
 
After the war ended … [the] power [of those who sided with the British] was increased, for 
the government trusted them and supported them because they had been loyal. Chiefs the 
government could rely on were appointed to succeed those hanged or deposed after the war.
66
 
  
Often these new ‗chiefs‘ had not possessed an indigenous leadership role prior to the war.67 
Law thus became an instrument for social change, whether that change was biased, invented 
or imposed.
68
 Britain‘s ultimate interest in order meant that the costs of such changes were 
overlooked. As Fyfe suggests, these changes in legal administration meant that the Sierra 
Leone Protectorate ‗was at peace, [but] it was not yet ruled by law or justice.‘69 Rather than 
being reproduced through social practice, custom was enforced by a legal order, backed up by 
the colonial state, whose ‗order‘ was often coercively maintained.70  
 
The manner in which the colonial power interpreted custom has had long-term impacts on 
configurations of justice provision in Sierra Leone. Whilst British District Commissioners 
curtailed chiefly duties considerably, allowing them to arbitrate only on issues of land, 
marriage, divorce and petty offences under the Penal Code, their power within these realms 
increased.
71
 As chiefs and elders now had greater purview for determining what constituted 
‗custom‘, their power in relation to their limited jurisdiction went unchecked by other forces, 
leading to accusations of authoritarianism and that chiefs ran the chiefdoms ‗as if it was their 
personal property.‘72 In this way, as Finnegan and Murray suggest, ‗a new definitive power 
was introduced where before a ruler had to rely on persuasion and diplomacy.‘73 These 
powers have remained contentious within Sierra Leone, (chiefly abuse, as seen in chapter two, 
was pointed to by former-combatants as a cause of the war) and are now being critically re-
examined by government and civil society post-conflict.
74
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Chiefly abuse in administering customary law eventually prompted action by the Colonial 
government, who feared that oppressive behaviour might incite public disorder. In 1937 
Tribal Authorities were established within chiefdoms, in an attempt to check the judicial 
powers of chiefs. In settling disputes chiefs would henceforth have to consult with Tribal 
Authorities who represented taxpayers within their communities.
75
 Despite the administrative 
change, this rarely happened in practice.
76
 Colonialist‘s ‗modernisation‘ plans became more 
frequent in the lead up to decolonisation throughout the 1950s, in recognition of the fact that 
while chiefs had served a useful purpose under indirect rule, they were not what was required 
for independent government.
77
 This recognition suggests some level of understanding that 
important differences exist between the order sought by the colonial government through 
indirect rule and the governance required for independence. District Councils were 
established in 1947 which led to a reduction in the formal role of chiefs and Tribal 
Authorities. Yet despite these cosmetic changes, the powers of the chiefs remained strong. 
Ruth Finnegan and David Murray note: 
 
The chiefs still combined judicial, tax assessing and collecting, and local administrative roles, 
as well as filling an office of considerable prestige. In the execution of their powers they were 
not subjected to close supervision, and the Commission into the disturbances in the Provinces 
in 1956 [a revolt against chiefs] revealed the manner in which the chiefs were able to use their 
powers: using the tax assessment committees to impose fines, arranging the judicial bench to 
suit their interests, using the power to assess taxes to distribute favours and punishments, 
imposing unlawful levies and tributes, selective summoning of persons to Tribal Authority 
meetings, incarcerating on their own authority, and so on.
78
 
 
The colonial period was thus crucial in shaping the modern justice matrix in Sierra Leone, 
establishing the division between formal and customary law, empowering chiefs to interpret 
custom and limiting their jurisdiction whilst broadening their powers within it. 
 
An Independent Judiciary? 
Independence in 1961 provided Sierra Leone with the opportunity to forge a new judicial 
system. Internationally, it was thought that as newly-independent African states developed 
and became more ‗modern‘, their reliance on informal or traditional means of resolving 
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disputes would fade.
79
 This did not occur, and customary law has remained widespread.
80
 
Equally, the option of rejecting the colonialist imposition of formal English law also did not 
occur. Fullerton Joireman points out:  
 
At independence ... experience of a national legal system ... was of that designed by the 
continental European powers or the British. Therefore, just as newly independent colonies 
chose to keep the languages of the metropoles for the conduct of governmental activities, so 
too they retained the legal and other political institutions left behind.
81
 
 
Sierra Leonean independence thus embraced a complex array of legal institutions, rather than 
streamlining them into a unified legal code. This maintenance of two legal codes (as well as 
Islamic law, in relation to Muslim marriages)
82
 meant that justice in the post-independence 
environment continued to be a two-tiered system, both of which provided a deplorable 
service.  
 
The weakness of the burgeoning indigenous formal judiciary rendered it susceptible to 
political influence. Sir Albert Margai (President from 1964-1967) removed Chief Justice Sir 
Bankole Jones and replaced him with his friend, Gershon Collier, thus beginning a trend of 
nepotism within the judiciary.
83
 During this time legislation curtailing individual rights was 
also introduced, such as the Public Order Act (1965) and Criminal Procedures Act (1965).
84
 
Under the (eventual) one party rule of the All People‘s Congress (APC) of Siaka Stevens 
(1967-1985) and Joseph Momoh (1985-1991), the judiciary was ‗progressively politicised and 
subsumed under government control.‘85 Judicial appointments were increasingly made on the 
basis of loyalty to the APC regime and high level positions of Magistrates and Judges were 
doled out as patronage to the highest bidder (not necessarily in financial terms, but on the 
basis of who was most politically useful).
86
 In 1978 the Attorney General was granted powers 
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of ‗judicial affairs‘ and a single party constitution was passed. 87  As a report on the judiciary 
in Sierra Leone suggests, this constitution laid ‗a firm foundation for the executive to 
dominat[e] … not only the opposition, but also the judiciary and legislature.‘88 
 
Some attempts to engage in legal reform were made during this period, but were largely 
thwarted by inefficiency and corruption. For instance, the Law Reform Commission was 
established in 1975, to review English laws imported into Sierra Leonean legislation and to 
ensure that they were appropriate to the local context.
89
 Efforts were also to be made within 
the Commission to harmonise and codify customary law, which continued to differ across 
Sierra Leone‘s 149 chiefdoms. A few early drafts of plans were made by the Commission, but 
no legislative changes resulted.
90
 Niobe Thompson sums up the general perception of the 
post-independence judiciary: 
 
All this has arguably diluted judicial independence from the executive. Judges and magistrates 
are widely perceived as corrupt and the justice system came to be seen as an instrument of 
state power and wealthy interests. A reservoir of resentment developed towards the judiciary 
among those who ... received unfair treatment at its hands.
91
 
 
The above depiction is largely a Freetonian perspective, where the judiciary, like most state 
resources in Sierra Leone, operates most effectively.
92
 It should be noted that formal 
Magistrates Courts, dispensing English law were present in the provinces from 1965, but not 
nearly as popular as their customary law counterparts. Furthermore, by the 1980s the formal 
judiciary was virtually non-existent in provincial Sierra Leone as state resources dried up.
93
 
Customary law, however, continued to operate and the post-independence state was engaged 
in some of its transformations.  
 
As the most utilised legal justice service in the country, the workings and failings of the Local 
Courts require elaboration. A key development in Sierra Leone legal practice was the Local 
Courts Act of 1963, which established Local Courts as the arbiters of customary law, taking 
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over from their predecessor, the Native Courts.
94
 The Local Courts Act defines customary law 
as ‗[a]ny rule ... having the force of law in any chiefdom of the provinces ... and conforms 
with natural justice and equity‘.95 Unlike the Native Courts, chiefs no longer adjudicated on 
customary law matters, with court chairmen appointed in their place.
96
 This ostensibly 
removed chiefs from the Local Courts and afforded greater judicial independence. However, 
the court chairmen were largely selected by chiefs and therefore influenced by them, so that 
the system did not necessarily curtail the abuses it was intended to.
97
 For instance, Ryann 
Manning notes that ‗in a Bombali [district] chiefdom, a previous court chairman was alleged 
to have consulted the Paramount Chief on all cases before ruling.‘98 Local Courts were 
established in each chiefdom to administer customary laws as they related to civil, and some 
criminal cases, but the jurisdictional limits remain unclear.
99
 The Local Courts Amendment 
Act of 1965 provides that Local Courts can adjudicate on civil claims of up to Le200 (now, 
equivalent to just over USD 0.07) and criminal cases with a penalty of up to one year 
imprisonment.
100
 Yet these jurisdictional amounts remain contested in the literature
101
 and 
rarely adhered to in practice. As Clare Castillejo notes, ‗[a] number of local court chairmen 
and officers interviewed were unaware of the legal limits of their jurisdiction. For example, 
one local court officer in Koidu town reported that his court could hear cases that carry fines 
of up to 1 million Leones.‘102 
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It is certainly true that the Local Courts do not adhere to the Local Courts Amendment Act 
jurisdictional limits, and that they in fact adjudicate cases far beyond their jurisdiction. It is 
also true, however, that Le200 is an excessively low jurisdictional limit for any court. As 
Manning points out, Le200 ‗is not even enough to buy a small loaf of bread‘.103 Were the 
Local Courts to adhere to the Amendment Act limits, their jurisdiction would be largely 
meaningless. Such confusion is demonstrative of the lack of consistency or oversight of 
customary law practices. 
 
Local Courts are mainstreamed into the formal legal system in Sierra Leone through the 
appeals process, but certain procedures remain unique. For instance, Local Courts bar lawyers 
from representing clients within the Court, although users may draw upon persons 
knowledgeable in customary law to build their case.
104
 This is essential as customary law is 
still unwritten, and thus people cannot always be certain of the content of the law before 
bringing their case. Appeals from Local Courts are to the District Appeals Court (consisting 
of a District Magistrate, assisted by two ‗assessors‘, experts in customary law, as chosen by 
the Magistrate).
105
 Further appeal from the District Appeals Court is to the Local Appeals 
Division of the High Court (consisting of a High Court Judge and two assessors in a purely 
advisory capacity).
106
 Appeals from this Court are possible to the Court of Appeal and finally 
to the Supreme Court.
107
 However, while the appeals process integrates the Local Courts into 
the formal law system, in deciding cases in the formal appeals courts, judges must apply 
customary law (the presence of the assessors is to provide knowledge of this law, as judges 
are not necessarily trained in its application or its many forms). Local Courts are also, in 
theory, meant to be supervised by customary law officers, from the Attorney General‘s Office 
to ensure decisions adhere to natural justice and equity, but these did not function throughout 
the civil war (and in 2007 there were only three in all of provincial Sierra Leone to supervise 
the estimated 288 Local Courts countrywide).
108
 The Courts are funded and ultimately 
overseen by Ministry of Internal Affairs – a government, rather than judicial body, and thus 
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unique from other courts within the judicial system.
109
 
 
While the above depiction situates the Local Courts at the bottom of the legal system, this is 
from a formal law perspective. In practice, Local Courts also represent the highest body of 
appeal within chiefdoms, where customary law is administered by other informal actors.
110
 
Despite the changes to the customary law system and streamlining of its courts with those of 
the formal law system, it has been noted that, in practice, most people in the provinces 
continue to take disputes to their local chiefs, elders, workplace associations or secret 
societies first, and only to the Local Courts if the matter remains unresolved.
111
 The use of the 
chiefs and other informal actors as arbiters of customary law is expressly illegal.
112
 However, 
the continuation of such practices was arguably encouraged by the political environment of 
post-independence Sierra Leone. A combination of the contraction of state revenue and the 
Freetown/province divide (which ultimately sees the majority of resources directed towards 
the capital) ensured that services for provincial Sierra Leone remained an afterthought. It was 
thus permitted to continue functioning according to its own logic, providing that this did not 
negatively influence the government in Freetown. As a result, practices such as chiefly 
arbitrations continued to occur with little outside scrutiny. The central government‘s neglect 
of the provincial justice system thus exacerbated the abuses that are now recognised as having 
contributed to the conditions that led to civil war.
113
 
 
Throughout the civil war, oversight of provincial justice was even rarer still. Whilst in some 
areas, Local Courts ceased to function, in others (such as the Southern Province), Local 
Courts became entirely financially dependent on the revenue generated from fines, which 
varied greatly across regions and became increasingly heavy.
114
 Alongside the deteriorating 
Local Courts, chiefs continued to administer customary law in those areas which had not been 
displaced by conflict, or from where the chiefs had not fled.
115
 As Thompson suggests: 
 
With the onset of chronic insecurity in 1991, a host of improvised ―justice systems‖ emerged 
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to compete with or replace the state judiciary, just as vigilantism in the form of civil defence 
militias filled the vacuum created by the retreating official Sierra Leone Army. As a result, the 
authority of the courts has been seriously eroded.
116
  
 
In some areas, the RUF and CDFs took over judicial functions, operating a highly 
discriminatory system that meted out harsh penalties.
117
 After 11 years of conflict, court 
buildings and records were destroyed, judicial staff were not paid, Local Courts exacted hefty 
fines to meet costs, and a huge backlog of cases meant that many were awaiting justice. The 
justice system, both formal and customary, had quite clearly broken down.   
 
Post-conflict and contemporary legal system 
The failures of the Sierra Leonean justice system to both administer judicial processes and to 
provide substantive justice cannot be underestimated. Post-conflict, the results have been 
devastating. The formal court system suffers from chronic understaffing, lack of funding and 
paucity of resources, which ultimately deprives provincial Sierra Leoneans more than those in 
the Western Area, where limited resources are concentrated. In 2000 there were only 15 
magistrates and 20 judges in the entire country, with the vast majority of these Freetown 
based, serving approximately 20 per cent of the national population.
118
 No Magistrate Court 
was operable in the Northern Province, with a temporary court set up in Lungi to carry out its 
functions.
119
 At the end of 2001 there were approximately 100 lawyers in the country, 92 of 
them were Freetown-based.
 120
 Eight served the regions around Bo and Kenema, while there 
were no practicing lawyers in the Northern Province.
121
 By 2008, this situation had not 
improved, with the Sierra Leone Bar Association reporting approximately 100 lawyers 
nationwide, yet only seven outside Freetown.
122
 The Director of Public Prosecutions informed 
researchers in 2008 that there were ten state prosecutors nationwide, with seven based in 
Freetown and three allocated to the Provinces.
123
 As a result, prosecutions within Magistrates 
Courts in the provinces are almost always carried out by police prosecutors.
124
 Rent-seeking 
behaviour by court personnel is common, deterring many from utilising the Magistrate 
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Courts, which are already perceived as being more expensive than Local Courts.
125
 Alterman 
and others have noted in their examination of justice in Sierra Leone: 
 
One lawyer, comparing today‘s situation to that before the war, says that corruption is more 
open and shameless than in the past. Before the war, he said, lawyers would approach 
magistrates after hours with offers of bribes whereas now the graft is more open and well 
known ... Magistrates feel especially empowered because their word is nearly always the final 
one. This situation results from the court being located far away from Freetown, with little 
possibilities for claimants to travel to appellate courts when they feel the process has been 
unjust.
126
 
 
This corruption is not surprising when one considers that in Moyamba town, JSDP staff 
reported that court clerks had not been paid for 28 months.
127
 Failure is also present in the 
higher echelons of the legal system. For instance, of 12 High Court Judges, ten sit in 
Freetown, one in Bo and one covers both Northern and Eastern Provinces.
128
 Staff shortages 
have meant excessive workloads within the courts and a backlog of cases overwhelms staff. 
Thompson noted, for instance, that in 2002 Freetown Magistrates often heard up to 50 cases 
per day and that at the High Court level, backlog had caused delays for several years, with a 
number of active criminal and civil cases dating back to 1993-1995.
129
  
 
While failures to provide both order and equitable justice in the formal system should not be 
underestimated, it is failures in the customary law system that are more relevant to the 
majority of Sierra Leoneans. Pamela Dale notes that in the provinces ‗[t]he limited number of 
functioning magistrates courts are based in district headquarter towns, which are far away 
(both physically and mentally) from residents of many remote – and even not-so-remote – 
villages.‘130 People thus more commonly rely upon the more prevalent Local Courts. There 
are between 1 and 5 Local Courts in each chiefdom in Sierra Leone, with an estimated 288 
Local Courts countrywide, making these Courts substantially more accessible to those in the 
provinces.
131
 Yet this accessibility has meant little in terms of improving access to substantive 
justice in Sierra Leone. In fact, the conditions in the Local Courts led Castillejo to suggest: 
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While there is undoubtedly discrimination in the formal justice system, the most serious 
concerns relate to inequality in the customary justice system, where the laws are set and the 
procedures managed by senior men, with little oversight from other authorities and often in 
contradiction with the rights of marginalised groups.
132
 
 
The legacy of the Local Courts is one of gerontocratic abuse of power vis-à-vis youth, 
‗strangers‘, women and other marginalised categories within Sierra Leonean society. While 
the Local Courts are, according to the Local Courts Act (1963), meant to provide a justice 
service to their communities, they are often inhospitable environments in which community 
members are poorly treated. As Gabriel Jonnie explains: 
 
The conduct of proceedings at the Native Authority courts [Local Courts] is often held in an 
unfriendly atmosphere characterised by fear and intimidation. Court officials are notorious for 
intimidating parties by frequently shouting at them, thereby creating panic. Litigants, 
therefore, find it difficult to compose themselves well when giving evidence.
133
 
 
Disproportionate fines are issued for sometimes invented offences. Vivek Maru illustrates 
such a scenario he witnessed in a Local Court in the Southern Province, where two fines of 
10,000 Leones (USD 3.50) were levied against a witness as punishment for the witness 
speaking ‗a one-word answer to a question asked of him before the court clerk had finished 
recording the question in his languid handwriting.‘134 As Maru notes, the irony of this 
situation is that the witness was ‗someone who was in principle assisting the court in its 
work.‘135 Those unable to pay the fines are imprisoned, made to work off the fine through 
labouring, or forced to leave the chiefdom.
136
 Castillejo notes that these fines: 
 
appear to be becoming increasingly important as the new local councils now take a proportion 
of the tax that previously went entirely to the chiefdom. It was widely reported that fines 
levied by local courts bear less relation to the offence than to the current financial needs of the 
court and chief.
137  
 
These excessive fines mean that one of the prime benefits of the customary system – its 
financial accessibility – is potentially merely a perception rather than reality and further that 
grievances over injustices that led to civil war in the past remain unaddressed. 
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This derelict depiction of the justice system in Sierra Leone provides ample justification for 
the ‗rule of law orthodoxy‘ programming that has become increasingly popular amongst 
international donors. For all the weaknesses and limitations of international engagement, the 
ability of outsiders to see the potential for justice is important. As Thompson laments, ‗Sierra 
Leoneans‘ expectations of justice have been woefully low due to their accrued experience of 
failed court systems, powerful local militias and a weak police force.‘138 Alterman, and others, 
similarly note in their findings: 
 
Subtle comments during interviews often hinted that many respondents accepted 
politicisation, incoherence, and unaccountability as intrinsic characteristics of the law. In other 
words, it is questionable whether the public could distinguish these flaws from the concept of 
law itself. This suspicion was supported more when we spoke to Sierra Leoneans outside of 
Sierra Leone. One interviewee in New York City exclaimed that he never saw the problems 
with bribes and nepotism until he left Sierra Leone. When a flawed legal system is all people 
know, it is difficult to require of them to demand better.
139
 
 
It is in this regard that internationally-led justice reform efforts can assist in carving out a 
potential justice dividend within Sierra Leone‘s legal system. Indeed, the Government of 
Sierra Leone has recognised that the justice predicament the country has found itself in at the 
end of the war ‗could seriously undermine peace, stability and development ... if left 
unaddressed.
140
 Yet reforms are not merely about returning to the pre-conflict state of 
affairs.
141
 As Mark Malan notes: 
 
The judicial infrastructure was perilous even before the war, suffering from under-investment 
in court buildings, accommodation for itinerant judges and magistrates, and transport 
facilities. The RUF subsequently destroyed most of what remained of the courts, which were 
systematically targeted along with other institutions of state power as part of the rebel 
strategy.
142
 
 
Reforms must therefore go beyond merely mending old structures to attempting to forge new 
ones, which will better provide procedural and substantive justice to Sierra Leoneans, and yet 
still have the local legitimacy and trust needed to make justice institutions relevant. DFID has 
recognised the importance of engaging the justice sector as part of broader SSR efforts to 
ensure a sustainable peace:  
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Where there is poor governance and lack of belief in a rule of law ... then grievances, social 
exclusion and competition for resources are more likely to become violent. This can result in 
insecurity and conflict. Therefore, an important means of conflict prevention is for a country 
to have an effective state which provides free and fair justice.
143
 
 
The efforts by DFID to create ‗free and fair justice‘ through primary justice reform projects 
will be the focus of the remainder of this chapter. 
 
DFID’s justice reform programmes 
The initial focus of DFID‘s SSR programme was on security as an issue of policing and the 
armed forces, with justice playing no role in the early stages. A Law Development Project 
(LDP) was envisaged in 1995-1996 but was delayed due to the fragile security situation.
144
 
Yet as the capacity of the police improved, it became obvious that their ability to provide 
effective policing (and thus security) depended upon a functioning judiciary and prisons 
service that could prosecute suspects and detain convicted criminals.
145
 The role of justice 
within security was thus recognised as playing an important, though ill-defined part. 
Furthermore, international justice efforts, such as the Truth and Reconciliation Commission, 
pointed to injustice as a central cause of the civil war, providing evidence of the need for 
justice reform to ensure post-conflict peace.
146
 
 
The DFID-sponsored Law Development Project finally commenced in 2001 with a small 
budget of GBP 3-4 million.
147
 The initial goals of the LDP, to improve the effectiveness of the 
judiciary including both the higher courts and Local Courts, to update and reform the legal 
code, and to train all legal personnel, proved overambitious.
148
 Ultimately, the Project 
refurbished the three provincial High Courts, built and refurbished magistrate court buildings 
throughout the country, as well as providing equipment and logistical support to the 
judiciary.
149
 These cosmetic improvements ‗had a major psychological effect – symbolising 
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the restoration of normality and the rule of law‘.150 Yet little improvement could be discerned 
in the capacity of the judiciary and case backlogs and corruption remained common, while the 
customary law system was weak and under-supervised.
151
 Thus, although the LDP made 
strides towards improved materials and structures which could facilitate the application of the 
law, human and institutional capacity remained low. As Sannerholm notes: 
 
The issue of both law reform and institution building has frequently been approached as a 
technical or practical problem translated into refurbishing courthouses or importing ―good 
laws‖. But the problem lies elsewhere. As noted by the [UN] Secretary-General in relation to 
Sierra Leone, courthouses and prison facilities have been built or renovated throughout the 
country, but ―progress has been slow in addressing such problems as undue delays in the trial 
and adjudication of cases and the lack of judicial personnel.‖ Any type of externally promoted 
rule of law reform is, above all, a matter of enhancing capacity and changing behaviour, and 
as such, is more political than legal-technical in nature.
152
 
 
In order to build a judicial system capable of effective functioning, efforts were needed to 
enhance the capacity of staff within the judiciary and to engage with cultures both within the 
justice system and those surrounding it, to alter the manner in which law was practiced.
153
  
 
As the extent of breakdown within the legal system was fully realised and the links between 
justice, security and development better understood, justice reform began to be mainstreamed 
into DFID and Government of Sierra Leone work. Around this time, in 2003-2004, initial 
preparatory planning was being done for Sierra Leone‘s Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper 
(PRSP), in which the rule of law, human rights and due process were highlighted as 
fundamental to economic growth.
154
 Commitment to a sector-wide justice reform programme 
was indicated in the ‗Long-Term Partnership for Development‘, agreed between the 
governments of the UK and Sierra Leone in 2003.
155
 A ‗broad programme of support‘ for the 
justice sector was also flagged as one of the UK‘s indicators of progress within the Poverty 
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Reduction Framework Agreement between the UK and Sierra Leone, the document intended 
to set out the commitments necessary to reducing poverty in post-conflict Sierra Leone.
156
 As 
justice was increasingly recognised as being important for both security (in support of 
policing functions and providing people with an effective non-violent conflict resolution 
mechanism) and development (by maintaining the rule of law and due process that would 
attract investors), DFID‘s work in this area duly expanded. 
 
The Justice Sector Development Programme (JSDP) was launched in 2005, funded by DFID 
and managed by the British Council.
157
 Its five year mandate (which has since been extended 
to 2011) is to establish safety, security and access to justice for the people of Sierra Leone, in 
particular the poor, vulnerable and marginalised.
158
 The JSDP takes a broad, multi-sector 
approach to justice, working with ‗all stakeholders who have a part to play in delivering 
justice, both within government and within civil society.‘159 They involve the judiciary (both 
formal and customary systems), Ministry of Internal Affairs, police, prisons service and civil 
society in attempting to create a fairer and more effective justice system.
160
 This joined-up 
approach represents an important shift away from conceiving of institutions in isolated reform 
packages, as tended to occur with early policing and military reform programmes.
161
 The 
JSDP became regarded as ‗the first Sierra Leone experience of a broad sector-wide 
programme‘,162 with the programme regarded as ‗the most ambitious and far-reaching of 
reform efforts.‘163 Perhaps more importantly, the JSDP also paved the way for the broadening 
of understandings of security within SSR to incorporate issues of justice. Such a broadening 
might tentatively suggest a more locally relevant understanding of security, given the role that 
injustice played in causing the civil war. 
 
JSDP‘s Formal Justice Reforms 
An examination of the projects that have been undertaken within the JSDP highlights just how 
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broad justice reform has been in Sierra Leone. The primary focus of the JSDP has been to 
assist the Government of Sierra Leone in establishing a Justice Sector Coordination Office 
(JSCO) (the JSDP continues to provide budgetary support to the JSCO), to oversee and 
coordinate the complex legal system. Current JSDP activities engage largely with the formal 
legal system, and include building the capacity of Parliament to debate legislation in a 
meaningful manner, support to the Ombudsman, as well as to investigations and operations of 
the Anti-Corruption Commission.
164
 They have assisted the Government of Sierra Leone in 
reviewing national legislation and legally implementing international obligations, both of 
which have also been followed up with public awareness campaigns to publicise new laws.
165
 
Capacity building projects work with the Ministry of Internal Affairs in an attempt to improve 
oversight of the police and with civil society to build upon the role that they can play in 
advocacy and oversight within the justice system.
166
 The SLP are supported through ongoing 
projects to promote proactive intelligence-led policing, and a countrywide manual is being 
produced to standardise the practices of the Family Support Units.
167
 Work is being done with 
the Department for Public Prosecutions, to improve their capacity and efficiency and 
community mediation programmes (in conjunction with civil society) are being supported, 
alongside the development of a legal aid programme, all in an effort to build a more 
accessible and speedy justice system.
168
 Prisons management is being reformed, with 
particular attention being paid to the health and rehabilitation of prisoners.
169
 This area of 
justice reform cannot be overlooked, with the largest prison in Sierra Leone, Pademba Road 
in Freetown, operating at a capacity of 350 per cent.
170
 Alongside the prisons programme, 
attempts are also being made to improve juvenile justice, moving minors from prisons into 
youth remand centres.
171
 The JSDP has also provided ‗top-ups‘ of the salaries of judges and 
registrars, in an attempt to curb corruption and as an incentive to recruit qualified staff to the 
state system, which exists in competition with the traditionally more lucrative private legal 
sector.
172
 Finally, infrastructure and equipment is being upgraded and improved across the 
country at all court levels.
173
 Whilst each of these reforms has undoubtedly contributed in 
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interesting ways to the post-conflict justice system, of concern here are the efforts to engage 
informal justice actors. 
 
JSDP‘s Informal Justice Reforms 
Alongside this substantial engagement with the formal legal system, the JSDP has also been 
active in reforms of the informal legal system. As Stephen Golub notes, DFID ‗has … played 
a trailblazing role in studying customary and other non-state justice systems, which the poor 
employ far more than their societies‘ less affordable, accessible and comprehensible 
judiciaries.‘174 Given that dissatisfaction with the justice system within Sierra Leone has been 
noted as a cause of the conflict, and given the greater reliance upon informal justice practices 
than on the formal judiciary, such engagement and reform is crucial to building a sustainable 
peace. DFID‘s ‗trailblazing‘ role also heeds the advice of UN Secretary-General Kofi 
Annan‘s 2004 report to the Security Council, ‗The Rule of Law and Transitional Justice in 
Conflict and Post-conflict Societies‘, in which he suggests that ‗[d]ue regard must be given to 
indigenous and informal traditions for administering justice or settling disputes, to help them 
to continue their often vital role and to do so in conformity with both international standards 
and local tradition.‘175    
 
The JSDP has developed, in consultation with GoSL, a Justice Sector Reform Strategy, which 
sets the goal of providing improved justice at the community level, as ‗with a formal legal 
system that is inaccessible to 70% of our people, we need to make sure that alternative 
systems for delivering justice (including through chiefdoms) are functioning properly and 
fairly.‘176 According to the JSDP, primary justice is where justice intersects with communities 
and becomes meaningful at the local level.
177
 As of early 2009, primary justice projects 
focused predominantly on efforts to codify customary law and to reform the Local Courts 
system that administers customary law. Pilots of these projects were carried out in Moyamba 
District (the JSDP‘s pilot location) and are now being rolled out more broadly.178 These two 
main projects will be considered in turn before highlighting their potential limitations. While 
DFID‘s JSDP has made headway engaging with informal justice actors, the terms of these 
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engagements are not without shortcomings, which ultimately limit the ability of their SSR 
programme to comprehensively address the causes of conflict and provide sustainable post-
conflict security. 
 
Codification of Customary Law 
The JSDP has embarked upon a project to codify customary law across Sierra Leone‘s 149 
chiefdoms, which currently each operate with their own version of customary law. Customary 
law in Sierra Leone is not written, and interpretations of the law within Local Courts are 
based upon the memory of community leaders, and differ markedly across the country.
179
 The 
unwritten status of customary law has created difficulties in determining precedents and in 
affording citizens knowledge of the law. Such inexactitudes have meant that the law as 
applied by the Local Courts is often unclear, with citizens not knowing what behaviours 
constitute a crime and what the punishments for contraventions might be.
180
 This lack of 
clarity has also allowed the Courts to pass judgments that are unlawful (according to statutes 
limiting their jurisdiction) as well as unjust. It is recognised within the Sierra Leonean legal 
system that these injustices contributed to the dissatisfactions that led to conflict, and 
customary law therefore needs to be rendered more transparent in order to avoid such 
injustices in future.
181
 One method of clarifying customary law and reducing its arbitrariness 
is to develop it from its loosely understood principles that differ from place to place into exact 
statements of law that can be recorded and consistently applied. This logic led to the JSDP‘s 
codification project. 
 
Codification, as understood by the High Court Justice tasked with the project, involves three 
stages – restatement, unification and codification. As of late 2009 only the first stage had been 
completed within Moyamba District (1 of 12 districts in Sierra Leone), containing 14 
chiefdoms.
182
 Justice Fofana of the High Court of Sierra Leone was appointed by the JSDP to 
carry out the restatement within this area and took just under 12 months to complete the 
process. Restatement involves compiling a description of all laws of the communities within a 
District, drawing upon interviews with community elders, written works, Local Court and 
superior court records (where the latter have employed their local appellate jurisdiction), 
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District Council reports and chiefdom bye-laws.
183
 The restatement is thus a ‗systematic 
description of all laws of various tribes as they exist in an approved, simplified and coherent 
manner.‘184 The JSDP estimates that restatement within each District will take approximately 
six months (despite the fact that the Moyamba pilot project took nearly double this time).
185
 
They aim to have several teams working on restatements in different Districts at one time, so 
as to complete the process before the JSDP‘s 2011 pull-out date. Once the restatements are 
completed, unification will be undertaken, attempting to harmonise the laws through legal 
integration. Where contradictions in laws arise, a determination of the ‗greatest good for the 
greatest number‘ will be used to resolve discrepancies.186 Some locally specific regulations 
that do not contradict the codified version of customary law will be maintained in chiefdom 
bye-laws, applying only to a specific chiefdom, however overwhelmingly customary law will 
become general in nature.
187
 This utilitarian argument glosses over many fundamental 
discrepancies in customary law across Sierra Leone, and suggests that resolution will be 
straightforward and devoid of politics. For example, customary law in the predominantly 
Islamic Northern province of Sierra Leone does not allow women to be elected as chiefs, 
whereas this is permissible in the more Christian South. Changing the laws either way in 
those regions will not only be a question of law, but an affront to culture. Choosing one of 
these cultures to be imposed upon the other does not seem an effective way of alleviating 
grievances over injustices. This example is suggestive of the overly theoretical and formalised 
approach taken to codification that abstracts potential challenges from their political, cultural 
and historical context by applying utilitarian and universalising logics. 
 
Finally, the unified statement of customary law across Sierra Leone will be enacted into 
legislation. That is, it will become codified and thus prescriptive and legally binding on all 
Local Courts across the country.
188
 Application of laws outside of or contradictory to this 
code will be illegal. With a general and prescriptive customary legal code in place, Sierra 
Leoneans will be able to know the legal implications of their actions before they perform 
them, and Local Courts will be limited in their ability to make arbitrary or unfair judgments. 
These changes are intended to ensure a more amenable justice system for the 70-80 per cent 
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of Sierra Leoneans who rely upon informal or primary justice mechanisms, and provide more 
effective non-violent avenues for conflict resolution. 
 
Local Court Reform 
As the only legal informal administrator of customary law in Sierra Leone, the Local Courts 
represent potentially the most promising judicial institution in the country.
189
 As Alterman 
and others explain: 
 
The local court has more potential for transparency than any other legal mechanism in Sierra 
Leone. Its adjudications are open to the public, its rulings are generally recorded, and the 
customary procedure and law is familiar and accessible to the public. The local court seems to 
be the most accepted and best understood ... legal institution in the provinces. It can therefore 
be strategically the single most important element of reform.
190
 
 
Yet despite such potential, a 2007 perception survey of these Courts revealed that 80 per cent 
of respondents agreed that there were barriers to accessing Local Courts, 50 per cent of 
respondents felt that Local Court officials had unfavourable attitudes, and only 26.8 per cent 
believed that the Local Courts Act bound Court procedures.
191
 As the most popular legal 
channel for resolving disputes (chiefs remain the more utilised institution but are legally not 
allowed to act in a judicial capacity), the Local Courts were pinpointed by the JSDP as a key 
target for reform if the injustices of the past were to be ended. These injustices included 
fabrication of offences, excessive penalties and punishments which often forced subjugated 
groups to forgo personal opportunities (such as education, marriage or independent 
businesses) or even to leave the chiefdom. In recognition of the role that such injustices 
played in instigating civil war, the JSDP has attempted to reform the Local Courts to ensure 
that they contribute to substantive justice and peace, rather than injustice and conflict. 
 
Reform of the Local Courts has been extensive and, given the dire situation in which Sierra 
Leone‘s legal system was in at the end of the war, had to start from the basics. The last time 
that training was provided to Local Court staff was in the early 1980s.
192
 Thus, training has 
been a key aspect of Court reform. Given the tense relationship between youths and the 
customary justice system, and the role that this played in triggering conflict, efforts have been 
made to improve communication between the two parties. In the JSDP‘s pilot district of 
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Moyamba efforts have been underway to sensitise Local Court staff to youth rights issues, as 
well as more broadly to jurisdictional limits and independence.
193
 Reports following up these 
projects attest that ‗JSDP‘s work with local courts had resulted in these courts levying more 
appropriate fines.‘194 Further to this, Castillejo notes: 
 
The Moyamba Youth Movement reported that … [sensitisation on youth rights] has resulted 
in improvements in the relationship between young people and police and that young people 
are now more willing to take disputes to local courts, rather than seeking to resolve them 
through violence, as they are receiving fairer hearings and verdicts from the local courts.‘195 
 
There have also been efforts since late-2009 to train chiefdom police. The lack of engagement 
with informal policing providers in DFID‘s policing reform programme might thus be being 
turned around within the JSDP. While this would be a fascinating project to investigate given 
the focus on this thesis, it is still in its early stages, with training of 88 officers only completed 
in the pilot Moyamba district in May 2010, a year after fieldwork was conducted for this 
project.
196
  
 
The primary focus of Local Court reforms has been placed on amending the Local Courts Act 
(1963). A new Bill, still in its drafting stages as of early 2010, aims to give more power to the 
judiciary and put a check on the influence of chiefs and elders within the Court process.
197
 
The Bill places the power to elect Local Court Chairmen with the judiciary, rather than a 
government official. By so doing, the Bill reinforces the independence of the judiciary as the 
best placed body for ensuring due process within the justice system, both formal and 
customary. In placing the Local Courts under the supervision of the judiciary (rather than the 
Ministry of Internal Affairs), the Local Courts Bill also links the formal and customary legal 
systems in an unprecedented manner, ‗enabling closer supervision, and hopefully 
strengthening the emphasis on judicial standards and human and constitutional rights in the 
local courts.‘198 This closer proximity between the two legal systems aims to overcome the 
justice divide between rural and urban Sierra Leone by harmonising the formal and informal. 
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Engagement with the customary justice system has thus been relatively far-reaching. Whilst 
reforms of the formal legal system still predominate, the JSDP reforms have been the most 
impressive within the DFID-led SSR programme in Sierra Leone in engaging with informal 
processes which comprise the most used systems within the country, and also house some of 
the key failures that led to conflict. Yet despite DFID‘s impressive efforts within the justice 
sector, the programme remains lesser known in comparison with its police and armed forces 
reform programme counterparts. A Summary Report of a DFID Evaluation of programmes 
between 2002 and 2007 makes little mention of the JSDP or Law Development Programme, 
mentioning justice only in passing, to state that, ‗[a]ccess to justice for the poor has not 
improved significantly but strategies and systems are being developed that should address this 
over time.‘199 Given the status that SSR in Sierra Leone holds as a successful programme 
from which projects can be extracted for application in other theatres, it is important that the 
right lessons are being learned, and the best projects chosen for replication in other contexts. 
The importance of informal actors has been witnessed in theatres outside of Sierra Leone, in 
places as diverse as Afghanistan, Timor-Leste and the Democratic Republic of the Congo.
200
 
Given this shared reality and the challenges it has posed in each of these environments, a 
reform project such as the JSDP, which has gone to the greatest lengths of DFID‘s SSR 
projects in Sierra Leone to engage the informal, should be high on the list of transferable 
projects. Yet while the JSDP has been impressive in its unprecedented engagement with the 
informal, challenges inevitably remain from which important lessons can be learned. 
 
Judging Primary Justice Reforms 
DFID‘s JSDP reform efforts, whilst uniquely engaging outside of just the formal judiciary, 
are limited by the manner in which they have understood informal justice actors and sought to 
engage them. In assessing their reforms, four key observations are made. First, the JSDP has 
dealt with informal justice in an abstract and overly formal manner, attempting to formalise 
informal practices which by their nature defy such attempts. Second, formalisation attempts 
risk pushing people towards a greater reliance upon informal actors not being targeted for 
reform, such as chiefs and secret societies, thus limiting the effectiveness of the reforms made 
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to the Local Courts. Third and following on from this, DFID‘s JSDP has operated with a 
selective definition of the informal that includes only legal informal actors, and not the more 
utilised illegal informal actors. Finally, the JSDP has also been unable, thus far, to transfer the 
level of detail of its knowledge in policy and amongst staff into projects on the ground. The 
terms of its engagement with the informal therefore detract from what is otherwise a laudable 
and unique attempt by DFID to address failures beyond the state security apparatus. It seems 
that while the JSDP has recognised the important role played by informal justice actors, its 
engagements try to incorporate the informal into the framework of the formal justice system. 
The dangers of such endeavours will be examined in more detail here, in an attempt to 
improve the efforts of the JSDP thus far and to contribute more broadly to the ability of SSR 
programmes to address failures within customary practices.  
 
Problems of formalisation 
The abstract and formal approach the JSDP takes to its reforms does not appear to be 
cognisant of the disjuncture between formalised rules and actual practices that has dominated 
the history of customary justice in Sierra Leone. Stephen Ellis and Gerrie Ter Haar highlight 
the longevity of this disjuncture: 
 
Colonial officials were in practice often frustrated to find that people in villages persisted in 
doing things in ways that did not accord with the monographs on ethnic tradition that were 
being printed on the basis of expert research, and that chiefs often did not apply the customary 
laws that had been identified. Rather, chiefs and others were constantly updating custom in 
light of new circumstances. Even in postcolonial Africa, the same process continues, as 
officials of some central governments continue to uphold a bureaucratic notion of proper 
customary law that differs from what people actually do, or what might be called ―living‖ 
law.
201
 
 
Several more contemporary examples of incongruence between rules and practice in 
customary justice in Sierra Leone demonstrate this point. Both the JSDP‘s codification and 
Local Court reform projects fall prey to this concern. The JSDP‘s codification process takes a 
highly abstract, theoretical and top-down approach to resolving the interaction of various laws 
in Sierra Leone. Their codification methodology is rooted in how these laws should, 
according to legal rationalism and utilitarian concepts of ‗the greatest good for the greatest 
number‘ be harmonised.202 Responding to questions about how a unified and generally 
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applicable customary code would be enforced, interviewees belied a dogmatic belief in the 
power of legislation – Local Courts would enforce the new code because the new code would 
be the law.
203
 This does not bear a great deal of correlation to how Local Courts have in fact 
been practicing to date. This abstract and formalised approach to codification means that the 
process is highly ambitious and idealistic, with little consideration of the tactile problems of 
enforcing adherence to legislation in practice.  
 
JSDP attempts to amend the Local Courts Act (1963) with a new Bill also suffer from the 
same misapprehension of the relationship between theory (in this case, legal codes) and 
practice (the manner in which Local Courts, in fact, act). For instance, one of the aims of the 
new Bill is to unite the customary and formal legal systems in order to strengthen judicial 
independence and thus the separation of powers. However, it should be noted that the formal 
and customary systems were in fact linked under the 1963 Act, through the appeals process 
(people could appeal a Local Court decision to the Magistrate‘s Court and further up the 
formal Court hierarchy). However, this link was rarely played out in practice, with appeals 
from the Local Court usually going to the District Officer or one of the three customary law 
officers in provincial Sierra Leone (and even this was very rare).
204
 In part, of course, this was 
due to financial limitations of accessing the Magistrates‘ and other formal courts. However, 
there was also a sense of alienation from the formal justice system, and a preference for the 
customary which was known, understood and identified with.
205
 As Tiébilé Dramé notes, ‗[i]t 
is no exaggeration to say that the average African identifies neither with the judicial system 
nor with the other modern institutions inherited from colonialism. It is as if the state and the 
social and cultural environment in which most of the population exist are incompatible.‘206 It 
is thus unlikely that another piece of legislation linking the two justice systems will forge a 
closer relationship in practice. Rather, the practice of an integrated legal system is what needs 
to be fostered, with, for instance, people from the provinces being familiarised with the formal 
court system and the manner in which the two justice systems interact (not only through the 
rule-based operation of courts set out in legislation, but through assisted visits to courts, to see 
where they are, how they operate and who does what). Various impediments to building such 
a relationship in practice exist, such as the geographical and financial barriers to travelling to 
formal courts, the legal formalism (‗legalese‘) adopted in the formal courts and the use of 
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English as the language of operation, which automatically excludes many people from the 
provinces, who often do not speak English. It is changes to remove these impediments, more 
than amendments to legislation that will bring the customary and formal legal systems closer 
together in practice.  
 
Another example of the gap between formal legislation and legal practice can be found in the 
example of the Customary Law Officers. The Local Courts have, since 1963, been supervised 
by the Customary Law Division of the Law Officers Department, consisting of Customary 
Law Officers (of which 3 are allocated to the provinces).
207
 These Officers are intended to: 
 
advise the local courts in matters of law and organisation, and educate and train local courts 
staff on the extent of the jurisdiction of the courts, how to distinguish civil from criminal 
matters, the possible conflict of interest when cases are tried, proper court procedures and 
court administration.
208
 
 
Customary Law Officers also posses powers of review of Local Court decisions (alongside 
the abovementioned right of appeal to the formal courts).
209
 Yet despite these efforts to 
regulate and supervise the Local Courts, they remain efforts on paper, encapsulated in the 
often ignored Local Courts Act. These stipulations do not reflect the practice of the Local 
Courts, whose decisions have rarely been the subject of oversight or appeal.  
 
A final illustrative example can be found in the removal of judicial powers from chiefs in 
1963, whereupon this power was bestowed upon the judiciary.
210
 Yet, to this day, many chiefs 
are unaware of this law, or choose to flout it, and continue to exercise judicial power.
211
 Most 
Sierra Leoneans also believe that such power is legal.
212
 By law, chiefs actually wield 
incredibly limited powers but this is not reflected in practice, studies of which suggest that 
provincial Sierra Leoneans use the conflict resolution mechanisms of chiefs more frequently 
than any other forum.
213
  
 
The above examples of the disconnect between formal laws and practice in Sierra Leone 
                                                 
207
 African Human Security Initiative, ―Sierra Leone: A country review of crime and criminal justice, 2008,‖ ISS 
Monograph 160, May 2009, 109. 
208
 Ibid. 
209
 Ibid. 
210
 Ibid. 
211
 Ibid. 
212
 Ibid. 
213
 Koroma, ―Local Courts Record Analysis Survey in Sierra Leone,‖ 6; Sierra Leone Court Monitoring 
Programme, ―Customary Law Users Guide.‖ 
 179 
 
 
suggest that there is little reason to expect that further formal reforms to the legal code or 
constitution will be meaningful for how the Courts in fact function. This misplaced belief of 
judicial reformers is explained by Guido de Ruggiero: 
 
The love of rationalistic simplification … leads people to think that in the mere technicalities 
of the law they possess the means and the power to effect unlimited changes … [Such an 
illusion is] cherished by lawyers who imagine that, by drafting new constitutions and laws 
they can begin the work of history all over again, and know nothing of the force of traditions, 
habits, associations and institutions.
214
 
 
Reforms need to engage with practical regulation, rather than words on paper written in 
Freetown in a language most of the population cannot understand. Whilst, at law, formal 
English law overrides customary, and thus reformers may believe legislative changes will 
‗trickle down‘, one would be mistaken to think that this hierarchy plays out in practice.215 
 
In part, the failure to carry out in practice what is formally law on paper is due to 
understaffing, resource shortages and lack of training, all of which create inefficiencies and 
backlogs. Thus, reformers might console themselves in thinking that formal laws will take 
hold once capacity improves. However, neglect of formal laws may well have roots in more 
than just capacity and resource scarcities. There is a sense in which the bureaucracy of 
Freetown, with its formal legislation, is distant more than merely geographically from 
provincial practices.
216
 The hinterland separating Freetown from the provinces also represents 
a divide in lifestyle, culture and authority structures that reformers must understand if they 
hope to alter practices in the provinces. Whereas the rule of law in Freetown is derived from 
an (increasingly) independent judiciary and ‗modern‘ policing functions of the SLP, the 
provinces have conventionally derived order from more localised, customary authority 
structures, such as chiefs, elders and secret societies. As Alterman and others discerned in 
their own field research in Sierra Leone: 
 
Customary law encompasses a crucial dimension of the people‘s identity and sense of 
community belonging. Customary law is perceived as a link between the past where the law 
has been minted by ancestors. Thus, obedience to the law is validation of belonging. The 
people adhere to customary law more loyally than to common law, which is often poorly 
known and perceived as ―coming from Freetown‖.217 
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Efforts to regulate behaviour in provincial Sierra Leone through formal laws might not be as 
binding as reformers hope, because other laws also exist, the arbiters of which enjoy greater 
allegiance than the central government. Similar problems are encountered in attempting to 
create a formalised and generally applicable version of customary law for the provinces. 
Citizenship in provincial Sierra Leone is chiefdom-specific, with individuals becoming 
‗strangers‘ when they leave their original chiefdoms. Key aspects that differentiate chiefdoms 
from one another are the rules and customs that apply within their boundaries. Attempts to 
apply a generally applicable, formalised version of customary law would mask these 
important, identity-enforcing differences in rules and customs that make each chiefdom 
unique and bestow a chiefdom-specific identity. The challenges that provincial identity 
constructions pose to formal law and to formalised versions of customary law need to be 
considered by reformers in greater depth. Without doing so, reforms risk being either of 
limited effectiveness or disruptive to identity formation and inter-chiefdom relations. 
 
Attempting to improve justice reform efforts, Erik Jensen suggests that laws are ultimately 
most powerful and effective when they are broadly compatible with previously existing 
practices.
218
 He suggests that it is these existing practices which are most ‗thickly‘ (and thus 
most easily) enforced – not merely through ‗thin‘ legislation, but also through custom and 
convention.
219
 Jensen explains in more detail: 
 
Law (or rules) is just one potential mechanism by which behaviour is ordered, and often not 
the most robust mechanism, especially in postconflict situations. Custom and convention play 
predominant roles in ordering behaviour, even in rule-based societies, and an overwhelming 
role in statebuilding contexts where formal institutions are often weak.
220
 
 
Promoting change through alterations to the law is a top-down and ‗thin‘ approach to change. 
It expects behaviours to alter on the basis of decree. Yet unless such decrees are embedded in 
a ‗thick‘ understanding of the practices of the community they wish to change, they will 
remain superficial and most likely be ignored by those they attempt to regulate (short of strict 
enforcement, which is not feasible with limited police resources in rural Sierra Leone). 
Furthermore, even the threat of enforcement has its limitations. As Max Weber points out, 
‗legal coercion … where it opposes custom, frequently fails in the attempt to influence actual 
conduct … Only a limited measure of success can be attained through the threat of coercion 
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supporting the legal order.‘221 In other words, the potential for the law to transform practices 
is limited. While the JSDP‘s codification at one level seems aware of this, only the 
restatement component of the process reflects this. Unification and codification, rather, seek 
to determine best practice across all practices, and then apply this generally across 
communities with vastly different histories of practice. Work within the codification project 
needs to focus on building towards consensus across communities, rather than blithely hoping 
that the strength of law will overcome longstanding practice, despite little history of this being 
the case. Recognising that the interaction of the formal rules with actual practice is not as 
straightforward as donors‘ models of change would suggest is key to enhancing their ability to 
promote long-term transformations. 
 
Reform efforts that focus on amending legislation that is already virtually defunct holds little 
promise of promoting change in practice. Rather, reform efforts, such as those of the JSDP‘s, 
need to engage more directly with practice in the provinces and ensure that legislation drawn 
up in Freetown reflects what is practicable there, rather than vice versa. This is not to suggest 
that law reform programmes should merely codify into law practices as they already occur. 
Clearly this approach would allow for very little change. However, legislation passed must 
relate to feasible practices and realistic changes given the context one is operating in. While 
reformers might ideally want to support a law banning female circumcision such a dramatic 
change will most likely not resonate with (and thus not likely alter) practices. More realistic 
legislation might require consent of the woman, or a sanitised environment in which the 
practice be carried out. This may mean more meagre progress towards DFID‘s ideal version 
of the rule of law. Yet incremental changes that have greater resonance with actual practices 
will ultimately be more meaningful and sustainable after British reformers return home.  
 
The ‗informal informal‘? 
The JSDP‘s efforts to formalise primary justice in Sierra Leone also risk discouraging users 
from the Local Courts and pushing them to rely, instead, on other unreformed informal justice 
providers. As Simeon Koroma, Director of TIMAP for Justice (a Sierra Leonean NGO that 
trains paralegals) interestingly points out, even if reformers‘ attempts to formalise and 
modernise the customary legal system were successful, that is, if the Local Courts did 
implement the reformed Local Courts Act and codified version of customary law, this would 
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not ensure that people would continue to use this form of the customary legal system. Rather 
people may cease to use the Local Courts and instead take their disputes to chiefs and secret 
societies, who will continue to arbitrate on the basis of localised customary law and thus 
continue to provide the important identity link to culture, custom and ancestry. Again, this 
point emphasises the proximity of customary law to the people of the provinces, whose 
identities are linked to their ancestors by custom, and thus also to custom by their 
ancestors.
222
 The danger of this scenario is that chiefs and secret societies are often derided 
for providing even more arbitrary justice than the Local Courts.
223
 As Koroma suggests, ‗if 
we formalise the informal system, people will go down to the informal informal system.‘ 224 
That is, those informal justice actors existing outside the legal realm which the JSDP is 
engaging with. Koroma‘s view suggests a fundamental relationship between provincial Sierra 
Leoneans and their customary justice systems that does not necessarily lend itself to 
formalisation. That is, while local customs and Sierra Leonean communities are themselves 
constantly changing, they are not necessarily moving towards codified legislation, which the 
JSDP seems to view as crucial to modernising customary justice. Thus, if the Local Court 
system is forced down this route, there is a danger that rather than modernising the justice that 
provincial Sierra Leoneans rely upon, it will merely lead to such people relying upon 
customary justice as applied by alternative informal sources. Such a scenario suggests there is 
a potential danger that modernisation and customary law might be perceived as incompatible 
by customary law users. Koroma went on to suggest, for instance, that ‗you can never make 
an informal system formal. There can only be a meeting point, and that point of balance needs 
to be struck.‘225 Perhaps the very informal nature of customary justice makes it accessible and 
preferred by those in the provinces. No amount of formalisation will ever be able to account 
for all informal behaviour - theory cannot account for all practices.
226
 This being the case, 
some practices might be popular or important precisely because they lack formalisation. If 
this is the case, then the manner of JSDP‘s engagement with customary justice needs to be 
fundamentally reconsidered.  
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Who is ‗the informal‘? 
The concern regarding the ‗informal informal‘ also raises the issue of DFID‘s definition of the 
informal as an important consideration that impacts upon the JSDP‘s primary justice 
engagements. While DFID policy documents regarding justice recognise the predominant 
roles played by chiefs, elders and secret societies within customary justice practices, the 
JSDP‘s engagement with these actors has been minimal. Rather, the JSDP has sought to 
engage with the Local Courts, who represent the only legal informal adjudicators of 
customary law (according to the Local Courts Act (1963) and the Constitution of Sierra 
Leone). Outside of the Local Courts, the illegal informal adjudicators – predominantly chiefs, 
elders and secret societies, continue to arbitrate without interference from the JSDP. This is 
despite these illegal adjudicators being the most used conflict resolution channel in the 
country. As Alterman, and others note: 
 
While customary law is most institutionalised in the form of local courts, the public tends to 
consider the chief‘s audience the initial formal forum of customary law adjudication. Even 
where local courts are accessible and operational, the people turn to the chief in their disputes 
when their informal mediations or arbitrations in auxiliary social groups fail. This is true even 
though district officers and Freetown officials speak against the practice and official 
government laws to not recognise chief‘s adjudications.227 
 
Under the Local Courts Act chiefs had all but their most minimal judicial powers stripped and 
passed on to the Local Courts. Within Freetown and the judiciary, there is opposition to 
chiefly adjudications and the arbitrariness they are perceived to be based upon.
228
 Yet, as 
Alterman and others go on to note: 
 
people and chiefs rally behind chief adjudications. Such popular support may cause any 
attempts to circumvent this mechanism to fail. While the chief does not necessarily guarantee 
a fair and objective adjudication, he is honoured as the head of the community, knowledgeable 
of the community ways, customary law, and tribal justice.
229
  
 
In interviews with JSDP staff, illegal customary justice was a sensitive issue that was not 
talked about in great detail. The new Local Courts Bill that seeks to reform the Local Courts 
Act does not mention the adjudications carried out by illegal customary justice providers.
230
 
These primary justice providers however clearly represent a challenge to the JSDP‘s reform 
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efforts. While this chapter applauds the JSDP‘s unprecedented engagement with informal 
justice actors, this is clearly limited by their willingness to engage with only some of these 
actors, to the exclusion of those most utilised. The JSDP is faced with two options in this 
regard. They may seek to engage with the full gambit of informal actors and risk being seen to 
be supporting an illegal and arbitrary justice system; or they may focus their efforts on 
improving legal customary channels in the hope that improved service will deter people from 
using the illegal customary channels. Yet the latter approach, which the JSDP seems to have 
opted for, also risks alienating reform efforts from the actual manner in which justice in Sierra 
Leone is practiced. The JSDP might be able to attract users who would otherwise have relied 
upon the chiefs and secret societies, but it might also merely create a thin upper layer to the 
Sierra Leone justice system that operates in an effective manner for the minority of people 
who rely upon it. Cracking that surface is risky, but potentially crucial in ensuring sustained 
reforms of the justice system that will provide substantive justice to its users. Furthermore, 
whilst engaging with both legal and illegal informal actors may be perceived to be supporting 
an arbitrary justice system, it is arguably these very arbitrary systems that are most in need of 
reform. DFID policing and justice consultant, Piet Biesheuvel, notes the need to engage with 
some unappealing characters in both the formal and informal settings: 
 
There has been this debate, not just in DFID ... about whether you should engage with these 
bad people or not ... Do you say ―we can‘t possibly have anything to do with it‖, or do you try 
and engage and change? I mean, it is the same debate ... about police reform. I mean a lot of 
the police services worldwide are pretty foul regimes but if you never engage with them, you 
are not going to be able to change them are you? So I think engagement is absolutely right ... I 
don‘t pretend ... [the customary system] is perfect. It‘s far from it ... But I don‘t think that 
should stop us from engaging with it – in fact exactly the opposite. 231 
 
The entire SSR process is predicated on engaging with less than desirable security actors in 
order to reform them. The illegal informal, in this sense, is no different from formal security 
forces also in need of reform. 
 
Resistance to engaging with informal justice actors is not, however, solely a problem on the 
part of DFID. Interviews revealed that resistance to engaging even with the Local Courts was 
strong on the part of the Government of Sierra Leone.
232
 Such resistance is suggestive of the 
historic divide between Freetown and the indigenous inhabitants of the provinces. 
Freetonians, particularly the dominant krio settler population, consider the provinces 
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‗traditional‘ or backward and resistant to the benefits of modernisation.233 Historically there 
has been, at times, a sense of embarrassment on the part of the urban krio population that their 
country should encourage reliance upon what they perceive to be distinctly un-modern justice 
or governance systems.
234
 Thus engagement with illegal informal actors might require bridge 
building within Sierra Leonean society, as much as a shift in thinking on DFID‘s part. 
 
Transferring knowledge to practice: Putting primary justice in perspective 
The final challenge for DFID‘s JSDP relates to the disjuncture between DFID‘s knowledge 
and reform practices. There is ample evidence in policy documents and in talking with DFID 
and JSDP staff of their awareness of the importance of engaging customary or informal 
justice. For instance, DFID policy notes that their: 
 
policy on safety, security and access to justice (SSAJ) recognises the importance of traditional 
and informal systems as complements to formal state systems … In general, actions should 
aim to identify and build on the strengths of the systems and address those aspects that have a 
negative effect on poor people‘s safety and access to justice.235 
 
Yet in spite of recognition of the importance of engaging informal justice systems, action on 
this front has been comparatively limited. Despite the JSDP‘s claim to focus overwhelmingly 
on justice for the poor and marginalised, there is just one Primary Justice Manager with 
responsibility for the customary justice system alongside three other component managers 
with areas of responsibility in the formal justice realm.
 236
 As mentioned above, JSDP 
engagement with customary justice is limited to the Local Courts, excluding key customary 
justice providers. As Castillejo points out, JSDP: 
 
strategy actually focuses far more on reform of the formal system than the customary system, 
and the majority of customary justice personnel and chiefs interviewed during this research 
were unaware of the strategy‘s existence, despite apparently being its main targets. Moreover, 
the vast majority of donor support to the justice sector is focused on formal institutions, with 
only the JSDP pilot in Moyamba doing any significant work with customary institutions. This 
gap between the recognition of the importance of the customary sector and the limited plans to 
address it highlights the challenges of working with customary justice institutions, and the 
importance of finding new ways to do this.
237
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The gap between DFID‘s knowledge of the need for engagement with customary law 
institutions and its practice of doing so on the ground also extends to particular project areas. 
For instance, the perils of codification have been acknowledged in DFID policy: 
 
Governments may request help with writing down customary law. Past experience with 
restatement and other codification projects suggests that there is a danger that law will become 
―frozen‖ and that judges and lawyers will start formally applying customary law without 
taking into account the particular context. It is more useful to work with multidisciplinary 
teams, including anthropologists, to understand the norms and principles of non-state systems 
and assess options for collaborating between state and non-state systems.
238
 
 
Despite this acknowledgement, the JSDP‘s codification project does not reflect this broad 
anthropological approach. Understanding at the policy level even goes as far as recognising 
the limitations of formal laws in ordering behaviour: 
 
The formal accountability of public officials is defined by statutory law and regulations. 
However, social norms and relations influence how formal accountability is actually 
exercised. At the local level, accountability can be channeled through informal, customary or 
traditional norms and mechanisms, often a more influential source of local standard-setting 
and dispute resolution than formal systems.
239
  
 
Yet this knowledge does not appear to be transferred into programmes. Why is it that DFID 
appears to understand the importance of engaging with customary justice systems, and the 
difficulties posed by codification and formalised approaches to reform, but yet is not able to 
incorporate such knowledge in practice? The disconnect is summed up by Jensen: 
 
Discourse on statebuilding and the rule of law tends to be schizophrenic. One moment, 
conversation is probing the customs and conventions of society, followed in the same breath 
by confidently suggesting technocratic and formalistic interventions to modify customs and 
conventions.
240
 
 
There is no doubt that transforming societies through justice reform is a hugely complex and 
difficult task. There are no easy solutions, which is in part why the achievements that the 
JSDP has made are so impressive. Yet interesting and important questions remain about the 
inability to put into practice that which is so succinctly and incisively written in policy and 
understood by staff. In part these lapses have to do with bureaucratic inertia and the comfort 
zones of staff with experience in traditional programming. Jensen illustrates this point well: 
                                                 
238
 DFID, ―Non-state Justice and Security Systems,‖ 14. 
239
 DFID, ―Justice and Accountability‖ (London: DFID, May 2008), 3. 
240
 Jensen, ―Justice and the Rule of Law,‖ 137. 
 187 
 
 
‗Institutional support to strengthen the rule of law mimics the drunk looking under the 
lamppost for his keys, not because he lost his keys there, but because that is where the light 
is.‘241 JSDP reformers might thus be aware that their programmes are not going to achieve the 
levels of accessible justice that they desire, but work in the realms they are familiar with. Yet 
if the JSDP hopes to fulfil its mandate of providing improved justice for poor, vulnerable and 
marginalised groups, they must engage with the broad spectrum of informal justice providers, 
who most Sierra Leoneans turn to. Furthermore, in doing so they must consider that 
formalising the informal may simply create other problems within the primary justice system. 
 
Conclusion 
DFID‘s justice reform programme has demonstrated a substantially broader engagement with 
informal security actors, boding well for the longevity of successes within this aspect of SSR. 
However, limitations remain. DFID has thus far engaged predominantly with only the legal 
informal justice institutions (the Local Courts), and not the illegal informal (chiefs, elders and 
secret societies), who remain the predominant providers of justice to the majority of rural 
Sierra Leone. This dividing line of engagement risks further marginalising this majority by 
failing to engage with their principal justice providers and thus not improving the quality of 
justice that they choose to, or are forced to, rely upon.  Further, JSDP engagement with 
customary law has taken place in an overly formalised manner, focusing upon legislation and 
codification, rather than on the practices of the customary justice system. In so doing, the 
JSDP has not adequately considered the lack of correlation between formalised rules and 
practice in the history of Sierra Leone‘s customary legal system. It thus remains dubious as to 
whether formalising rules and creating further legislation will have any impact upon the actual 
functioning of the customary justice system. Finally, while the JSDP has gone further than 
any other of DFID‘s SSR programmes in engaging with the informal, policy continues to 
outstrip projects in this regard. In fact, the JSDP‘s engagement with primary justice is a 
relatively small component of their overall programming. When looked upon in this way, the 
Programme‘s achievements, while impressive, are also dwarfed in comparison to engagement 
with the formal justice system, which caters for approximately 20 per cent of the Sierra 
Leonean population.  
 
The JSDP Coordinator suggested in interview that a minimum of ten years of justice reform 
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programming would be necessary to create sustainable change in a non-fragile state. In a 
fragile state, such as Sierra Leone, this minimum amount increases to at least 15 years.
242
 At 
the end of its programming, the JSDP will have been in Sierra Leone for just six years. The 
limitations of this time period are evident. Yet these limitations should not completely 
overshadow the importance of DFID‘s justice reform efforts. Castillejo has noted that 
‗[d]onors do not usually provide extensive funding for the justice sector, and it has only 
received so much attention in Sierra Leone because of the role of poor justice in triggering the 
conflict and the recommendations of the Truth and Reconciliation Committee.‘243 
 
Her statement suggests that DFID has understood the role that injustice has played in causing 
the war. JSDP‘s limited engagement with the informal justice sector further suggests a 
budding recognition of the role that informal injustice played in causing the war. Its 
engagement also goes further than other reform programmes in recognising that isolating or 
criminalising informal institutions will not necessarily lead to their cessation, but rather that 
these practices need to be engaged and reformed themselves. Greater successes could be 
achieved if engagement went beyond the legal informal to also engage with the more utilised 
illegal informal justice actors, and if focus shifted from attempts to formalise and codify rules, 
to attempts to engage with actual practices of informal justice. Such alterations to the JSDP‘s 
primary justice projects would ensure that, for at least the final year of programming, reforms 
more directly address the causes of conflict and thus maximise the potential of DFID‘s justice 
reforms to provide both procedural and substantive justice outcomes. 
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5 
Security sector reform by liberal, bureaucratic means? 
 
The problematic set out in this thesis revolves around the overly state-centric approach DFID 
has adopted towards understanding the conflict in Sierra Leone and the resultant lack of 
engagement with informal security actors in its SSR programme. These informal actors have 
been highlighted as key to a more comprehensive understanding of the causes of conflict in 
Sierra Leone, as well as being central to the matrix of security provision. The case studies 
have yielded somewhat diverging results as to whether engagement has occurred in practice. 
In the case of police reform, negligible engagement with informal actors can be discerned, 
limiting the effectiveness of reforms to improve the predominant policing providers, thus 
hindering the sustainability of reforms. In the case of the Justice Sector Development 
Programme (JSDP), greater engagement was apparent at the level of primary justice, although 
this was limited to efforts to formalise legal informal justice actors.  
 
This chapter seeks to explain the differences between the two case studies, as well as to 
address the larger question that the earlier chapters of the thesis point to: why has DFID been 
seemingly unable to engage with informal security actors? In answering this larger question, 
the chapter examines the bureaucratic and political aspects of DFID itself, revealing how a 
state-focused agenda within the organisation emerges to limit its programmatic engagements. 
This is shown to exist in tension with the experience of statehood in Sierra Leone and the 
relationship between state and informal systems throughout Africa. The contradiction of 
favouring state engagement over engagement with informal actors on the basis of human 
rights standards is also highlighted, before finally suggesting how DFID‘s bureaucratic and 
political limitations might impact upon its broader role in security-related development tasks. 
What, then, can the insights provided in the case studies tell us about DFID‘s ability to engage 
with informal actors and the impacts this has upon their SSR programme?  
 
Explaining the divergence in case studies 
The empirical case studies suggest that DFID, in its earlier police reform programme, did not 
engage with informal actors, and thus it addressed only the state failure aspect of the causes of 
conflict, reforming only the formal, urban-centred policing providers. They were able, 
however, in later justice programmes and policy to incorporate at least some engagement with 
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these dominant security actors. Yet this engagement was limited both in its extent and the 
kinds of informal actors it involved. Perhaps the most obvious explanation for the different 
levels of engagement with informal actors in the two case studies is one of institutional 
learning. Given that DFID‘s police reform programme occurred in the early stages of their 
involvement in Sierra Leone and SSR, the programme could not benefit from lessons learned 
in the same way that the later Justice Sector Development Programme (JSDP) could. Rather, 
as DFID‘s involvement in-country continues, it is likely that it learns more about the Sierra 
Leonean context and the causes of the war. According to this logic, later programmes would 
therefore benefit from this accrued knowledge and at least have the potential to learn from 
earlier mistakes. This explanation is supported by the evolution within DFID policy 
documents, which suggest that an understanding of the importance of informal actors 
developed more fully over time.  
 
It is also possible that the divergence in case studies is the result of different personalities 
leading the police and justice reform programmes. While the British Inspector General of the 
Sierra Leone Police, Keith Biddle, maintained that engagement with informal actors was ‗a lot 
of woolly thinking‘,1 the JSDP Programme Manager, Peter Viner, claimed that the JSDP was 
‗only too keen‘ to engage with informal justice actors.2 Yet the relative consistency with 
which DFID‘s policy on justice sector reform has recognised the importance of engaging with 
informal actors (albeit in a limited manner), contrasted with the policy approach taken to the 
rest of the security sector, also suggests that the different treatment might be more systematic 
than personalities alone can explain. Therefore, while the divergence in findings between the 
two case studies might suggest a process of learning from previous programmes or 
personality difference in programme leaders, it might also hint at a double standard within 
DFID‘s concept of security itself across the policing and justice sectors. 
 
The role of justice reform within SSR has not been without controversy.
3
 While DFID 
maintains that justice is integral to sustainable security, the relationship between the two 
concepts remains blurred. For instance, at times justice reform is encapsulated within the 
broad catch-all category of SSR, while at other times the more inclusive term security and 
                                                 
1
 Author interview with Keith Biddle, Inspector General of Sierra Leone Police and Head of Commonwealth 
Community Safety and Security Project, 13 September 2008. 
2
 Author interview with Peter Viner, Coordinator, Justice Sector Development Programme, 27 February 2009. 
3
 Author interview with Piet Biesheuvel, Libra Advisory Group (SSR consultants to DFID), 17 October 2008. 
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justice sector reform (SJSR) is used.
4
 The tension between the two concepts is apparent in 
DFID policy. There are indications that despite incorporating justice reform under the heading 
of SSR, DFID continues to see the two fields as overlapping, but not integrated.
5
 A 2007 
Explanatory Note on Security and Access to Justice, produced by DFID notes that 
‗[c]onceptually and institutionally, the security and justice sectors are closely connected, and 
overlapping, but are not identical.‘6 Drawing upon the notion of the separation of powers 
within Western political thought, DFID claims that this principle requires a strengthening of 
judicial independence away from the influence of the executive, as well as military, police 
and intelligence actors.
7
 It should be reinforced, therefore, that these actors are not one and 
the same with the judiciary, but rather are subject to judicial oversight.
8
 As a result, distance 
between the security and justice sectors is suggested. The document goes on to point out that 
the goals of security and justice are not always complementary and in particular that security 
threats may in some circumstances justify curtailments of individual rights – an act that is not 
necessarily in the interests of justice.
9
 Thus, the understanding of the relationship between 
security and justice that DFID ultimately promotes appears to be one of ‗coherence‘ and 
‗coordination‘, but not of integration.10 The approach taken by DFID, at least in policy terms, 
seems therefore to recognise the importance of justice in attaining sustainable security, but 
does not see justice as a part of security. This is despite the fact that the human security 
approach (that DFID adopts as a security framework) explicitly encompasses justice issues 
and further, that injustices are largely accepted as having led to the grievances of the civil war 
and thus to insecurity.
11
 This ‗important-but-apart‘ approach was at times problematic on the 
ground. For instance, the police represent an institution that performs both justice and security 
functions. As a result, with the establishment of the JSDP, funding for the police was split 
between the JSDP and the ongoing SSR programme (SILSEP), whereby the former funded 
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the justice aspects of policing, while the latter took on the funding of its security functions.
12
 
As Albrecht and Jackson conclude:  
 
It became clear that having two separate programmes with separate funding within a single 
organisation was difficult to coordinate and almost impossible to manage coherently. In 
addition, it nurtured an impression in the MoD that the SLP had an ―unfair advantage‖ in 
access to DFID funding, since, in effect, the SLP had two pools of funding. Equally, within 
the SLP, it was not very clear how, as it was by far the greatest beneficiary of CCSSP 
[Commonwealth Community Safety and Security Project], it should be part of JSDP, precisely 
because of the latter‘s much broader focus.13 
 
The splitting of security and justice functions has thus potentially stymied an integrated 
approach to SSR and DFID may need to further clarify the relationship between these two 
concepts. 
 
This sense of justice being ‗sort-of-but-not-quite‘ akin to security was also apparent in 
interviews. Speaking with Piet Biesheuvel, a DFID consultant on policing and justice, 
primary justice programmes were discussed, such as long-term education campaigns to raise 
awareness of human rights, which might not be upheld under customary law. As Biesheuvel 
noted, such programmes are certainly part of justice reform – in that they aim to improve the 
substantive justice provided by primary justice mechanisms. Yet it is not clear as to whether 
such long-term education campaigns can be conceived of as part of SSR. As Biesheuvel 
reasoned: 
 
Is it security sector reform? Well maybe it is, but it certainly is justice reform, isn‘t it? It‘s ... a 
sub-set of SSR. We come back to the definition of the problem ... I don‘t think it is SSR, 
although SSR gurus would say ―well it‘s a component part of it‖, but nearly everything is a 
component part of SSR, frankly. I think it‘s pure justice work.14 
 
The explanation for DFID‘s seemingly increased ability to engage with informal actors in 
relation to justice reform, as separate from policing reform, might be explained by important 
differences between security and justice, even if the precise differences are not easily 
articulated. If this is the case, then a distinction is being made by DFID between justice and 
the rest of the security sector about the centrality of the state to these functions. 
 
Whereas police services, like armed forces, fit with conventional Western understandings of 
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security that narrowly focus on the monopoly of force, the justice sector, despite possessing 
coercive powers (such as imposing fines and prison sentences) fits less comfortably within 
this strict security purview.
15
 Because courts do not wield the ultimate coercive implements of 
physical violence, their status as part of the security sector is not as apparent as for sectors 
that do wield such force. In articulating one of the most significant definitions of the modern 
state, Max Weber emphasised two crucial characteristics: territoriality and violence.
16
 David 
Held, explaining this model contends that ‗[t]he state‘s web of agencies and institutions finds 
its ultimate sanction in the claim of the monopoly of coercion, and a political order is only, in 
the last instance, vulnerable to crisis when this monopoly erodes.‘17 While Weber goes on to 
explain that, of course, other characteristics also inform the modern state, territoriality and a 
monopoly of violence are his preeminent conditions.
18
 A more intrinsic relationship can 
therefore be seen to exist between the state and security forces wielding physical force than 
between the state and its other functions. Informal justice actors making arbitrary judgments, 
while hardly desirable, does not elicit the same panic or threat amongst the public and 
executive as the image of informal soldiers or police brandishing weapons. This is a 
particularly sensitive issue in Sierra Leone given its recent history of the RUF – perhaps a 
textbook example of the dangers of an armed informal group.  Because the justice sector does 
not wield physical force, the legitimacy of non-state actors within this sector is, perhaps, more 
acceptable than in the case of the police. The reason for the variance in engagement with 
informal actors seen in the two case studies might, therefore, be explained by the tension 
within the very concept of security that underlies SSR.  
 
As the concept of security has broadened, its boundaries with other concepts such as 
development and justice have become increasingly blurred. Thus, it is now possible to talk 
about ‗security as development‘ (in relation to the security-development nexus), or ‗security 
as justice‘ (in relation to rule of law reform), in the sense that both improved development and 
justice contribute to, or strengthen, security. These fuzzier notions of security are 
encapsulated in the very concept of human security that DFID employs.
19
 Yet what precisely 
is implied by these broader understandings of security remains unclear. The increased 
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willingness of DFID reformers to engage with informal actors in justice reform programmes, 
as opposed to police reform programmes, suggests that ‗security as justice‘ is importantly 
different from security itself. Such a difference is not necessarily a problem. However, the 
language of SSR and its attempts to address the constituent parts of the security apparatus as a 
coherent sector in a joined-up manner, disguises underlying differences that make engaging 
with informal actors problematic. The variance detected in DFID‘s level of engagement with 
informal actors across reform programmes suggests a reappraisal might be needed of DFID‘s 
efforts to fit a vast array of projects and approaches under the single banner of increasingly 
coordinated, coherent and joined-up SSR.  
 
While it is important to explain the divergent findings of the case studies and what these 
suggest about DFID‘s understanding of security, in both cases DFID‘s engagement with 
informal security actors was not straightforward. Either, in the case of police reform, it did not 
occur, or, in the case of justice reform, it did only in a limited and problematic manner. Aside 
from looking to explain the slight variation in levels of engagement in each case study then, 
this chapter also seeks to explain the seeming difficulty that DFID has in engaging informal 
security actors across the board.  
 
Explaining DFID’s lack of engagement with the informal 
Against the seeming incognisance DFID programmes have shown towards the informal, 
DFID staff and more recent policy documents seem acutely aware of the importance of 
informal actors and the roles they play in the lives of many Sierra Leoneans.
20
 There has been 
a growing recognition in DFID‘s policy documents (as well as those of other major donors 
and SSR actors) of the importance of acknowledging informal security actors.
21
 This change 
is indicative of the significance of these actors in the SSR process. Yet despite this 
recognition, at least in the Sierra Leone case, transformation into practice has been limited. 
The policing and justice case studies examined in this thesis suggest that these new policy 
statements are more rhetoric than applied policy. It is one thing to recognise the importance of 
the informal in policy, but quite another to be capable of transforming this into practice. 
Homage to informal actors in DFID policy thus risks becoming a vacant concept with little 
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practical meaning, rather than flagging concerted organisational attempts to recalibrate the 
manner in which they conduct SSR. Why this emerging disjuncture between policy and 
practice?  
 
The seeming inability of DFID to engage with informal security actors in practice is not 
inexplicable. Rather, it belies an important observation of the organisation itself. DFID does 
not only or wholly overlook engagement with informal security actors because it lacks 
awareness, or understanding of their importance, as their later policy position and interviews 
with DFID staff attests. They are keenly aware of the challenges posed by informal actors 
within the Sierra Leonean context. All DFID staff interviewed demonstrated a nuanced 
understanding of such challenges. Mark White, DFID‘s former programme manager for the 
security sector reform and justice sector development programmes in Sierra Leone, and now 
Regional Conflict Advisor for West Africa, notes that ‗there remains a clear gap between the 
policy and the practice … as evidenced by the fact that 80 percent of the population in sub-
Saharan Africa get their security and justice services from non-state actors.‘22 DFID is also 
not complacent about the importance of such actors but recognises the central role they play 
in Sierra Leonean life. More than most international organisations, DFID appears to regularly 
update and refine their engagement techniques to ensure they are relevant and meaningful.
23
 
Their lack of practical engagement, then, suggests something more intrinsic to the DFID 
machine itself. Partly the policy-practice disjuncture can be explained by bureaucratic inertia, 
whereby changes in practices lag behind ‗eureka moments‘ at the policy level (not least due to 
funding cycles and project planning).
24
 It can take some time for an idea to be developed, 
incorporated into programming, funded and equipped (with contracts for materials, say, 
requiring a lengthy tender process), staffed and finally implemented. But beyond this and 
more importantly, DFID‘s political, bureaucratic and statist nature also curtails their 
programmatic practices.  
 
DFID as a bureaucratic organisation 
While seemingly a mundane observation, an important starting point for understanding 
DFID‘s behaviour is to recognise that DFID is first and foremost a bureaucratic organisation, 
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rooted in legal-rational processes. From this bureaucratic nature much can be discerned. As 
Michael Barnett and Martha Finnemore explain, organisations ‗are constituted as 
bureaucracies, and that bureaucratic character profoundly shapes the way they behave.‘25 
Organisations like DFID exhibit bureaucratic decision making and administrative processes, 
which are rooted in particular values, most comprehensively set out in the work of Max 
Weber.
26
 These bureaucratic processes are centred around impersonal, neutral rules enforced 
by experts.
27
 Experts are hired solely on the basis of their capacity to do a specific job, and 
their loyalty is to the purpose of their office, not to a higher ranking person (as opposed, for 
instance, to patrimonialism where loyalty is to one‘s patron and the hierarchy in which they 
stand).
28
 This commitment to the office and the impersonality of the rules ensures, in 
principle, their rational, dispassionate and thus consistent application, which is in turn 
monitored by equally impersonal accountability structures.
29
 Rules are based upon legal-
rationalism and are general, abstract and universalisable. Their rationality derives from their 
‗objectiveness‘, which Weber defines as ‗the discharge of business according to calculable 
rules and ―without regard for persons‖.‘30 He goes on to suggest that his ideal type31 of 
bureaucracy ‗develops more perfectly, the more it is ―dehumanised‖, the more completely it 
succeeds in eliminating from official business love, hatred, and all purely personal, irrational, 
and emotional elements which escape calculation.‘32 Weber proposed that an organisation 
with these bureaucratic attributes possessed a ‗technical superiority over any other form of 
organisation‘, given its heightened efficiency.33 This belief has been internalised (albeit 
imperfectly) by most large organisations operating in contemporary Western societies, and 
DFID is no exception. Bureaucratic politics are now ‗demanded by law as well as by 
―modern‖ conceptions of fairness and justice.‘34 In fact, law-enshrined bureaucracy was 
mentioned in interviews with DFID staff, particularly in relation to cumbersome procurement 
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procedures.
35
 
 
These bureaucratic rules, internal to DFID, act upon the organisation and help to forge its 
behaviour by delimiting the manner in which ‗bureaucrats see the world and perceive the 
problems they face.‘36 As Mary Douglas explains, bureaucracies curtail thinking by 
promoting a particular worldview based upon legal-rational decision making.
37
 For DFID 
staff, engaging with those outside of this worldview becomes problematic (this is not to 
suggest that DFID staff are not aware of the broader view – in fact they most certainly are).38 
Informal security actors in Sierra Leone do not display such legal-rational decision making. 
They do not operate according to impersonal rules, are not expertise-oriented, or accountable 
in any impersonal sense. Rather, they act in a highly personalised manner with one‘s identity 
being a key determinant in the outcome of particular, often arbitrary, decisions.
39
 The ‗rules‘ 
vary depending on who they are being applied to and one‘s position in a hierarchy is often not 
based upon dispassionate expertise but lineage, wealth, age, sex, personal connections or 
birthplace. Informal security actors, therefore, do not fit with the legal-rational worldview 
internalised by DFID, but are more representative of Weber‗s patrimonial model of 
administration (which has since been made increasingly relevant to the context of Sierra 
Leone through models of neopatrimonialism, most convincingly set out by William Reno).
40
 
Yet bureaucratic emphasis on neutrality and impartiality does not mean that DFID lacks 
normative values, despite such values often being overlooked by political scientists.
41
 Rather, 
as Barnett and Finnemore argue, ‗bureaucracies always serve some social purpose or set of 
cultural values, even when they are shrouded in myths of impartiality or value-neutral 
technocracy.‘42 Therefore while DFID is bounded in part by the bureaucratic processes 
internal to it, it is also bounded by a commitment to a particular political mandate, defining 
the organisation‘s purpose, to reduce global poverty. 
 
                                                 
35
 Author interview with Garth Glentworth, Senior Governance Advisor, DFID, 17 October 2008. 
36
 Barnett and Finnemore, Rules for the World, 18 
37
 Mary Douglas, How Institutions Think (New York, NY: Syracuse University Press, 1986), 75-76. 
38
 Ibid. 
39
 Paul Richards, Fighting for the Rainforest (London: James Currey, 1996), 34; Morten Bøås, ―Liberia and 
Sierra Leone – Dead Ringers? The Logic of Neopatrimonial Rule,‖ Third World Quarterly 22, no. 5 (2001): 698. 
40
 Weber, Economy and Society, vol. III, 1010-1041; In relation to Sierra Leone, neopatrimonialism has been 
used as a descriptive model most notably by William Reno, Corruption and State Politics in Sierra Leone 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995); and William Reno, Warlord Politics and African States 
(Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 1998). 
41
 Kenneth J. Meier and Laurence J. O‘Toole Jr., Bureaucracy in a Democratic States: A Governance 
Perspective (Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2006), 137. 
42
 Barnett and Finnemore, Rules for the World, 21. 
 198 
 
 
DFID as a liberal democratic entity  
In its political sphere, DFID is a bureaucratic organisation embedded within a liberal 
democratic political system of a Western state. Its purpose of reducing poverty is 
operationalised through attempting to foster liberal democracy elsewhere, which it believes is 
best achieved through building or strengthening state structures.
43
 DFID is not an institution 
for the propagation of tyranny, corruption or illiberal politics. Engaging with informal 
security actors can mean dealing with some highly unsavoury characters involved in highly 
unsavoury activities (such as female circumcision or the recruitment of child soldiers). As 
Biesheuvel explained, SSR involves working with ‗the sort of guys who finish up in charge of 
armies, police forces [and] intelligence services ... You are not always talking about pleasant 
individuals.‘44 This is not always comfortable territory for a liberal organisation more used to 
working with civil society, often perceived to be a progressive social force lobbying for 
increased respect for human rights, justice and tolerance.
45
 As Charles Call and Susan Cook 
explain, ‗local or traditional forms of governance require difficult choices and perhaps the 
sacrifice of values liberals hold dear. Traditional, legitimate forms of authority are often 
repressive of women‘s rights, individual rights, property rights, minority rights, and other 
rights.‘46 It is problematic for DFID to justify such engagements, unless it sees them capable 
of transformation into the kinds of institutions it is politically comfortable engaging with – 
that is, states that have the potential to be liberal democratic (or at least institutions that are 
regulated by states that are potentially liberal democratic). For instance, as seen in the case 
study of the JSDP‘s primary justice initiatives, customary law was targeted for reform by 
DFID only insofar as it could be formally codified and thus brought within state regulation. 
Thus, to some extent DFID‘s political character delimits the activities it is able to engage in. 
 
DFID, like most organisations, must perform to various constituencies which shape their 
actions – the British public, the government and the rest of the British civil service, and its 
donor recipients, such as Sierra Leone.
47
 As government agencies are given only minimal 
direct authority through legislation (in the case of DFID this is primarily through the 
International Development Act, 2002), the remainder is based upon delegated authority from 
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government and legitimacy.
48
 The role of legitimacy thus means that DFID‘s activities must 
be defensible to its various constituencies, but particularly the British government and public, 
from whom it ultimately derives its funds. DFID maintains this legitimacy through a reliance 
upon an ethical politics, advocating human rights, good governance and sustainable 
development to assist those living in extreme poverty.
49
 This ideology grants it legitimacy in 
the eyes of much of the public, and also provides DFID with a discrete identity within the 
British civil service. This is particularly important to DFID given its relatively recent 
devolution in 1997 from the Foreign and Commonwealth Office (FCO).
50
 Differentiation 
from the FCO‘s main task of diplomacy in the name of British interests, has thus been 
important for the younger organisation in marking out its sphere of influence and creating a 
public profile.
51
 As Guy Peters notes, ‗bureaucracies develop agency ideologies as a means of 
justifying their actions. These ideologies are important weapons in the struggle over 
influence.‘52 Having the authority, for example, to establish aid spending priorities, represent 
the government in bilateral negotiations and implement SSR programmes, relies upon DFID 
successfully attaining the legitimacy to do so. 
 
Thus while engagement with informal security actors might seem appropriate or necessary in 
the Sierra Leonean context,
53
 the British public might not be satisfied that engaging with 
secret societies and chiefs to improve security provision to in turn reduce poverty, is the best 
way to spend their tax payer money. In 1998 British newspapers created a publicity nightmare 
for the FCO and their supposedly ‗ethical‘ foreign policy with the exposure of the ‗arms to 
Africa‘ affair, in which a British private security company (allegedly with the knowledge of 
the FCO) provided weapons to forces supporting President Kabbah - perceived internationally 
as the more legitimate side of the war in Sierra Leone. The potential outcry were news 
headlines to read: ‗Despotic chiefs receive DFID funding‘ or ‗DFID makes FGM safe‘ is not 
difficult to imagine! Furthermore, not only does DFID need to appease the British 
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government and public about the quality of human rights provided by the actors it supports, 
but it also must satisfy itself of the quality of such actors. DFID‘s raison d‘etre does not sit 
comfortably with legitimising oppressive governance or security structures. This would be 
inimical to its political goals. The difficulty DFID staff had, for instance, in accepting the 
need to fund Sierra Leone Police training in non-lethal force demonstrates the lack of 
enthusiasm within the organisation for supporting practices perceived to be in any way 
coercive. It is questionable then to what extent DFID could engage with the kinds of informal 
actors this thesis has been dealing with, without appearing illiberal, or being accused of 
violating the core principles and values it is supposed to uphold, thereby jeopardising their 
legitimacy at home and within the organisation itself. DFID‘s programmatic choices are 
therefore not unbounded – they are in fact stringently curtailed by the various audiences and 
political commitments they must serve.  
 
The illiberal character of some of the organisations that informal engagement would bring 
DFID into contact with does not fit with their broader political agenda.
54
 Whilst Britain‘s 
Colonial Office was able to justify using chiefs as administrators through indirect rule because 
this facilitated order and stability, DFID‘s political mandate is different, requiring that its 
engagements fit with its liberal, democratic goals (principles that the Colonial office was less 
bound by because their authority depended upon other interests). Difficult decisions thus need 
to be made not only about how best to provide security, but also about how best to build the 
kinds of security that will support equality, justice and broader human rights concerns. These 
decisions are not entirely in DFID‘s hands. While it may be able to shape the manner in which 
its engagements are presented to the public, DFID is still beholden to its home audience, who 
must be convinced of the Department‘s ethical legitimacy in order that the government will 
continue to support its programmes.  
 
The state as the fallback engagement 
The argument made here does not mean to suggest that DFID staff are necessarily, or in all 
cases, blind to their liberal, bureaucratic limitations or that they are so embedded in them that 
they cannot see the world any other way. Certainly, many DFID staff and consultants I spoke 
with were aware of the politics surrounding the issue of informal actors.
55
 In fact it is this 
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awareness on their part that makes DFID‘s lack of engagement with the informal so surprising 
and interesting. Rather, DFID‘s liberal and bureaucratic natures combine to render certain 
goals and methods of achieving those goals more amenable than other courses of action. As 
Zöe Marriage explains: 
 
The compromise is reached by denial – ―knowing and not-knowing‖: the formal state is 
recognised to be superficial, but limited effort is made to see beyond it. In practical terms, 
relief workers have short contracts, do not build relationships with ―political‖ figures, and 
rarely have relevant historical knowledge or linguistic skills. Donor personnel are usually 
based in capital cities, making it difficult to perceive further in political terms.
56
 
 
DFID could choose to go against its bureaucratic and liberal nature by engaging with chiefs 
and secret societies in order to sensitise them and improve their services, with the aim of 
providing improved levels of policing and justice (however problematic) to all Sierra 
Leoneans. Yet this course of action would require a move away from normal operating 
procedures and institutional thinking, becoming more difficult to implement than engagement 
with liberal, bureaucratic actors (or those with the potential to be). This involves substantial 
work and political risk when there are actors with whom DFID can engage in a more 
straightforward manner, who possess the very attributes that DFID seeks to promote. Barnett 
and Finnemore explain: 
 
The course of action likely to be preferred by rational-legal authorities are, not surprisingly, 
rational-legal ones. Left to their own devices, bureaucracies are likely to craft policies that 
promote rational (in the Weberian sense), impersonal, rule-governed, and technocratic 
approaches to social tasks.
57
 
  
Finding greater resonance with these bureaucratic values within formal state structures, it is 
much easier and seemingly more promising for DFID to engage with state bodies in 
attempting to create the ‗good political behaviour‘ they seek. It is this combination of 
bureaucratic legal-rationality, alongside a political commitment to liberal democracy on the 
part of DFID and the lack of both of these attributes on the part of Sierra Leone‘s informal 
security providers that renders the partnership between the two problematic. DFID‘s inability 
to engage with informal security actors, then, is not explained by sheer ignorance, 
complacency or lack of contextualisation. Rather, it is only explained through an examination 
of DFID‘s political and bureaucratic nature itself, which acts to limit their potential 
engagements. The situation renders Weber‘s fears about bureaucracy somewhat prophetic. 
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Edward Page and Bill Jenkins explain that Weber‘s ‗conclusions about bureaucracy were 
about its potential to create an ―iron cage of bondage‖ … a system in which a series of 
powerful constraints limited what is perceived to be possible or desirable.‘58 I would not want 
to push the parallel being drawn here too far. As argued, DFID is capable of making choices 
outside of this worldview, but such choices are more problematic than those that remain 
within the political and bureaucratic nature of the organisation. 
 
These attributes predispose DFID toward engaging in particular ways with particular actors. 
These actors are ideally liberal democratic organisations with legal-rational decision making 
processes (or with the potential to be). The obvious contender demonstrating these qualities 
(or the greatest potential for them) is to be found in the very framework of which DFID is 
itself a part – the state. The state, as theorised by Weber is the pre-eminent legal-rational 
organisation.
59
 Further, in Western donor discourse, the state is also viewed as the vehicle for 
good governance (or, as DFID now terms it, ‗good enough governance‘)60 and liberal 
democracy. It is the most internationally accepted building block of the very attributes of 
liberalism and legal-rationalism that DFID exhibits. As DFID‘s policy on governance, 
development and democratic politics suggests: 
 
An effective state is the single most important factor in determining whether progress takes 
place ... Whether states are effective or not – whether they are capable of preventing violent 
conflict, fulfilling human rights obligations, helping business grow, and delivering essential 
public services to their citizens – is the single most important factor that determines whether 
or not successful development takes place.
61
 
 
Thus, in attempting to build peace in post-conflict Sierra Leone, DFID has adopted a state 
building framework. This is not uncommon in peacebuilding efforts, which have become 
increasingly coterminous with state building.
62
 DFID, itself a state actor, seeks to create order 
(security, peace and development) through a state-logic by reforming overwhelmingly state 
security forces within its SSR programme. This state building approach, while often 
represented as a natural and technocratic response to governance breakdown from a Western 
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viewpoint, is not devoid of a normative character.
63
 As Fairlie Chappuis and Heiner Hanggi 
note: 
 
In so far as the nature of the legitimacy of the state remains tied to its representation function, 
it is firmly embedded in an international discourse of liberal democratic governance. This 
brings a distinctly normative angle to the SSR agenda which further distinguishes SSR from 
technical military or security focussed assistance.64 
 
Thus while DFID operates with its own political and bureaucratic culture that limits its field 
of activities, the concept of SSR is also not without normative baggage. Although it may seem 
commonsensical to think that SSR simply means the reform – of any kind – of a security 
sector, the nature of the reforms that have built up to inform our understanding of the concept 
of SSR is in fact highly specific. These reforms are invariably aimed at creating 
democratically-controlled, accountable and disciplined security services – a highly desirable 
goal.
65
 Yet these concepts of control, accountability and discipline are understood through a 
state-centric framework: controlled by a democratic state; accountable to higher political 
authorities (in turn, at least in principle, accountable to the people). This predisposes SSR 
towards success with state forces, already embedded in a framework that can, with reform, 
ensure the kinds of security governance that SSR aims for. Successful reform is not so 
straightforward when dealing with security actors that fall outside of state structures that are 
vested with ensuring democratic control, accountability and discipline. Without the state 
framework that SSR relies upon to ensure the kinds of reform it promotes, the security 
dividend of such reforms is unclear. Biesheuvel notes the challenges posed by the lack of 
bureaucratic state structure amongst informal actors: 
 
When you work with non-state you don‘t have that institutional structure to work with [like 
you have with the state]. You know, there isn‘t a big door and a big man sitting behind a desk 
you can talk to like a Chief Justice or an IGP. You are working with different structures and 
the very thing that makes them so successful is the fact that they are traditional [and not the 
state].
66
 
  
If SSR is predicated on the very institutional structure that informal security actors lack, then 
the ability of SSR to achieve its intended outcomes through engagement with informal actors 
might not be realistic. If the concepts of accountability, democratic control and discipline at 
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the heart of SSR could be recalibrated to apply outside of the bureaucratic state – for instance, 
by linking accountability to community groups or civil society, rather than to government – 
then the normative agenda of SSR might not exclude successful reform of the informal. 
 
The state-centric notion of security that emerges from DFID, in part at least due to the 
organisation‘s bureaucratic and political character, have important consequences for its 
understanding of the causes of war, as seen in the first chapter. In viewing the state as the 
most legitimate security actor, DFID predisposes itself to engaging in security issues in a 
manner that preferences the state over other security providers. Thus while DFID‘s stated 
understanding of security centres on human security, its operationalisations through, for 
instance, SSR in Sierra Leone, suggest that this broader understanding of security is 
predominantly sought through conventional state security structures. Being shackled with a 
state security framework (albeit one oriented to achieving security for more than simply the 
territorial state) that derives from the organisation‘s bureaucratic and political nature, DFID‘s 
understanding of the war in Sierra Leone as a breakdown of the state, in turn requiring 
strengthening of the state, is not surprising.  
 
The normative focus of SSR is, however, not necessarily appropriate in all times and places. 
Finn Stepputat, Louise Andersen and Bjørn Møller have pointed to the lack of specific 
guidelines for reforming security systems in fragile and post-conflict states. They note that ‗in 
the absence of specific guidelines, most SSR efforts in fragile states have thus focused 
broadly on the dual task of (re)establishing a Weberian monopoly on violence and installing 
good governance safeguards to prevent the state from abusing this monopoly.‘67 This 
normative commitment to the Weberian state (and liberal, legal-rational rules of good 
governance) within SSR was originally formulated to reform security sectors that were too 
strong and too effective.
68
 The premise, then, is not necessarily relevant to fragile state 
scenarios such as Sierra Leone. The normative commitments of SSR are thus in danger of 
falling prey to the danger observed by Jeffrey Herbst that ‗the gap between how power is 
exercised in Africa and international assumptions about how states operate is significant and, 
in some cases, growing.‘69  
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DFID‘s attempts to build peace, security and development though state building assume that 
the Sierra Leonean state can successfully graft the Weberian type onto itself, thus ridding it of 
its praetorian, corrupt and feeble characteristics. Such an assumption fails to recognise the 
unique history of the Sierra Leonean state, which having undergone different transformations 
into statehood, represents a different beast to the European state model. This bias towards 
sovereign states, dominant in the discipline of international relations, does not necessarily 
reflect the manner in which power is in fact exercised.
70
 As Louise Andersen explains: 
 
When trying to understand state failure, one needs to look beyond the normative Weberian 
model of what a state is supposed to look like. One needs to start with the actual institutions 
and practices of the state and explore the way in which they have evolved in the specific 
historical settings.
71
 
 
DFID‘s state building approach attempts to universalise the European experience of state 
formation that was not only contextually unique – but also took decades or centuries to occur 
in those cases.
72
 Not only has the experience of the state in Sierra Leone been different, but 
these differences have also prompted an ever-greater reliance upon informal governance 
mechanisms. 
 
The specific history of the state in Sierra Leone has unfolded throughout this thesis, yet it is 
pertinent to note here the abstract and universalising implications of DFID‘s attempts to build 
liberal bureaucratic governance in Sierra Leone.
73
 DFID‘s approach suggests that types of 
governance can be divorced from their historical and contextual environments and transposed 
upon other times and places. This kind of thinking has been common in analysis of post-
conflict Sierra Leone. Danny Hoffman, for instance, writes of the failure of a key prosecution 
expert in the Special Court to understand the highly contextualised nature of chains of 
command within the community defence forces (CDFs).
74
 Rather, by assuming war to have 
common features across time and space, the expert presents it as an ‗ahistorical 
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phenomenon‘.75 Hoffman goes on to explain: 
 
The history of the anthropology of war has, however, been a history of refuting exactly this 
kind of decontextualised reading of communal violence. As Paul Richards and others have 
recently pointed out, one of the greatest weaknesses in much of the analytics of violence is 
the unwillingness of observers to locate their understandings of conflict within specific local 
contexts.76 
 
The same argument can be applied here to the tendency of DFID (and other Western donors 
working in non-Western contexts) to work on the basis that the liberal bureaucratic model of 
governance is the best form of administration across time and space. To paraphrase 
Hoffman‘s analysis, the supposition that it is a universal, ahistorical phenomenon generates 
responses that are increasingly mismatched with the realities of governance in Sierra Leone.
77
 
The history of the failures of the state in Sierra Leone demonstrate this disparity. 
 
The Sierra Leone State Experience 
The state in Africa has been increasingly theorised as a distinct phenomenon from European 
state models, usually through the addition of evocative adjectives such as ‗quasi-states‘,78 
‗shadow states‘,79 ‗vampire states‘80 and states characterised by ‗the politics of the belly‘.81 
Each of these descriptions refers, in different ways, to the weaknesses and complexities of 
African states in providing effective governance to their populations. The state in Sierra 
Leone has been depicted through a variety of these characterisations, although not without 
criticism.
82
 While I would accept some of these labels, given the academic controversy they 
tend to promote, I prefer here to characterise the Sierra Leonean state not through a particular 
state model, but rather by its dominant characteristics. These fit more closely with some 
models than others, but also cut across themes present in various models to highlight some of 
the most important characteristics in the Sierra Leonean case. This approach also moves away 
from neatened typologies of the state to a more open observation of political cultures. Of 
crucial importance in the following observations is the role that history has played in shaping 
the state. As Stephen Ellis notes, ‗many of Africa‘s current conflicts are just the latest twists 
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in a long and bloody history that goes back to the circumstances of decolonisation. 
Understanding this history is essential for rebuilding today.‘83  
 
The Sierra Leonean experience of centralised authority and the state has overwhelmingly been 
one based on coercion, focused primarily on disciplining citizens rather than providing public 
services. Precolonial political formations were ruled by warriors powerful enough to defend 
their kingdoms.
84
 Territorial control radiated out in concentric circles, often clashing on the 
outer reaches of kingdoms.
85
 Subjects were required to pay tribute to their warrior-king to 
show their loyalty and failure to do so was severely punished.
86
 This rule by force, dominant 
in the 18
th
 century, was altered in form under colonial rule, although the coercive nature of 
governance remained. Imposition of a foreign power required the curtailment of indigenous 
rights as well as the use of force to ensure compliance. The colonial experience thus 
represented governance as concerned with regime survival rather than popular interests.  
 
Both the colony and protectorate were administered for the commercial benefit of the British 
Empire, with little regard for the economic position of Sierra Leoneans.
87
 The introduction of 
taxation, for instance, was perceived in the provinces as tribute to a foreign power that 
provided few public services in return.
88
 Natural resources were stripped from the country and 
processed elsewhere, leaving the Sierra Leonean economy overwhelmingly export-oriented.
89
 
The commercial imperative of colonial rule instilled an economic prerogative to governance 
that was to remain throughout independence, with rulers paying little heed to the public-
private separation of finance.  
 
Colonial government also reinforced the historical separation of Freetown from the provinces, 
through the Colony-Protectorate divide. Indirect rule through chiefs upcountry allowed 
traditional authorities to retain pre-colonial powers and mark out the provinces as their realm 
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of control vis-à-vis the government-run capital.
90
 This separation has remained a hallmark of 
Sierra Leonean politics, with the capital frequently unaware of, or unconcerned with, 
provincial affairs and willing, to some degree, to leave its administration up to traditional 
authorities.
91
 Mariane Ferme notes that this has resulted in a classic example of Mahmood 
Mamdani‘s ‗bifurcated state‘ with the upcountry population exhibiting the overlapping 
identities of both citizen and subject.
92
 Prior to decolonisation, the British attempted to limit 
the power that had been granted to chiefs, for instance with the establishment of District 
Councils in the 1950s who were to execute government policy in the provinces. Yet, as Joel 
Migdal notes, these Councils ‗found it difficult to establish ties with the population, at least in 
part because of the degree of social control already exercised by chiefs.‘93 At decolonisation 
the power of chiefs was so entrenched that legislative reforms had little impact. As Crawford 
Young suggests, ‗autocratic and hegemonic impulses … were the more enduring legacy of the 
colonial state‘ and not the hasty transfer of ‗thin‘ concepts of democracy in the lead up to 
independence.
94
  
 
Independence was characterised by struggles between the Freetown Krio and upcountry 
indigenous populations, as well as between the two major political parties, the Sierra Leone 
People‘s Party (SLPP) and the All People‘s Congress (APC). Since independence in 1961, 
Sierra Leone has held just four democratic elections (1967, 1996, 2002 and 2007), and the 
quality of these is dubious at best.
95
 The first election, in 1967 resulted in a stalemate, 
controversially resolved by the Governor-General before being overturned in a coup d‘etat by 
the losing SLPP. When the Governor-General‘s choice for President, APC‘s Siaka Stevens, 
was finally reinstated in 1968, he proved to be a corrupt and oppressive leader, turning Sierra 
Leone into a one-party state and bankrupting the country.
96
 His appointed successor in 1985, 
former army officer Joseph Momoh, was unable to build his own power base while 
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maintaining Stevens‘ patronage networks and eventually succumbed to a coup in 1992.97 This 
period of APC rule built upon the colonial experience to ensure that the state in Sierra Leone 
resembled little of Weber‘s ideal model. Services were highly personalised, with state security 
forces protecting the regime rather than the population.
98
 Police and military forces were 
feared by the population as sources of insecurity.
99
 State and personal bank accounts became 
blurred.
100
 Stevens amassed considerable wealth as President while the country‘s financial 
position drastically deteriorated. As national budgets dried up and regime survival became 
increasingly important, services were more frequently provided on a patron-client basis.
101
 
Clients traded their political allegiance, labour or other ‗in kind‘ payment for jobs, education, 
and other services. In this manner, Sierra Leone ‗worked‘ - although it clearly worked better 
for those with access to resources.
102
 In 1991, after President Momoh had agreed to hold 
elections, the country descended into civil war, which would see three more coups in 
Freetown before a democratically elected government was secured.  
 
The Sierra Leonean state vs. the informal 
This experience of the state corroborates two important points here. First, the poor leadership 
and lack of security (as opposed to merely state order) supplied by the colonial government, 
one-party government, and the various military rulers who coopted State House, has required 
Sierra Leoneans to increasingly search for it in other places.
103
 Pierre Englebert characterises 
the experience of the state in many African contexts: 
 
Most … [states in Africa] have not brought about or facilitated much economic or human 
development for their populations since independence. Often, they have caused their people  
much havoc, misery, uncertainty, and fear. With some exceptions, African states have been, 
mildly or acutely, the enemies of Africans. Parasitic or predatory, they suck resources out of 
their societies.  At the same time, weak and dysfunctional, many of them are unable or 
unwilling to sustainably provide the rule of law, safety, and basic property rights that have, 
since Hobbes, justified the very existence of states in the modern world.
104
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This experience of the state has meant that governance has been innovated in alternative ways 
outside of the state, and now constitutes the primary manner in which Sierra Leoneans access 
resources. I do not want to suggest that informal actors are relied upon solely because of the 
weakness of the state. As Eric Scheye and Louise Andersen rightly note: 
 
The absence of state services may be one reason why people rely on nonstate providers. There 
may, however, be another reason also. Sometimes nonstate providers are the choice of first 
resort, because the values embedded in the nonstate justice and security systems correspond 
more closely to those held by the citizenry, whereas state systems are considered to house 
foreign principles and standards and are, therefore, to be shunned.105 
 
This idea has been examined in the case studies in chapters three and four. For the moment, 
however, let me focus upon the impact that a weakening state had upon the provision of 
public services, notwithstanding the allegiance that informal actors attract vis-à-vis a stronger 
state.
106
 As the state became less and less interested in, or capable of, service provision space 
was created for others to fill this void or increase their involvement.
107
 As Ellis explains, such 
power vacuums have been filled by: 
 
structures with deep roots in Africa‘s history. These institutions, such as Somalia‘s subclans or 
West Africa‘s initiation societies, do not figure in textbooks on government. … At present … 
[foreign] administrators tend to ignore such networks and often spend an entire tour of duty 
patiently rebuilding formal new governments without noticing the alternate structures already 
in existence right under their noses. Administrators should learn to take advantage of such 
indigenous political institutions. Over the next few decades, governance in many parts of 
Africa must be substantially reinvented, and the more solidly it is grounded, the better. Not all 
local institutions that have a historical pedigree should be preserved. But because certain deep-
rooted local structures are not going to disappear, it makes sense to think about how they can 
play a role.108 
 
I am not suggesting that chiefs and secret societies had ceased to play a governance role 
somewhere during independence, and then reemerged to fill this role when the state declined 
by the 1980s. Certainly, these informal actors continued to fulfil a governance function 
throughout this period, collecting taxes, fees and fines.
109
 However, the decline of the state 
augmented the importance of informal actors and allowed them to carve out a more relevant 
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governance role than might have been the case had the state not so dramatically weakened.
110
 
Joshua Bernard Forrest illustrates the point well: 
 
In rural Africa, the loosening of state tentacles has not meant an end of politics but rather the 
removal of arcane administrative superstructures that were often ill suited to the civil societies 
over which they ruled (or pretended to rule). This has rendered more visible the social bases of 
power that exert real-world influence over the lives of most Africans. From the point of view 
of social science, this represents both a mandate and an opportunity to investigate what the 
political world looks like beneath the pretentious architecture of the colonially constructed 
state.
111
 
 
Given their experience of the state, Sierra Leoneans have little reason to believe that the state 
will be any better a provider now than it has proved in the past. As Stepputat, Andersen and 
Møller note, many people in fragile states experience the state as ‗arbitrary predators rather 
than … legitimate centres of authority.‘112 Even the current interventions by donors to reform 
the state apparatus offer little hope for Sierra Leoneans, who bore witness to donor 
interventions in the 1980s and 1990s through structural adjustment programmes, which 
further impoverished the country.
113
 The state has largely proved a failure in Sierra Leone. It 
has, according to patrimonial models, bred division and allocated resources on the basis of 
these divisions, rather than acting as a unifying and meritocratic force. The Western 
assumption that the state is the legitimate site for security functions is not necessarily 
warranted in the Sierra Leonean case. Given Sierra Leone‘s experience of the state, it has 
proved itself to have no greater liberal potential than the many informal security actors (who 
the state at times supported) that have acted as security providers in the country‘s past. While 
governance reform efforts since 2002 have undoubtedly improved the quality of governance 
and public service delivery, it remains to be seen whether this can be sustained once donor 
assistance dries up. It is also unclear to what extent these recent improvements can turn 
around the perception many Sierra Leoneans have developed of their state as corrupt, 
inefficient and incompetent. Certainly local media remains scathing and largely unimpressed 
with state government.
114
 It seems dubious as to whether Sierra Leoneans will see enough 
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promise in the state to turn away from the security providers from whom they have accessed 
security for so long (despite the often oppressive quality of this service). Jeffrey Herbst‘s 
prediction a decade ago remains pertinent today, ‗the rough equilibrium in conventional 
politics between the state and traditional leaders - where neither makes significant inroads on 
the other‘s turf - appears likely to be relatively stable for many countries for many years.‘115 
Chiefs, patrons and secret societies continue to dominate much service delivery in Sierra 
Leone, including policing and justice provision. This reality is wedded to the historical 
experience of statehood in the country and thus challenges dominant donor wisdom of the 
validity of the Weberian state model. Stepputat, Andersen and Møller enunciate the challenge: 
‗by virtue of the real life alternatives to state authority and state legitimacy they present … 
[fragile states] force us to rethink and explore the limits of the normative state model that is 
underpinning most of the current discussion about order and disorder in the global system.‘116 
State models promoted by donors through post-conflict state building efforts in Sierra Leone 
must incorporate greater space for informal actors, who have played dominant roles 
throughout history, particularly as formal state structures deteriorated. 
 
The Sierra Leonean state vs. the reformed state 
The second point illustrated by Sierra Leone‘s state experience is the disjuncture between the 
kind of state that has developed there historically, and the kind of state that the UK (and 
others) are trying to build. Attempts to build a Weberian state in a place where the ‗state‘ has 
been largely ‗juridical‘ rather than ‗empirical‘,117 must concede that the outcome will be a 
‗thin‘ version of what can only sustainably be achieved through such outcomes becoming 
‗thick‘.118 Without a culture or history of Weber‘s characteristics of bureaucracy, 
accountability, rule of law, democracy, legal-rationalism, and so on, the Weberian state risks 
sitting precariously and without foundations upon a very different political culture and 
alternative informal governance mechanisms. The newly built state, however ideal in design, 
then, will not easily grow roots in a system where alternative modes of operation, boasting 
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greater longevity and fealty, are entrenched. Such social roots cannot be socially engineered, 
they must be grounded in practical experience. In order to retain the possibility of 
fundamentally altering security to ensure that the causes of conflict are comprehensively 
addressed, engagement must be at the level where security happens on a daily basis and where 
it is ‗thick‘, in the sense of being locally understood and legitimated.119 This might mean 
letting go of the assumption that the Weberian state will be the best governance mechanism 
across time and space. Those of us in the West have largely succumbed to the belief that the 
state, as we know it, is a natural entity.
120
 Yet, as Lisa Anderson demonstrates: 
 
Human history is full of complex and orderly communities, tribes, chivalric orders, churches, 
empires, trade federations, aristocracies, religious brotherhoods and other expressions of 
human ingenuity ... Yet, for most citizens of established states, particularly in Europe and 
North America, these alternatives to the state have been dispatched to the curiosity shops of 
history or relegated to the private lives of citizens ... However they served for millennia as 
vehicles for regulating societal interaction, fortifying human bonds, organising economic 
production and exchange and assuring security in the absence of what we know as the state - 
and in many places they still do.121 
 
Thus despite DFID‘s political, bureaucratic and statist nature pushing it to engage with the 
Sierra Leonean state, it is not the state as they know it. Rather, in the case of Sierra Leone, it 
is a coercive, patrimonial and divided state that shares authority with a number of informal 
mechanisms in governing. As states across Africa have failed throughout the 1990s and 
traditional forms of governance have undergone a resurgence, the previously accepted dogma 
that the state was the political destiny for Africa is increasingly tenuous. Mark Beissinger and 
Crawford Young speak to this uncertain future: 
 
There no longer appears to be a clearly defined end point in the processes of adaptation in 
course. Although the tug of liberal democracy and market economy is strong, as a referential 
emblem of ―normality‖ and as a global cachet of respectability, given the enormous problems 
of stateness that affect these regions there is no longer a certainty that these represent the 
eventual destinations.122 
 
Engaging with overwhelmingly state actors neglects the political transformations underway 
and incorporates into programming only one dimension – a thin version – of the security and 
governance matrix in Sierra Leone. As Ellis posits, ‗[h]ealthier states will need to reflect the 
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actual politics of their societies, including some unconventional arrangements.‘123 This call to 
recalibrate reforms to engage with governance as it happens in practice has been widespread 
in academia.
124
 It follows that if DFID wants to make a real impact on the quality of security 
that Sierra Leoneans receive, they need to be prepared to engage with the state as it exists in 
Sierra Leone, not as they would like it to be. This means accepting that security functions 
have been divided between a coercive, patrimonial and internally riven state (albeit now 
reforming) and informal actors who have often been the predominant policing and justice 
providers, who pre-date the state, and whilst suffering from the same illiberal character, have 
a familiarity to rural citizens that the state does not. DFID needs to adopt a ‗thick‗ 
understanding of the causes of war, which reveals a fuller understanding of the nature of the 
state and the security architecture in Sierra Leone, in order to better reform security provision 
and comprehensively address the causes of the war.   
 
Problems with a strong state approach 
The obvious counterargument here, and the logic at times perceptible in DFID policy and 
interviews, is that building an effective state that governs capably will decrease the need for 
Sierra Leoneans to rely upon the, often illiberal, governance of chiefs, patrons and secret 
societies. Thus, strengthening the state addresses two problems: state capacity, and the moral 
dilemma posed by informal governance. Yet history and broader African experience suggests 
this transition is not so straightforward. In the best case scenario, perhaps state improvement 
will see a decline of informal governance eventually. At the moment, the state provides little 
unifying identity for Sierra Leoneans, who at least in the provinces relate more immediately to 
their chiefdom than the central state.
125
 As Englebert notes, the effort to democratise African 
states ‗lays bare the failure of the post-colonial African state to promote identity and 
facilitates efforts to return to traditional communities or to imagine new ones.‘126 Such 
identification is powerful in determining who people turn to with complaints, for the 
resolution of disputes, or for assistance. If the Sierra Leonean state can successfully overcome 
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its divisions between the provinces and Freetown, North and South, the wealthy elite and the 
marginalised and vulnerable, then it may be able to offer a sense of communal identity and 
thus accrue the trust that currently resides at the lower levels of chiefdoms.
127
 At such a time, 
the state may be well placed to become the predominant provider of policing and justice 
services. Forging this national identity will, however, be a long term process and in the 
meantime – the meantime being critical post-conflict years – the sense of belonging that 
chiefdoms provide will continue to play an important role in people‘s identities.  
 
As this thesis has tried to demonstrate, chiefs and secret societies have not been so resilient 
purely because of state weakness. They are also valued because of the identity-producing role 
they provide to their subjects and communities and the link they provide to ancestral history. 
This identity-producing power is in part shaped by the rights that chiefdom belonging carries. 
Land ownership, marriage prospects and labour rights continue to depend upon one‘s status as 
an indigene in Sierra Leonean chiefdoms.
128
 These rights, combined with more ephemeral 
connections to ancestors, communities and place, are still strongly mediated by chiefs and 
secret societies, rendering chiefdom-level politics a determining factor in policing and justice 
in the lives of many Sierra Leoneans. Furthermore, chiefs have remained powerful through 
their embeddedness in the informal political economy in Sierra Leone, which throughout 
colonialism and independence has been a dominant, and at times the predominant, means of 
production.
129
 The informal economy has provided a link between the state and chieftaincy 
system, with politicians purchasing support from chiefs (and by extension their subjects) in 
return for access to resources or turning a blind eye to their illicit practices.
130
 This ‗deal‘ is 
not a new one. British colonial officials exchanged positions of (often abusive) power for 
peace in the provinces and mining companies allowed small-scale illicit diamond mining to 
continue so long as chiefs maintained social order.
131
 During times of austerity, from the 
1980s and throughout the civil war, politicians also relied upon ‗big men‘ (sometimes chiefs, 
but not necessarily) to gain access to services and resources that were not available on the 
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formal market.
132
 Links to the informal economy have ensured that chiefs have been able to 
remain useful and thus relevant as providers of services not just to their subjects, but also to 
politicians unable to go it alone. This has meant that the state itself in Sierra Leone has not 
always opposed the power of informal actors.
133
 The very longevity of these informal 
governance mechanisms also attests to their staying power. Chiefs and secret societies in 
Sierra Leone have reinvented themselves through dramatic episodes in the country‘s past - 
colonisation, decolonisation, independence, dictatorship and civil war. As Olufemi Vaughan 
notes, ‗rapidly changing social, political and economic environments present adaptive and 
resilient indigenous political institutions as important domains where communal values are 
profoundly expressed.‘134 They thus seem well placed to survive the interventions of Western 
donors to reshape the state apparatus. 
 
The important role that informal authorities, such as chiefs continue to play in many strong 
African states also suggests that they are not merely relied upon in the absence of state 
strength. Englebert has demonstrated that Sierra Leone is one of the only examples (along 
with Somalia) of a resurgence of ‗indigenous authority structures‘, in a failed state context.135 
The vast majority of such revivals have occurred in relatively strong states, such as South 
Africa, Uganda and Nigeria, suggesting that the strength of traditional authorities is not linked 
to the weakness of state institutions.
136
 Englebert goes on to state that ‗on the contrary, 
relatively strong states like South Africa and Uganda have so far provided the context for the 
furthest-reaching restorations [of traditional authorities].‘137 This revelation suggests that 
informal governance providers may be around in Sierra Leone for longer than state reformers 
anticipate. Englebert posits that this trend may result from the greater confidence that strong 
states have in their own institutions and are not, therefore, threatened by alternative 
providers.
138
 Weak states not only react in a more hostile manner to traditional authorities, but 
in doing so they also foster a competitive relationship with them.
139
 The government of Sierra 
Leone therefore needs to take the lead in developing amicable ties with traditional governance 
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institutions. A confrontational attitude will serve only to alienate chiefs and secret societies 
(and with them, the Sierra Leoneans whom they have greater access to), creating conflicting 
and competitive forms of policing, rather than a unified system of security.
140
    
 
Revivals of traditional authority have also been further entrenched through more recent 
events. Englebert notes that ‗there is a broad timing concurrence between the resurgence of 
tradition and the spread of democratic experiments in Africa, both of which have followed the 
Cold War in 1989.‘141 With power increasingly devolved to ‗we, the people‘, identity 
questions of who ‗we‘ are inevitably arise.142 Terence Ranger proposes that a revival of 
traditional authority occurs as a response to this ‗we‘ question, given the new space opened up 
by democracy promotion following the oppression suffered under colonial and post-colonial 
regimes.
143
 In searching for communal identity, it seems unsurprising that Africans may look 
to practices and authority structures not as tainted by the oppression of colonial rule and post-
independence dictatorship. In rural Sierra Leone, such identity formation was able to occur to 
some extent throughout the APC dictatorships of Stevens and Momoh following 
independence, as the provinces were left largely to themselves by the overly-centralised state 
government.
144
 This process was disrupted by the civil war, but questions of national identity 
have emerged again in the post-conflict environment. If Sierra Leoneans look to traditional 
authorities as part of their identity, the ‗we‘ that is so essential to democracy, then any efforts 
to suppress these authorities risks being widely unpopular and perceived as an assault upon 
Sierra Leonean ethnic identities. This danger is particularly strong in Sierra Leone where the 
historic divide (both geographical and relational) from 1787 between the Krio and indigenous 
populations makes the formation of a state identity difficult.
145
 
 
The global economic crisis of the 1970s and subsequent structural adjustment programmes 
promoted by the International Monetary Fund and World Bank also inadvertently played their 
part in strengthening traditional authorities. As the state was rolled back and social spending 
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cut, African citizens increasingly looked for alternative service providers.
146
 Traditional forms 
of governance thus reinforced their relevance within the ‗modern‘ state system. Finally, a 
revival of indigenous structures was further supported by donor trends from the mid-1990s, 
which saw a growing focus on local ownership.
147
 Grassroots institutions and the seemingly 
‗traditional‘ became the favoured conduits for providing assistance that would be sustainable 
and relevant to the needs of local communities. Such aid channels were perceived as 
bypassing the corruption seen to blight state governments.  
 
Indeed, current donor emphasis, particularly in the field of SSR, on local ownership, could 
utilise the grassroots legitimacy enjoyed by traditional authorities to strengthen their 
programmes and make them more locally relevant.
148
 Taking a statist position towards SSR, 
DFID‘s local ownership focuses upon government buy in. Yet given that the state represents 
merely a fraction of the governance matrix in Sierra Leone, and given its poor history of 
representation, this might not be sufficient as a form of local ownership. As Hashim Gibrill 
suggests, national reconciliation cannot merely be conferred by elite agreement, but rather 
must occur across the divides of capital and hinterland, indigenes and strangers and youth and 
elders.
149
 This idea of more grassroots buy in is not particularly novel, with donors turning to 
civil society (including traditional authorities) to improve grassroots local ownership in the 
1980s and early 1990s.
150
 Yet in relation to SSR, it has yet to be attempted. As Richard Sklar 
notes: 
 
 Increasingly … [the moral authority of traditional leaders] is reckoned in Africa to be a 
political resource of potentially great value. Wisely used, it can help to maintain civic morale 
and social order during the current era of extremely difficult transitions to modern forms of 
economy and society. A separate source of authority, embedded in tradition, could be used to 
reinforce social stability without the abandonment of democratic reforms. Traditional 
governments would then prove themselves to be superior shock absorbers for the African 
ships of state during the stormy passages of these turbulent times.
151 
 
Attempts to improve governance both in quantity and quality might thus benefit from a 
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partnership between state and non-state. The history of the state in Sierra Leone highlights the 
ongoing importance of informal governance providers, and also the manner in which current 
reform efforts do not resonate with the experience of the state there. Yet it is precisely this 
kind of engagement that DFID seems politically and organisationally limited in 
operationalising.   
 
Judging human rights records 
A common refrain amongst donors is that informal actors cannot be engaged if they are 
illiberal in character or have a poor human rights record.
152
 This is an important impediment 
for DFID given its commitment to human rights and the British public‘s perception of DFID 
as a human rights protecting organisation. However this is an interesting protestation given 
that state actors in Sierra Leone, who DFID have not hesitated to engage with, do not have a 
much better history of human rights, good governance or democracy than their informal 
counterparts. Thus, if the human rights abuses of states can supposedly be transformed, why 
not those of informal actors? As Eric Scheye rightly demands: 
 
Even if one were to distinguish between state institutions and non-state/local justice networks, 
the distinction would be specious. Donors support state institutions that routinely violate 
human rights, in part to lessen the occurrence of the abuses. The same logic should be applied 
to non-state/local justice networks.153  
 
Zöe Marriage has problematised DFID‘s engagement with state actors on the basis that they 
represent ‗good governance‘.154 As Marriage points out, DFID claims to support good 
governance in its aid commitments and partnerships, often leading it to engage with states, but 
it is unclear what ―good‖ means. It is worth quoting her interpretation at length: 
 
Empirically ―good‖ reveals little, and governance supported by DFID was compatible with 
violence and destitution. In Sierra Leone Kabbah was elected when the country was divided 
and people were facing death to vote in a system they had little reason to trust; when ousted he 
was reinstated by foreign military intervention. Asked whether there had been questions about 
the government‘s legitimacy, DFID‘s First Secretary in Freetown replied, ―Not so far. It‘s the 
democratically elected government of Sierra Leone. If it postponed the election for an 
indefinite period, let‘s say one year, I think everyone would have to question it.‖ Elections 
took place over a year later in May 2002, but nobody questioned it … In terms of being 
―good‖ politically, the International Crisis Group claims Kabbah‘s ―poor judgment‖ over the 
policy leading to the execution of people connected to the junta [who temporarily overthrew 
him] ―undoubtedly contributed to the intensity of the horrific revenge killings and abuses 
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during the January 1999 RUF attacks on Freetown‖. Others have found Kabbah ―weak, 
corrupt and partisan‖ and documented his blind-eye discipline of the army or allied militias. 
DFID‘s decision to support him was not influenced by these factors.155 
 
If such a governance record is dignified with the response of engagement to build ‗good 
governance‘ by DFID, questions must be raised about the lack of engagement with informal 
governance actors and the legitimacy that is bestowed upon the state.  
 
The distinction made between the human rights abuses committed by states and those 
committed by informal actors is further indicative of the prism of liberalism, bureaucracy and 
statism through which DFID understands and replicates the world and models its development 
assistance. As an agency of a state itself, and operating within particular bureaucratic and 
political confines, DFID‘s worldview focuses on the benevolent potential of state 
bureaucracies over that of informal actors. Justice, security, democracy and human rights thus 
become most effectively served by a centralised state authority, properly structured and rule-
bound by legal-rationalism. Informal actors, conversely, represent unaccountability and a lack 
of oversight, rendering them unmanageable forces. Yet this worldview is excessively neat and 
does not account for the reality of state experience and capacity in Sierra Leone. Whilst the 
iniquities of the state are deemed as being legitimate targets for reform, the iniquities of 
informal security actors are not. DFID thus risks falling prey to the pitfall described by 
Barnett and Finnemore: ‗In their efforts to protect human rights, provide security, and 
promote development, bureaucracies continually find that their definitions and standard 
operating procedures do not take into account features of reality that threaten their ability to 
accomplish these missions.‘156 Such a position does not accept that governance (not just in 
Sierra Leone, but everywhere) might involve informal actors and that, in practice, the 
Weberian ideal exists nowhere in archetypal form. DFID operates with a model of the state 
that is divorced from Sierra Leonean experience. It does not acknowledge the important roles 
played by the informal and the inherent differences of the state as compared to European 
models. As Eric Scheye and Louise Andersen note: 
 
[the illiberal nature of nonstate security providers does not] set them apart from the state 
systems. In fragile states, the security provided by both state and  nonstate systems is unequal 
and ―patchy‖ and provides varying levels of service (if any) to different community members 
… The donor‘s choice is not between supporting a human-rights-respecting state system and 
an illiberal nonstate system. If only that were the case, the choice would be simple. The 
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complexity and the predicament arise when faced with a state system that provides very few 
… services and a nonstate system that does provide some – albeit in a less than perfect 
manner.
157  
 
This more complicated choice is simplified for DFID by valorising the potential of the state, 
regardless of the lack of evidence to suggest that such a state is possible in practice.
158
 Even if 
DFID staff possess a more nuanced understanding of the state (and on the basis of interviews 
I believe they do) – the nature of the organisation itself limits certain programmatic 
engagements. Engagement with the broad spectrum of security providers, needed to improve 
security and justice for marginalised and vulnerable groups and to comprehensively address 
the causes of conflict, thus might not be possible for DFID, given its liberal democratic ethos, 
as well as its legal-rational, state-centred worldview.  
 
The security-development nexus 
DFID‘s political and organisational limitations go further though than just stymieing 
engagement with informal security actors. They also raise larger questions about DFID‘s 
involvement in security, which it justifies on the basis of the security-development nexus. In 
its increasing engagements with security tasks DFID is partnering with the MoD and the 
FCO. Aside from issues of cross-departmental coordination, the viability of such partnerships 
has been largely neglected. If development organisations, like DFID, work with particular 
logics (an ethical politics based on liberalism that provides them with authority) that are 
insulated from logics of security (which rest upon alternative sources of authority and 
internalise different normative commitments), when such organisations end up involved in 
security practices, their guiding commitments are incongruous and likely to clash.
159
 There 
are reasons why security organisations and development organisations are historically 
different. Development agencies have fostered internal cultures that are oriented towards 
traditional development practices – education, healthcare and human rights promotion, for 
example, which allow them to adopt a liberal culture. Security tasks, on the other hand, often 
involve dealing with direct violence and highly unsavoury actors in increasingly non-state 
contexts through a strict chain-of-command. These are situations conventionally deemed so 
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exceptional that usual politics is suspended in favour of a securitised response.
160
 DFID‘s 
ability to work with such actors and in such environments might only be possible in a very 
limited sense. Entering the field of security tasks requires a transformation of thinking from 
being predominantly concerned with the human rights record of participants, their liberal 
democratic potential and their decision making processes. One cannot simply bolt on security 
logics to development logics and assume the two will not contradict. Security and 
development fields have been institutionally and ideologically (in policy worlds, as in 
academia) distinct, with often opposing worldviews that can result in antagonistic 
relationships in increasingly shared humanitarian spaces.
161
 This is apparent in social settings 
in Freetown and where security personnel have been heard referring to development workers 
as ‗tree huggers‘, whilst those in the development industry speak of security forces as lacking 
cultural understanding, intelligence and being heavy handed.
162
 As Maria Stern and Joakim 
Ojendal note, ‗notions of both ―security‖ and ―development‖ emerge from disparate 
ontologies.‘163 These opposing commitments and worldviews cannot easily be melded 
together without compromise. Indeed, civil-military relations theory was developed precisely 
to assist in navigating this unusual relationship between two culturally (in the organisational 
sense) divergent actors.
164
 Civil-military relations literature maintains that differences in 
organisational culture can hamper integration of security and development activities.
165
 The 
well-noted problems of coherence between DFID, FCO and MoD staff in Sierra Leone thus 
might be more than just procedural failures that can be amended with increased 
communication.
166
 They might, rather, be indicative of contradictory organisational cultures 
and goals that whilst seemingly having been resolved in policy and doctrine, are more 
intractable in practice.
167
 The boundary between the concepts of security and development, 
whilst penetrable at a conceptual level in policy statements, requires far more difficult 
transformations of logics on the ground. DFID‘s political nature may prevent it from 
overcoming such transformations, and thus ultimately limit its ability to effectively engage in 
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security tasks. 
 
Conclusion 
DFID‘s political character disallows it from making the kind of engagements necessary to 
fundamentally alter security practices. DFID needs to consider what security role it can play 
in future operations. The policing and justice programmes in Sierra Leone have undoubtedly 
made positive contributions to post-conflict life. Both the police and judiciary are more 
trusted and utilised institutions than they were previously. But it would be a stretch to say that 
these improved services have fundamentally altered the manner in which the majority of 
Sierra Leoneans access security. This still occurs largely through informal and often illiberal 
actors, dissatisfaction with whom was a contributing cause of the civil war. Does this mean 
that DFID should not do SSR in future? Or does it simply mean that it needs to be more 
cognisant of its limitations and the hubris involved in social engineering attempts and accept 
that SSR (as it has been practiced by DFID in Sierra Leone) will never fundamentally alter 
practices of security or address the full spectrum of conflict causes? Scheye and Andersen 
characterise the dilemma DFID faces: 
 
if donors want to support SSR in fragile states, while maintaining good development practices, 
they may need to recognise and accept the risks of working with nonstate actors who may not 
respect, adhere to, or believe in international human rights standards. Donors, of course, can 
choose not to engage in SSR under such circumstances, but, if they do wish to engage, the 
pertinent question may not be whether a nonstate justice and security provider accepts 
Western standards or not, but rather how donor assistance can improve the lives of citizens 
subjected to such service providers.
168
 
 
DFID must decide whether there is space within its liberal, bureaucratic and statist nature to 
accommodate the kinds of actors that engagement with security tasks puts the organisation in 
contact with, or whether its role in SSR needs to be limited to practices that fit more 
comfortably with the organisation‘s goals and culture. This dilemma has not been arrived at 
by wrong footing. DFID has recognised that its earlier approach to achieving development 
was insufficient and has attempted to incorporate new and innovative strategies to improve its 
efforts. To paraphrase Barnett and Finnemore, as DFID has recognised that its worldview is 
incomplete and that achieving its goal of poverty reduction requires it to take into account 
other variables, such as security, it has expanded its work into new fields.
169
 The challenge, 
however, is to determine whether the organisation, as it stands, is politically and 
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bureaucratically capable of making the engagements that success in this new field would 
require. That is, engaging with the informal security actors who are the predominant security 
providers and whose failures were a contributing cause of the civil war. As Scheye and 
Andersen rightly warn, ‗the challenge is a forbidding one.‘170 
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Conclusion 
 
It has been the argument of this thesis that DFID‘s ability to engage with informal actors, 
necessary for sustainable security sector reform (SSR) that comprehensively addresses the 
causes of conflict, is limited by the organisation‘s bureaucratic nature and political 
commitments, that lead the organisation to perceive the causes of war in a particular manner. 
The peacebuilding literature, along with the Final Report of Sierra Leone‘s Truth and 
Reconciliation Commission, indicate that peacebuilding efforts must address the causes of 
conflict to make a lasting impact.1 Only by resolving the problems that instigated conflict in 
the past can future violence be avoided and peace sustainably achieved.2 This has also been 
the goal of the UK‘s SSR programme in Sierra Leone.3 Whilst DFID‘s understanding of the 
causes of conflict in Sierra Leone (set out in the first chapter) was largely limited to state 
failure and security-development nexus rubrics, the second chapter of this thesis argued for a 
‗thicker‘ understanding of the causes of conflict. This built upon a demonstration of the many 
roles played by chiefs and secret societies and how these practices created grievances that led 
to conflict. This thicker understanding detects failures, then, not merely in the state 
governance apparatus, but also in the informal practices of the chieftaincy system, which 
administers everyday politics for the majority of Sierra Leoneans who live in rural areas. The 
chieftaincy system, along with other informal actors such as secret societies and patron-client 
relationships, are the primary authorities determining people‘s access to resources on a daily 
basis, not the central state. Many former-RUF recruits spoke of disenchantment with these 
authorities due to their frequent abuses of power and the lack of opportunities afforded under 
their control.
4
 These grievances, compounded with state failure, were the antecedents to the 
civil war. Yet as has emerged repeatedly throughout this thesis, despite dissatisfaction with 
chiefs, overwhelming local opinion insists upon their continued existence.
5
 Building a 
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sustainable peace that addresses these grievances means engaging with these informal, 
dominant, flawed but locally legitimate, security providers. 
 
 
However, DFID‘s SSR programme in Sierra Leone has not, on the whole, engaged with these 
informal actors, or has done so in a limited manner. As demonstrated in the case studies in 
chapters three and four, DFID has focused overwhelmingly on formal, state security forces 
such as the Republic of Sierra Leone Armed Forces (RSLAF), the Sierra Leone Police (SLP), 
the Central Intelligence and Security Unit (CISU), the Office for National Security (ONS) and 
the formal judiciary.
6
 Despite early efforts by DFID to strengthen Paramount Chiefs through 
the Chiefdom Governance Reform Programme, discussed in chapter two, this programme was 
unsuccessful in engaging with the politics and failures of the chieftaincy system, and 
ultimately was disbanded. Thus, while DFID‘s foray into SSR has certainly improved formal 
policing and justice services, especially in Freetown and urban areas, it has not fundamentally 
transformed the means by which the majority of the population access security and justice, 
nor has it comprehensively addressed the causes of the conflict. This is, at least in part, 
because they have not engaged with the informal policing and justice actors who are Sierra 
Leone‘s predominant providers and whose failures were a contributing factor that led to youth 
revolt. For instance, the chapter three case study of the Family Support Units (FSUs) as part 
of the reform of the SLP indicates that they fail to attract the majority of poor, rural women 
given the geographic, financial and cultural inaccessibility of the Units. These women thus 
continue to be policed by their local chiefs and secret societies, whose human rights records 
fall far below international standards and have not been the recipients of international reform 
efforts. Had SSR efforts recognised the importance of informal policing actors and engaged 
them in reform, more women would be able to access improved policing services. The case 
study of primary justice reform conducted by DFID‘s Justice Sector Development Programme 
(JSDP) in chapter four offers more promise of engagement with informal actors through its 
attempts to codify customary law and reform the Local Courts that administer these laws. 
Such engagement should be applauded and, as the programme is not due to finish until 2011, 
encouraged to extend their efforts further. However, the JSDP‘s engagement has been limited 
to attempts to formalise the informal and to engage only with the constitutionally legal 
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informal actors. This excludes from engagement the chieftaincy system and secret societies 
that provide a tier of justice below the Local Courts which is often the first point of call for 
many Sierra Leoneans.
7
 More could therefore be done to extend engagement to all informal 
actors, especially those who are the dominant justice providers. DFID‘s SSR efforts in Sierra 
Leone thus seemed originally incognisant of the role that the failure of informal governance 
and security architectures played in triggering the civil war and while they have managed to 
later incorporate some level of understanding through the JSDP, this has been to a limited 
degree.  
 
The fifth chapter turned to the question of why DFID is seemingly unable to engage with 
informal security actors. It began by examining the variation in levels of informal engagement 
between the case studies, suggesting that DFID‘s understandings of security and justice are 
crucial to the terms of its SSR engagements in these fields. Overwhelmingly however, both 
case studies suggested that the informal pose far greater challenges for DFID engagement 
than their state security counterparts. In examining why, the bureaucratic character and 
political commitments internal to DFID were discussed, suggesting that DFID‘s 
programmatic choices are bounded by the organisation‘s very nature. In delineating DFID‘s 
worldview, this nature renders engagement with formal state structures significantly more 
straightforward than engagement with informal actors that operate according to different 
bureaucratic and political logics. Specifically, DFID‘s bureaucratic nature and political 
commitments lead them to a view of the causes of conflict and nature of security provision in 
Sierra Leone that privileges the state. This understanding filters through DFID‘s post-conflict 
recovery response, resulting in an overwhelmingly state-centric SSR programme that leaves 
informal security actors unreformed. This restricts the ability of its SSR efforts to 
comprehensively address the thickly understood causes of conflict and sustainably transform 
security provision in Sierra Leone. These limitations bring into question DFID‘s increasing 
involvement in security tasks as development processes more broadly. In concluding, new 
directions of enquiry will be pointed to that the thesis pushes towards. Two key areas are 
suggested for further research, before highlighting the original contributions of the thesis. 
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What might engaging with state and informal security actors look like? 
This thesis has argued that addressing the causes of conflict and sustainably transforming 
security provision in Sierra Leone, requires both formal state structures and informal security 
actors be engaged in SSR. What might such a two-pronged approach to SSR look like? While 
it might seem that supporting the security sector of a centralised state would be weakened or 
contradicted by simultaneously working with informal security providers, this approach 
misunderstands the longevity of a dual system of governance, policing and justice within 
Sierra Leone and the links between chiefs and the state. While at times chiefs and state 
politicians vie for power, they are more often interwoven into a dependence on each other for 
funding, votes and access to resources.
8
 Sierra Leoneans maintain a loyalty to their chiefs 
while at the same time participating in the life of an increasingly democratic state. As Ryann 
Manning explains ‗the reality of local authority in Sierra Leone is not an antagonistic and 
mutually incompatible duality between the modern and the traditional, but a complex and 
dynamic hybrid of the two.‘9 Rather than creating a competitive security environment, then, 
reforming security provision at both the formal and informal locations would simply allow 
Sierra Leoneans in both urban and rural settings a better chance of accessing improved 
policing and justice.  
 
Efforts to understand the duality of Sierra Leonean citizenship as located in both the chiefdom 
and the state are beginning to emerge.
10
 This kind of research is an essential foundation for 
sustainable peacebuilding efforts, as it provides a more accurate, thicker account of Sierra 
Leonean practices. Understanding these practices will allow external practitioners to build a 
better picture of local authority structures, allegiances and service providers, rather than 
having to extrapolate from experiences in their often culturally distant home countries. In this 
manner, reforms can build upon practices with thick roots in society that will weather the 
political and social storms of the future better than thinly planted reforms. This thesis has 
attempted to highlight one area in which the failure to sufficiently understand local practices 
has limited the effectiveness of DFID‘s SSR programme. Further research is needed in order 
to forge a security system that meets the needs of the entire population. Given the strain that 
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formal policing and justice systems operate under, any options to alleviate this and share the 
workload (as well as the backlog) should be welcomed. With reform, there is no reason that 
informal security provision should be any more oppressive, unjust or inequitable than state 
security provision. Both systems face serious challenges and must confront legacies of past 
abuse. The improvements achieved thus far through SSR, evident within the formal system, 
are impressive and a cause for cautious optimism. Similar improvements could be made 
within their informal policing and justice counterparts if reforms were so extended. 
 
In more practical terms, a good starting place for a comprehensive approach to SSR may be to 
bring formal and informal security providers together in training exercises. Important lessons 
could be learned on both sides. This recognition has informed recent efforts within the JSDP 
to train chiefdom police (although, given the JSDP‘s looming pull-out date of 2011, it is 
unclear how widespread this training will be beyond the pilot project in Moyamba District).
11
 
What needs to be avoided is an imposition, or a perceived imposition, of ‗modern‘ (read 
Western) policing or justice practices. Rather, dialogue and exchange of ideas between the 
formal and informal, as well as international reform practitioners should be encouraged. 
Chiefs currently express frustration and anger that donor money is spent in their chiefdoms in 
a manner that they feel undermines their authority and seeks to make them irrelevant.
12
 It is 
this approach, rather than reform at both formal and informal levels, that drives a wedge 
between the two systems and creates a competitive style of policing and justice. If informal 
security actors are made to feel legitimate providers alongside the state, then they are more 
likely to enter into some kind of partnership. Opportunities for this kind of engagement need 
to be further examined. 
 
Overcoming or living with bureaucratic and political obstacles 
This thesis has demonstrated how DFID‘s ability to engage informal security actors is limited 
by its bureaucratic nature and political commitments. Can these be transcended to ensure 
better SSR in future, or are they intrinsic to DFID itself? As suggested in the fifth chapter, 
findings here indicate that DFID has thus far been unable to overcome its bureaucratic nature 
and political commitments to engage with informal security actors, even when DFID staff 
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have been aware of the benefits of doing so. Given the absolutely central role that donors play 
in implementing SSR, it is surprising that so little research has been dedicated to examining 
their impact. This is an area for much needed further research, examining the workings and 
politics of donors themselves. This thesis has laid the foundations for this new agenda by 
revealing the bureaucratic and political confines that DFID operates within. Further research, 
perhaps by way of anthropological studies of the internal workings of donors, would yield 
important insights into how their bureaucratic and political commitments interact within the 
organisation and in which sections of the organisation space might be found for developing 
new ideologies more amenable to security tasks.
13
 As Michael Barnett and Martha Finnemore 
suggest: 
 
Just as understanding how the double-helix DNA molecule is constituted materially makes 
possible causal arguments about genetics, disease, and other biological processes, so 
understanding how bureaucracies are constituted socially allows us to hypothesize about the 
behaviour of IOs [international organisations] and the effects this social form might have in 
world politics.
14
 
 
Perhaps bureaucracy is not the iron cage that Weber feared. Perhaps its shackles can be 
circumvented. Equally, the political mandates that delimit the field of practice of 
organisations like DFID might be flexible. These quandaries require that research focus not 
only on the difficult questions of operationalisation of peacebuilding strategies in specific 
country settings, but also on more rigorous examinations of how the nature of donors 
themselves determine programme outcomes. Even if research were to find that no space exists 
within DFID to forge new agency ideologies, this would assist in providing a better 
understanding of DFID‘s capabilities and limitations and thus defining the scope of its 
operations in the field. DFID is credited as being one of the most responsive development 
donors in operation and any research that can assist in keeping it on track and maximising its 
effectiveness should therefore be welcomed.
15
 Equally, research into other donors and other 
fragile contexts would make a valuable contribution to better understanding peacebuilding 
practice. 
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Contribution 
This thesis has contributed to the literatures on peacebuilding, the conflict in Sierra Leone and 
informal actors in three principal ways. First and foremost, an original contribution is made 
by revealing the limitations of a key development donor in perceiving thick understandings of 
security practices in the field. Rather than writing DFID off as an unthinking organisation that 
simply does not know about these practices, however, this thesis moves beyond such 
simplifications to highlight that limitations exist despite DFID staff being aware of and 
informed about more complex practices. Examining DFID itself and the constraints that it 
works within to explain this problem represents a novel approach within the peacebuilding 
literature.   
 
Second, while much ink has been spilt arguing about the causes of war in Sierra Leone, there 
has been no research to date that attempts to use these arguments as a basis for critiquing post-
conflict responses. It is widely accepted in the peacebuilding literature that post-conflict 
response efforts must comprehensively address the antecedents to conflict if peace and 
development are to be in any way sustainable.
16
 Examining DFID‘s lack of engagement with 
the failures of informal actors indicates that their post-conflict SSR response is likely to only 
address the state failure aspect of the causes of war in Sierra Leone. This thesis thus builds 
upon the literature surrounding the causes of war and extends it by linking these arguments to 
the success or otherwise of donor response. Critiquing the success of donors in adhering to the 
standards that they set themselves is crucial to ensuring better peacebuilding that achieves its 
purpose of establishing a sustainable and positive post-conflict peace.  
 
Finally, the thesis also provides a detailed account of some of the roles played by chiefs and 
secret societies in Sierra Leone, drawing upon fieldwork interviews as well as secondary 
research. This serves to give greater specificity to increasing discussions on informal actors 
within African security and governance.
17
 An awareness of these roles will be vital to any 
attempts to understand and reform how power and authority are exercised in post-conflict 
Sierra Leone.  Taken together, these three central contributions represent original efforts to 
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provide more empirically-grounded research of thick practices of security in Sierra Leone.  
 
Conclusion 
While the story told here is of a specific organisation doing SSR in the context of Sierra 
Leone, the findings should be insightful for other development agencies engaged in SSR in 
complex security environments. The challenges of informal security actors to SSR 
programmes have been noted in Timor-Leste,
18
 Afghanistan
19
, Iraq
20
 and the Democratic 
Republic of the Congo
21
 – to name but a few. The prevalence of this problem across diverse 
contexts suggests that unpacking how these actors can be engaged or why they cannot, will be 
of crucial importance in honing our post-conflict peacebuilding devices. This is particularly 
relevant as development agencies increasingly become involved in security tasks, such as 
SSR. While it is comforting to believe that development organisations are uniquely placed to 
focus reforms on enabling the security sector to contribute to broader developmental goals, 
the practicability of such tasks needs serious consideration. As the case of DFID in Sierra 
Leone attests, development organisations might be limited by their political mandate and 
bureaucratic nature in engaging with the kinds of actors that often provide security in weakly 
state-governed contexts. Reforming the actors who have been powerful and/or coercive 
enough to maintain control over people throughout an appallingly brutal political history in 
Sierra Leone was never going to be an appealing or straightforward task. I do not want to 
suggest that this means SSR should be conducted solely by defence departments and security 
forces, but the practicable role of development organisations should be considered in light of 
what will provide the best possible security for the most people in any given country.  
 
This is not to suggest that DFID should merely strengthen informal governance mechanisms 
to reinstate the pre-war power configurations, merely recreating the conditions for conflict.
22
 
This approach was tried by DFID through the Chiefdom Governance Reform Programme, and 
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failed.
23
 Rather, it is argued that the war occurred due to failures in both state and non-state 
governance structures, and thus both need reforming to comprehensively address the causes of 
conflict and ensure a sustainable peace. DFID has recognised this in regard to the state and 
has launched reform programmes accordingly. Yet their liberal bureaucratic nature has made 
the same reform efforts vis-à-vis informal actors problematic. This thesis should be taken as a 
prompt for serious conversation about what role informal governance mechanisms can play in 
contemporary politics and security and the role of development agencies in shaping them. In 
many places, the liberal bureaucratic model of state administration has been circumvented, 
undermined, failed, or never really existed in the first place. Further research into what hybrid 
political orders might look like is needed.  
 
If development agencies are not able to engage with the thorny and morally dubious actors 
that are involved in security provision, or even those actors who merely operate according to 
non-bureaucratic processes, then the nature of their contribution to SSR needs to be 
reappraised. It is all well and good to hope that, over time, fealty towards informal security 
providers will weaken, as state security forces improve. Yet there is little precedent in Sierra 
Leone, or Africa more broadly, to suggest that this shift will occur, as evidenced by the 
growing literature on the continuing role of informal institutions in African governance.24 
Practitioners may well need to put their hopes for a legal-rational, Weberian state on the 
backburner and focus in the meantime on improving the kinds of states that actually exist in 
Africa. Helene Kyed and Lars Buur describe the fear of some practitioners: 
 
The fear of the sceptics is that the gains promised by democracy with regard to equity, human 
rights, and gender equality will be lost if the rudder of development and governance is handed 
over to an indeterminate huddle of unelected patriarchal leaders in the name of efficient, 
localised governance, cultural diversity, and the inclusion of local communities.
25
  
 
Yet, as they go on to argue, this is what already exists, to varying degrees in many places. To 
engage with this form of governance is merely to recognise already lived realities. This reality 
                                                 
23
 Author interviews with Mark White, West Africa Regional Conflict Advisor, DFID (former Security Sector 
Reform Advisor and former Programme Manager for Security Sector Reform and Justice Sector Development 
Programmes in Sierra Leone, DFID), 16 October 2008; and Garth Glentworth, Senior Governance Advisor, 
DFID, 17 October 2008. 
24
 Buur and Kyed eds., State Recognition and Democratisation in Sub-Saharan Africa; Vaughan ed., Tradition 
and Politics; Andersen, Møller and Stepputat eds., Fragile States and Insecure People?; Bruce Baker, ―Post-
Settlement Governance Programmes: What is Being Built in Africa?,‖ in Ending Africa‘s Wars, eds. Oliver 
Furley and Roy May (Aldershot: Ashgate, 2006), 31-46; G. Blundo and J-P Olivier de Sardan, Everyday 
Corruption and the State (London: Zed Books, 2006). 
25
 Kyed and Buur, ―Introduction: Traditional Authority and Democratisation in Africa,‖ 11. 
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in Sierra Leone is a weak but resilient state that exists alongside many equally resilient 
‗twilight institutions‘26 that exercise authority over the day to day affairs of people‘s lives. 
Not only are both of these responsible for dispensing security and justice in Sierra Leone, but 
it was also the failure of both that precipitated the civil war. Addressing the causes of conflict 
and improving security and justice for Sierra Leoneans means engaging both and finding the 
appropriate donors willing and able to do so. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
26
 Christian Lund, Twilight Institutions (Oxford: Blackwell, 2007). 
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